Abstract The impartiality and apolitical nature of the American judiciary are key to its legitimacy and the liberal constitutional legal system it supports. Though less than 1 % of U.S. Federal judges admit to political motivations for retirement or resignation, our research suggests these influences are more widespread. Examining data from 1802 to 2019, we found 11 % of retirements and 23 % of resignations from the U.S. Courts of Appeals may be linked to political cycles. Judges are less likely to retire before a Presidential election when the President is from a different party than their appointing party, and more likely to resign after the election if the President is from their appointing party. These politically motivated exits have grown, accounting for 14 % of retirements since 1975, which points to a more politically charged and polarized judiciary. Previous studies relying on self-reports or annual analyses have missed these political dynamics in judges’ departure timing. Our quarter-to-election level analysis reveals that significant decisions by Federal judges may often be influenced by unconscious bias or conscious partisan loyalty, both of which challenge the idea of judicial neutrality and the common law precedents judges must uphold. Our findings support growing concerns about undemocratic political power being exercised through the courts, giving rise to juristocracy – the practice of engaging in politics under the guise of legal proceedings.
{"title":"The Disavowal of Decisionism: Politically Motivated Exits from the U.S. Courts of Appeals","authors":"Daniel L. Chen, Eric Reinhart","doi":"10.1515/rle-2024-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2024-0044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The impartiality and apolitical nature of the American judiciary are key to its legitimacy and the liberal constitutional legal system it supports. Though less than 1 % of U.S. Federal judges admit to political motivations for retirement or resignation, our research suggests these influences are more widespread. Examining data from 1802 to 2019, we found 11 % of retirements and 23 % of resignations from the U.S. Courts of Appeals may be linked to political cycles. Judges are less likely to retire before a Presidential election when the President is from a different party than their appointing party, and more likely to resign after the election if the President is from their appointing party. These politically motivated exits have grown, accounting for 14 % of retirements since 1975, which points to a more politically charged and polarized judiciary. Previous studies relying on self-reports or annual analyses have missed these political dynamics in judges’ departure timing. Our quarter-to-election level analysis reveals that significant decisions by Federal judges may often be influenced by unconscious bias or conscious partisan loyalty, both of which challenge the idea of judicial neutrality and the common law precedents judges must uphold. Our findings support growing concerns about undemocratic political power being exercised through the courts, giving rise to juristocracy – the practice of engaging in politics under the guise of legal proceedings.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141667757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Peltzman effect posits that implementing safety measures incentivizes agents to reduce their effort to a degree where these measures become counterproductive. This paper emphasizes the significance of including the agent’s type (skills, attributes) when analyzing the effectiveness of safety measures. Using data from iRacing, an online racing simulator, we find that the detection of the Peltzman effect is solely attributed to the omitted variable bias; specifically, the omission of a variable capturing the agent’s type. Additionally, our data demonstrates that enhancing types (increasing skills) leads to safety improvements.
{"title":"Unraveling the Peltzman Effect: The Significance of Agent’s Type","authors":"Konrad Grabiszewski, A. Horenstein","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0072","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Peltzman effect posits that implementing safety measures incentivizes agents to reduce their effort to a degree where these measures become counterproductive. This paper emphasizes the significance of including the agent’s type (skills, attributes) when analyzing the effectiveness of safety measures. Using data from iRacing, an online racing simulator, we find that the detection of the Peltzman effect is solely attributed to the omitted variable bias; specifically, the omission of a variable capturing the agent’s type. Additionally, our data demonstrates that enhancing types (increasing skills) leads to safety improvements.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139249951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper empirically investigates the impact of broadband diffusion on crime. I employ state-level data on high-speed Internet penetration and criminal activity in the United States from 2000 to 2012. To tackle the endogeneity of broadband diffusion, I rely on a set of technologically motivated instrumental variables. The outcomes show that the impact of high-speed Internet diffusion on crime is negative and it is not significant for more severe offenses. Concerning the underlying mechanism, I find support for the hypothesis that the broadband-driven crime reduction occurs through a voluntary incapacitation effect, as people change their leisure time allocation by spending more time at home and off the streets. This in turn reduces the availability of criminal opportunities – and crime levels. Finally, my results suggest that the voluntary incapacitation effect concerns both sides of criminal interactions.
{"title":"Broadband Internet and Crime","authors":"Ilaria Masiero","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper empirically investigates the impact of broadband diffusion on crime. I employ state-level data on high-speed Internet penetration and criminal activity in the United States from 2000 to 2012. To tackle the endogeneity of broadband diffusion, I rely on a set of technologically motivated instrumental variables. The outcomes show that the impact of high-speed Internet diffusion on crime is negative and it is not significant for more severe offenses. Concerning the underlying mechanism, I find support for the hypothesis that the broadband-driven crime reduction occurs through a voluntary incapacitation effect, as people change their leisure time allocation by spending more time at home and off the streets. This in turn reduces the availability of criminal opportunities – and crime levels. Finally, my results suggest that the voluntary incapacitation effect concerns both sides of criminal interactions.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139248843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract When a victim loses property due to an injurer’s wrongful act, it must be decided whether the damages award should include the sales taxes associated with the lost property’s replacement. This is especially acute when the victim can make other use of the damages award than replacement. This paper compares regimes that differ in how they treat sales taxes, focusing on possible distortions of consumption and care choices. We find that regimes that include sales taxes in damages awards only when incurred to replace the lost property (as, for instance, the German Civil Code does) induce suboptimal consumption and care incentives. Distortions of care incentives also depend on the nature of care expenditures (monetary or non-monetary).
{"title":"On the Role of Sales Taxes for Efficient Compensation of Property Loss Under Strict Liability","authors":"F. Baumann, Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When a victim loses property due to an injurer’s wrongful act, it must be decided whether the damages award should include the sales taxes associated with the lost property’s replacement. This is especially acute when the victim can make other use of the damages award than replacement. This paper compares regimes that differ in how they treat sales taxes, focusing on possible distortions of consumption and care choices. We find that regimes that include sales taxes in damages awards only when incurred to replace the lost property (as, for instance, the German Civil Code does) induce suboptimal consumption and care incentives. Distortions of care incentives also depend on the nature of care expenditures (monetary or non-monetary).","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139247384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract From 2003 to 2018, all 50 states and the District of Columbia enacted breach notification laws (BNLs) mandating that firms suffering data breaches provide timely notification to affected persons and others about breach incidents and mitigation responses. BNLs were supposed to decrease data breaches and develop a market for data privacy where firms could strike their preferred balance between data security quality and cost. We find no systemic evidence for either supposition. Results from two-way difference-in-difference analyses indicate no decrease in data breach incident counts or magnitudes after BNLs are enacted. Results also indicate no longer-term decrease in data misuse after breaches. These non-effects appear to be precisely estimated nulls that persist for different firms, time-periods, data-breach types, and BNL types. Apparently inconsistent notification standards and inadequate information dissemination to the public may explain BNL ineffectiveness. An alternative federal regime may address these shortcomings and let a national BNL achieve goals state BNLs have apparently failed to meet.
{"title":"Do US State Breach Notification Laws Decrease Firm Data Breaches?","authors":"Paul M. Vaaler, Brad Greenwood","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract From 2003 to 2018, all 50 states and the District of Columbia enacted breach notification laws (BNLs) mandating that firms suffering data breaches provide timely notification to affected persons and others about breach incidents and mitigation responses. BNLs were supposed to decrease data breaches and develop a market for data privacy where firms could strike their preferred balance between data security quality and cost. We find no systemic evidence for either supposition. Results from two-way difference-in-difference analyses indicate no decrease in data breach incident counts or magnitudes after BNLs are enacted. Results also indicate no longer-term decrease in data misuse after breaches. These non-effects appear to be precisely estimated nulls that persist for different firms, time-periods, data-breach types, and BNL types. Apparently inconsistent notification standards and inadequate information dissemination to the public may explain BNL ineffectiveness. An alternative federal regime may address these shortcomings and let a national BNL achieve goals state BNLs have apparently failed to meet.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139298778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract One of the most vexing problems in privacy policy is identifying consumer harm from unwanted observation; because it is highly subjective and is likely to vary greatly throughout the population, it doesn’t lend itself to easy measurement. Yet, these types of situations increasingly are the focal point of privacy policy discussions, including the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding standing and the FTC’s recently announced commercial surveillance rulemaking. The primary approach to attempt to quantify subjective harms has been to measure consumers’ willingness to exchange personal data for money in an experimental setting. This study takes a different tack, using field data to measure actual consumer response to a real-world reduction in the anonymity of online search. In March 2012, Google began to combine user information across platforms. To the extent that Google’s policy change reduced the anonymity associated with Google search, it may have diminished incentives to search sensitive topics. Using Google Trends (GT) data and a difference-in-difference estimator with top non-sensitive search terms as the control group, the results suggest that there was a 3–7 % short-term (1–2 months) reduction in sensitive search (relative to the non-sensitive search control group), as measured by GT. I examine heterogenous treatment effects, and find that the largest measured impact is for health-related search. There is no measured difference in reaction between high- and low-privacy demand states.
{"title":"Anonymity and Online Search: Measuring the Privacy Impact Of Google’s 2012 Privacy Policy Change","authors":"James C. Cooper","doi":"10.1515/rle-2023-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the most vexing problems in privacy policy is identifying consumer harm from unwanted observation; because it is highly subjective and is likely to vary greatly throughout the population, it doesn’t lend itself to easy measurement. Yet, these types of situations increasingly are the focal point of privacy policy discussions, including the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding standing and the FTC’s recently announced commercial surveillance rulemaking. The primary approach to attempt to quantify subjective harms has been to measure consumers’ willingness to exchange personal data for money in an experimental setting. This study takes a different tack, using field data to measure actual consumer response to a real-world reduction in the anonymity of online search. In March 2012, Google began to combine user information across platforms. To the extent that Google’s policy change reduced the anonymity associated with Google search, it may have diminished incentives to search sensitive topics. Using Google Trends (GT) data and a difference-in-difference estimator with top non-sensitive search terms as the control group, the results suggest that there was a 3–7 % short-term (1–2 months) reduction in sensitive search (relative to the non-sensitive search control group), as measured by GT. I examine heterogenous treatment effects, and find that the largest measured impact is for health-related search. There is no measured difference in reaction between high- and low-privacy demand states.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139301362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract It is difficult to overestimate the importance of protecting the rights and freedoms of entrepreneurs in a market economy – they are necessary “tools” and a driving force in the market relations that expand a country’s gross domestic product, and as such should be directly involved in the socio-economic policy of the state. Due to a historical absence of the specialised legal means and procedural tools required to ensure the effective security and protection of the rights of entrepreneurs, Kazakh legislators have carefully studied examples from other countries to develop their own legislation relating to profit-making entrepreneurial activities during the early stages of the post-independent development of Kazakhstan. In this way, licensing processes, protections for entrepreneurs from unreasonable inspections and abuse of power by the authorities, the creation of special organisations to protect entrepreneur’s rights, and a reduction in the number of administrative barriers in practice were all consolidated and codified into the regulatory structure. All the above allowed the authors to highlight the main purpose of this study – a comprehensive systemic study of the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of entrepreneurs in socio-economic, political, and legal relations (as exemplified by the Republic of Kazakhstan). The main and practically significant results were obtained by employing both theoretical and methodological analysis of scientific publications covering the issues of legal security and the protection of entrpreneurial rights and freedoms at the national and international levels, as well as tools of comparative legal, comparative political, systemic and structural analysis, value-statutory and institutional methods, and content analysis of statistical data and official documents. This paper constitutes a study of a scientific and recommendatory legal and socio-political nature, which has unconditional practical significance, originality in clarifying certain issues, and is aimed at a broad study of the essential aspects of the legal protection of entrepreneurial activity in modern Kazakhstan. We recognize that the subject considered in this paper is promising for further scientific elaboration and detailing of certain points, which have been superficially touched upon in this study.
{"title":"Legal Framework for the Protection of Entrepreneurs’ Rights","authors":"Nariman Suleimenov, Bakhytbek Begaliyev, Yernar Begaliyev, Almaz Yechshanov, Bulatbek Shnarbayev","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is difficult to overestimate the importance of protecting the rights and freedoms of entrepreneurs in a market economy – they are necessary “tools” and a driving force in the market relations that expand a country’s gross domestic product, and as such should be directly involved in the socio-economic policy of the state. Due to a historical absence of the specialised legal means and procedural tools required to ensure the effective security and protection of the rights of entrepreneurs, Kazakh legislators have carefully studied examples from other countries to develop their own legislation relating to profit-making entrepreneurial activities during the early stages of the post-independent development of Kazakhstan. In this way, licensing processes, protections for entrepreneurs from unreasonable inspections and abuse of power by the authorities, the creation of special organisations to protect entrepreneur’s rights, and a reduction in the number of administrative barriers in practice were all consolidated and codified into the regulatory structure. All the above allowed the authors to highlight the main purpose of this study – a comprehensive systemic study of the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of entrepreneurs in socio-economic, political, and legal relations (as exemplified by the Republic of Kazakhstan). The main and practically significant results were obtained by employing both theoretical and methodological analysis of scientific publications covering the issues of legal security and the protection of entrpreneurial rights and freedoms at the national and international levels, as well as tools of comparative legal, comparative political, systemic and structural analysis, value-statutory and institutional methods, and content analysis of statistical data and official documents. This paper constitutes a study of a scientific and recommendatory legal and socio-political nature, which has unconditional practical significance, originality in clarifying certain issues, and is aimed at a broad study of the essential aspects of the legal protection of entrepreneurial activity in modern Kazakhstan. We recognize that the subject considered in this paper is promising for further scientific elaboration and detailing of certain points, which have been superficially touched upon in this study.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136059225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper analyses possibilities for amending the withdrawal right under the EU consumer law, aiming to reduce the information asymmetry between contracting parties in distance sales and thus increase the number of concluded contracts and the overall contractual surplus. The main findings are that the rules suggested in law and economics theory (the personalized mandatory rules and the mandated-choice model) may not be optimal tools for amending the withdrawal right because they mostly seem to neglect the allocation of risk between contracting parties. Thus, this paper suggests the new ‘risk allocation’ rules as a tool for amending the withdrawal right, focusing on its use in distance sales. If amended in line with those rules, the withdrawal right could deal with information asymmetry problems more efficiently, incentivise contracting parties to enter more distance sales contracts, and increase the overall contractual surplus, especially within the realms of e-commerce. The suggested proposal is conceived – at least for the time being – more as a thought experiment; relevant empirical analysis may follow up at a subsequent phase.
{"title":"Law and Economics of the Withdrawal Right in EU Consumer Law","authors":"Antonios Karampatzos, Nikola Ilić","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0076","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper analyses possibilities for amending the withdrawal right under the EU consumer law, aiming to reduce the information asymmetry between contracting parties in distance sales and thus increase the number of concluded contracts and the overall contractual surplus. The main findings are that the rules suggested in law and economics theory (the personalized mandatory rules and the mandated-choice model) may not be optimal tools for amending the withdrawal right because they mostly seem to neglect the allocation of risk between contracting parties. Thus, this paper suggests the new ‘risk allocation’ rules as a tool for amending the withdrawal right, focusing on its use in distance sales. If amended in line with those rules, the withdrawal right could deal with information asymmetry problems more efficiently, incentivise contracting parties to enter more distance sales contracts, and increase the overall contractual surplus, especially within the realms of e-commerce. The suggested proposal is conceived – at least for the time being – more as a thought experiment; relevant empirical analysis may follow up at a subsequent phase.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134990995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines when firms face random demand fluctuations. Collusive firms can choose to alternate collusive periods with more competitive periods: such an intermittent strategy can be implemented particularly if demand variability is high. Firms then set competitive prices during recessions to cancel the risk of cartel detection and keep the ability to cartelize for the future. If the maximum fine is too low to fully deter cartels, the antitrust authority can influence the choice of collusive agreement by varying the level of fines according to demand states. If the demand is highly variable, the antitrust authority may induce firms to collude in all demand states (by decreasing the fine during recessions), in order to detect and break up cartels more easily. On the other hand, if the demand variability is low the optimal policy may be to reduce the fine when demand is high.
{"title":"Intermittent Collusive Agreements: Antitrust Policy and Business Cycles","authors":"Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines when firms face random demand fluctuations. Collusive firms can choose to alternate collusive periods with more competitive periods: such an intermittent strategy can be implemented particularly if demand variability is high. Firms then set competitive prices during recessions to cancel the risk of cartel detection and keep the ability to cartelize for the future. If the maximum fine is too low to fully deter cartels, the antitrust authority can influence the choice of collusive agreement by varying the level of fines according to demand states. If the demand is highly variable, the antitrust authority may induce firms to collude in all demand states (by decreasing the fine during recessions), in order to detect and break up cartels more easily. On the other hand, if the demand variability is low the optimal policy may be to reduce the fine when demand is high.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135824993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Recent evidence suggests that legal marijuana markets in several U.S. states have decreased violence in Mexican-U.S. border regions. As legal markets for production and distribution displace drug cartel distribution, the violence associated with cartel trafficking and distribution decreases. Prior analysis has not considered an important emerging innovation for drug distribution: online anonymous marketplaces. The increasing volume of drug trade that has occurred on this “Dark Web” could result in reduced drug cartel violence as production and distribution use this substitute network and turn away from the cartel distribution networks. This paper investigates the relationship between border violence and the volume of drug trade that occurs on the Dark Web using a difference in differences model. We examine differences in crime rates at the U.S.-Mexico border and away from the border during the emergence of the Dark Web. Data on Dark Web transactions, users, and markets allows us to measure changes in Dark Web activity and the subsequent impact on crime. We find evidence that the rise in Dark Web marketplaces results in crime reductions at the border of the U.S., relative to non-border counties.
{"title":"Dark Web Drug Markets and Cartel Crime","authors":"Brian Meehan, Nicholas Farmer","doi":"10.1515/rle-2022-0069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0069","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent evidence suggests that legal marijuana markets in several U.S. states have decreased violence in Mexican-U.S. border regions. As legal markets for production and distribution displace drug cartel distribution, the violence associated with cartel trafficking and distribution decreases. Prior analysis has not considered an important emerging innovation for drug distribution: online anonymous marketplaces. The increasing volume of drug trade that has occurred on this “Dark Web” could result in reduced drug cartel violence as production and distribution use this substitute network and turn away from the cartel distribution networks. This paper investigates the relationship between border violence and the volume of drug trade that occurs on the Dark Web using a difference in differences model. We examine differences in crime rates at the U.S.-Mexico border and away from the border during the emergence of the Dark Web. Data on Dark Web transactions, users, and markets allows us to measure changes in Dark Web activity and the subsequent impact on crime. We find evidence that the rise in Dark Web marketplaces results in crime reductions at the border of the U.S., relative to non-border counties.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135830424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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