Calling for transparency: Evidence from a field experiment

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101604
T.J. Wong , Gwen Yu , Shubo Zhang , Tianyu Zhang
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Abstract

We examine how firms respond to requests for enhanced disclosure that we make on an online investor platform. Exploiting variation in firms' customer and supplier disclosures, we ask a randomized set of non-disclosing firms to provide information on their customers' and suppliers' identities. We find that the firms' probability of disclosure depends on the basis we give for the demand—requests appealing to disclosure's usefulness to investors lead to more frequent disclosure, while those appealing to regulators' preference for disclosure lead to less frequent disclosure. The requests we make on the platform lead to more frequent customer- and supplier-related inquiries from other platform users. We also find that the treatment firms' disclosure of customer and supplier information improves in the next period's regulatory filings. The findings suggest that investor platforms can enhance corporate transparency by increasing retail investors' ability to demand information.

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呼吁透明度:来自实地实验的证据
我们研究了企业如何回应我们在在线投资者平台上提出的加强信息披露的要求。利用企业在客户和供应商信息披露方面的差异,我们随机要求一组不披露信息的企业提供其客户和供应商的身份信息。我们发现,企业披露信息的概率取决于我们提出要求的依据--以信息披露对投资者的有用性为出发点的要求会导致更频繁的信息披露,而以监管者对信息披露的偏好为出发点的要求则会导致较少的信息披露。我们在平台上提出的要求导致其他平台用户更频繁地提出与客户和供应商相关的询问。我们还发现,接受处理的公司在下一期监管文件中对客户和供应商信息的披露有所改善。研究结果表明,投资者平台可以通过提高散户投资者的信息需求能力来提高企业透明度。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
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