Journal of Financial Services Research最新文献

I study how bank relationships affected the timing and geographic distribution of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) lending. Half of banks’ PPP loans went to borrowers within two miles of a branch, mostly driven by relationship lending. Firms near less active lenders shifted to fintechs and other distant lenders, resulting in delays receiving credit but only slightly lower loan volumes. I estimate a structural model to fit the observed relationship between branch distance, bank PPP activity, and origination timing. I find that banks served relationship borrowers five to nine days before other borrowers, an effect in line with reduced-form estimates using a sample of PPP borrowers with previous SBA lending relationships.

This paper examines lessons from the previously unconventional monetary policy measures deployed since the Global Financial Crisis and the emerging evidence on policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. The Bank of England’s quantitative easing (QE) response to the Covid-19 shock was both large in scale and rapid in pace. The QE response also occurred against the backdrop of heightened market dysfunction, suggesting a particular form of ‘state contingency’ of QE. The paper considers some potential implications of this state contingency for future central bank balance sheet policies and the operational framework to support them.

This paper identifies banks born with a digital business model (‘neobanks’) and examines their performance and riskiness vis-à-vis traditional peers. We propose a novel approach to identify neobanks, based on non-financial hand-collected data, and identify 65 neobanks operating in Europe. We show that neobanks perform worse than their traditional peers, while recording a similar level of risk. Namely, neobanks charge higher interest income, record higher impairment charges, and face higher non-staff expenses. Further analysis suggests the presence of economies of scale and scope in digital banking. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns and changes to our baseline specification.

In this paper, we examine the influence of owner guarantees on loan rates. Other studies on the influence of business collateral have used survey and credit register data to establish this link. They support it with the pre-lending information theory and post-lending incentive theory and find that the latter predominates the former. Thus, we measure observed and unobserved risks on bank lending spreads negotiated over the counter to show the co-existence of both theories. The main findings and robustness tests show that owner guarantees reduce bank lending spreads for safe but not risky firms, supporting the pre-lending information theory rather than the post-lending incentive theory. These findings underscore the role of owner guarantees in allaying the information problems the bank confronts prior to lending.

We study how the misvaluation of banks affects their loan supply by considering proprietary data on 83 banks from 11 euro-area countries from 2010Q1 to 2019Q4. We measure bank market value by the Tobin’s Q and identify the impact of nonfundamental changes in bank market value by saturating our specifications with observable bank fundamentals and analyst forecasts on future bank performance as well as several fixed effects. We show that nonfundamental rises in market value lead a bank to increase its loan supply to firms and households, even when the bank’s capital structure constraint is not binding. Our findings are consistent with a mechanism in which bank managers cater to the misperceptions of stock market investors.

We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.

Abstract

Global systemically important banks (GSIBs) are subject to capital surcharges that increase with systemic importance indicators. We show that U.S. GSIBs lower their surcharges to a large extent by reducing one indicator—the notional amount of over-the-counter derivatives—in the fourth quarter of each year, the quarter that determines surcharges. This seasonal drop is stronger at GSIBs than at other banks, it increased after GSIB surcharges were introduced, and it is largely driven by interest rate swaps. We discuss implications of these results for the design of systemic importance indicators.

This paper identifies a contemporaneous substitutional relationship between retail deposits and wholesale funds, while the lagged relationship between the two is rather weak-a finding consistent with our “stable capitalization hypothesis.” We find that this substitution effect is much more pronounced for banks facing retail deposit inflows compared to those facing outflows, suggesting that influxes of deposits allow banks to cut wholesale funding more aggressively to maintain their capital structures. This substitution effect is also negatively associated with wholesale funding maturity and riskiness. Furthermore, we show that the substitutional relationship is weaker during funding shocks such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis and that the substitution itself does not help banks maintain their lending, which supports the argument for a lender of last resort. Finally, we demonstrate that liquidity regulation curbs this substitution, which overall helps banks improve financial stability.