{"title":"Do Co-opted Boards Affect the Financial Performance of Insurance Firms?","authors":"Michael Adams, Zafeira Kastrinaki","doi":"10.1007/s10693-023-00418-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine the performance-effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) co-opted boards in United Kingdom (UK) property-casualty insurers. We report that board insiders appointed in the aftermath of CEO succession reduce profitability, but bolster solvency. Enhanced solvency also results when the CEO is a financial expert and when proportionately more inside directors are selected by a CEO who is a financial expert. We further find enhanced profitability-effects for insurance experienced co-opted outside directors, while large investors improve solvency. However, the internal or external origin of the CEO does not affect financial outcomes. We consider that our results could have commercial and/or public policy implications.","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Services Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-023-00418-2","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract We examine the performance-effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) co-opted boards in United Kingdom (UK) property-casualty insurers. We report that board insiders appointed in the aftermath of CEO succession reduce profitability, but bolster solvency. Enhanced solvency also results when the CEO is a financial expert and when proportionately more inside directors are selected by a CEO who is a financial expert. We further find enhanced profitability-effects for insurance experienced co-opted outside directors, while large investors improve solvency. However, the internal or external origin of the CEO does not affect financial outcomes. We consider that our results could have commercial and/or public policy implications.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial Services Research publishes high quality empirical and theoretical research on the demand, supply, regulation, and pricing of financial services. Financial services are broadly defined to include banking, risk management, capital markets, mutual funds, insurance, venture capital, consumer and corporate finance, and the technologies used to produce, distribute, and regulate these services. Macro-financial policy issues, including comparative financial systems, the globalization of financial services, and the impact of these phenomena on economic growth and financial stability, are also within the JFSR’s scope of interest. The Journal seeks to promote research that enriches the profession’s understanding of financial services industries, to elevate industry and product efficiencies, as well as to inform the debate and promote the formulation of sound public policies. Officially cited as: J Financ Serv Res
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