The Dark Side of Insurance

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-23 DOI:10.1515/rle-2022-0054
Ronen Avraham, Ariel Porat
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Abstract

Abstract When insurance works properly it provides insureds with optimal incentives to prevent losses, alongside coverage for losses that could not be prevented efficiently. But insurance has an overlooked dark side to it as well. Insurers employ various tactics to shift losses to their insureds or to their victims in order to minimize their own costs instead of reducing their insureds’ losses. Worse, insurers might also act to increase or maintain long term risks, ensuring the future of the insurance business that can’t exist without risks. We focus on the incentives of insurers to engage in anti-competitive practices and trigger harmful behaviors of their insureds or third parties, in order to increase demand for insurance coverage. Policymakers should be aware and critical of insurers’ perverse incentives that counteract the interests of the insureds and society.
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保险的阴暗面
当保险正常运作时,它为被保险人提供了防止损失的最佳激励,以及对无法有效预防的损失的覆盖。但保险也有被忽视的阴暗面。保险公司采用各种策略将损失转移到被保险人或受害者身上,以尽量减少自己的成本,而不是减少被保险人的损失。更糟糕的是,保险公司还可能采取行动增加或维持长期风险,以确保没有风险的保险业务的未来。我们重点关注保险公司从事反竞争行为的动机,并引发其被保险人或第三方的有害行为,以增加对保险范围的需求。政策制定者应该意识到并批评保险公司违背被保险人和社会利益的不当激励措施。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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