Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success

Abstract

Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success Sameer Lalwani (bio) As India rises in economic and geopolitical stature, it has sought to cultivate an image of a leading power with multialigned dexterity. In a year where India helms the G-20 presidency, champions the global South, caucuses with the G-7, assumes leadership roles in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Quad, and deepens strategic ties with the United States while steadily maintaining defense relations with Russia, one might ascribe Indian foreign policy with a Bismarckian level of skill and sophistication. And while this could be a reasonable assessment, Rajesh Basrur's thoroughly researched contribution to neoclassical realist theory, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, reveals serious shortcomings in Indian foreign policy over the past two decades of India's rise. He terms these faults "drift," and it is this Indian foreign policy drift—at times timidity, at times torpor—that Basrur seeks to critique and explain. Briefly summarized, Basrur seeks to explain the dependent variable of India's foreign policy drift—the delta between New Delhi's stated foreign policy aims and its actual choices. Drift is characterized as indecisiveness and treated as generally, though not exclusively, suboptimal behavior. It fits well within similar research on puzzling state behavior such as "underbalancing" or neutrality.1 Basrur distinguishes drift from paralysis, noting that there is movement, but it is "erratic, slow, and uncertain" (p. 8). He contends there are two sources of drift. Involuntary drift is when domestic politics, specifically weak coalitions, hamstring leaders' autonomy to make bold, decisive moves for fear of small pockets of opposition pulling out of coalitions, which would result in government collapse. Voluntary drift, however, is perhaps Basrur's more novel contribution. Basrur contends voluntary drift occurs when a leader possesses sufficient control over policy but simply fails to execute it by avoiding costly choices or difficult tradeoffs and effectively deflects [End Page 134] responsibility and accountability. Other strands of international relations scholarship might characterize this as poor leadership, whether the failing is a deficiency in charisma, confidence, acumen, or moral fiber.2 The book sets out to test his theory on four major but diverse episodes of Indian foreign policy: counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, internal security reforms, and geopolitical realignment. The episodes include India's nuclear deal with the United States (2005–2008), material support for the Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers (2000–2009), nuclear doctrinal developments (1998–present), and contentions with cross-border terrorism (notably the 2008 Mumbai crisis). Even seasoned India foreign policy scholars well versed in these episodes can discover new details in Basrur's thoroughly researched empirical chapters, buttressed by 48 pages of bibliography. Basrur deserves credit not only for his rich empirical treatments but also for exploring some of the most consequential episodes in post–Cold War Indian foreign policy, despite some incongruity in each episode's duration, which varies from days (e.g., the Mumbai attack) to decades (e.g., nuclear doctrine deliberations). These cases track neatly with almost all the chapters in former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon's policy memoir, which expertly illuminates many of the convoluted mechanics of India's foreign policy decision-making.3 Because India has been led by a hegemonic political party and strong leader for almost a decade, its coalitional power sharing and the contentious federal politics that shaped its three-decade rise since the 1980s are sometimes obscured or forgotten. Many of the chapters in Basrur's book showcase the dynamics of India's intrastate bargaining with expert scientific communities, technical bureaucracies (like the Atomic Energy Commission), a sprawling network of national security and intelligence agencies, and rivalries between state-level regional parties shaping national-level coalition politics and thus constraining executive decision-making. It is not impossible to imagine the return of coalition politics hamstringing Indian foreign policy ambitions in the future. Another strength of the book is Basrur's employment of diverse empirical methods. Given the inaccessibility of classified government documents, the chapter on nuclear strategy makes smart use of the writings [End Page 135] of several former civilian and military officials to code their implicit nuclear deterrence views...