Introduction: Diplomacy and Ambiguity—Constructing Interests in Cooperation

Abstract

Introduction:Diplomacy and Ambiguity—Constructing Interests in Cooperation Wesley Widmaier (bio), Mathew Davies (bio), Lorraine Elliott (bio), Ralf Emmers (bio), Natasha Hamilton-Hart (bio), Wenting He (bio), Beverley Loke (bio), and Susan Park (bio) [End Page 1] "Diplomacy requires constant adjustment to changing circumstance; it must leave a margin for the unexpected; the unpredictable is what always happens in foreign affairs. Nuance, flexibility, and sometimes ambiguity are the tools of diplomacy." Henry Kissinger1 Scholars and practitioners of Asian diplomacy are well acquainted with notions of "constructive ambiguity," a concept associated most prominently with U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Indeed, Kissinger's use of ambiguous language—capable of being interpreted in a range of fashions—enabled what was arguably the most important geopolitical shift of the past half-century.2 Specifically, the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, issued by the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of [End Page 2] China (PRC), saw the United States affirm "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."3 By expressing U.S. views in this fashion, Kissinger elided disagreements over who might govern the "one China" and enabled the United States and the PRC to establish a de facto partnership opposing Soviet influence in Asia. This ambiguity also served to instill a degree of caution in the PRC and Taiwanese governments, leaving U.S. policy regarding any conflict opaque. Even as Kissinger should be faulted for pursuing an amoral realism in regional contexts, his pragmatic courting of interpretive "slack" enabled an era of geopolitical stability. Indeed, one might argue more broadly that key elements of the wider rules-based international order that arose after World War II were themselves based in a pragmatic acceptance of ambiguity, as such ambiguity might ease the process of responding to shifts in security and economic "fundamentals." For example, in place of the classical gold standard that had exacerbated deflationary pressures over the interwar decades, the fixed exchange rates of the Keynesian Bretton Woods framework had a normative component, reflecting a shared commitment to cooperation in pursuit of increased demand and growth. Even where it was recognized that a "fundamental disequilibrium" might compel devaluation, this criterion itself remained ambiguous, providing policymakers a zone of discretion in efforts to maintain growth.4 In this way, policymakers sought less to eliminate ambiguities than to manage them in ways that could buffer security or economic pressures. Nevertheless, such possibilities for the use of constructive ambiguity have been increasingly overlooked in recent decades. Rather than manage ambiguities, policymakers have sought to promote clarity and transparency in a way that can limit or eliminate the scope for interpretive nuance.5 Consider the change in approach to U.S.-China relations from Kissinger to President Joe Biden as the Biden administration has moved away [End Page 3] from long-standing ambiguity regarding U.S. intervention in a potential cross-strait conflict to a policy marked by increasingly clear alignment with Taiwan.6 The absence of ambiguity and uncertainty may lead to misplaced certainties and excessive risk-taking, making conflict more likely. Likewise, post–Cold War economic policymakers have seen transparency as the key to market stability. For example, former U.S. Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan recalled that the postwar Federal Reserve had "sought to foster highly liquid debt markets through the use of what we called constructive ambiguity," on the grounds that "markets uncertain as to the direction of interest rates would create a desired large buffer of both bids and offers."7 Departing from that view by the early 1990s, however, Greenspan argued that clarity would enable "market participants…to anticipate the Federal Reserve's future moves…[thereby] stabilizing the debt markets."8 Such expectations would, of course, be set back by the 2007–9 global financial crisis, demonstrating the risks that misplaced market and policy certainty might fuel contagion and self-reinforcing crisis. To be sure, none of this is to suggest that there are not conditions under which clarity may have advantages. Indeed, as Jacqueline Best has noted, "too much ambiguity can be destabilizing," given that there is no...