Signing Blank Checks: The Roles of Disclosure and Reputation in the Face of Limited Information

Andrea Pawliczek, A. Nicole Skinner, Sarah L. C. Zechman
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Abstract

ABSTRACT We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or “blank check” companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why investors invest. Although disclosure is important in traditional IPOs, the underlying information available differs for SPACs. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests disclosures are useful to SPAC investors, although differently than for traditional IPO investors. We also examine manager reputation and find prior SPAC or CEO experience and celebrity status are associated with funds raised. Even when an investment lacks commercial substance, disclosure and reputation are important for investing decisions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G24; G34; M41; M50.
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签署空白支票:信息有限时信息披露和声誉的作用
摘要本文研究了在投资背后没有商业实体的情况下,信息披露和经理人声誉如何影响募集资金。特殊目的收购公司(spac或“空白支票”公司)在IPO时没有业务或实质性资产,但承诺通常在两年内用筹集的资金收购一家私人公司。由于缺乏商业实质,且历来业绩不佳,目前尚不清楚SPACs在IPO时披露了哪些信息,以及投资者为何投资。尽管披露在传统的ipo中很重要,但在SPACs中可获得的基础信息有所不同。尽管如此,我们的证据表明,信息披露对SPAC投资者是有用的,尽管与传统的IPO投资者不同。我们还考察了经理的声誉,发现之前的SPAC或CEO经验和名人地位与筹集的资金有关。即使一项投资缺乏商业实质,信息披露和声誉对投资决策也很重要。数据可用性:数据可从文本中引用的公共来源获得。JEL分类:G24;G34;M41;M50。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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