India's Foreign Policy and the Ethic of Responsibility

Abstract

India's Foreign Policy and the Ethic of Responsibility Ian Hall (bio) Classical realism was formulated in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s to tackle a pressing problem: how to reconcile democratic politics with power politics. Most classical realists valued democracy as the form of government most likely to protect rights, uphold freedoms, and enable a majority of citizens to flourish.1 But at the same time, they observed that democracies often pursue foreign policies that are ill-conceived or downright dangerous.2 For this reason, classical realists lamented that democratic leaders are frequently outmaneuvered by authoritarians better schooled in the dark arts of international relations. Rajesh Basrur's excellent book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy responds to a similar challenge. This time, however, it is faced by India, a rising power whose foreign policy is "periodically afflicted" by "uncertainty and indecisiveness" (p. 1). Basrur's concern is the mismatch between India's ambition and its mixed record of success in the post–Cold War world. He argues the problems stem from domestic political constraints and the "limitations" of India's policies and policymakers (p. xi). If the postwar classical realists looked at India today, they would likely agree. They also blamed subpar foreign policies on domestic politics, which in democracies can empower poor leaders and flimsy ideas. They pointed to strategies like isolationism and appeasement, championed by popular politicians and widely supported in the interwar years but which undermined the capacity of democratic states to deter aggression and defend [End Page 116] their citizens when conflict eventually erupted.3 Even when it comes to their own security, the classical realists complained, democratic leaders and peoples can be feckless and reckless. Sometimes they were naive. At other times, they were prone to crusading moralism and ideological dogmatism, which could have even worse effects on national security and international order than simple idealism.4 For Basrur, the shortcomings with foreign policymaking in India—in particular, the causes of "policy drift," in which necessary action is not taken or is performed suboptimally—are more quotidian. He shows how they can and do arise from the messiness of coalition politics, the complexities of federalism, and elite irresponsibility. But the consequences of these shortcomings, as his book shows, are still serious, and analysts and policymakers need to understand them properly if they are to remedy them effectively. Subcontinental Drift contributes to this effort by examining four episodes in India's foreign policy with the help of neoclassical realism, which draws inspiration from its classical forebear to explain state behavior in international relations.5 Each case study is impeccably argued. Basrur finds evidence for what he terms "involuntary drift" in the long struggle to secure support for the U.S.-India nuclear deal and in New Delhi's mishandling of the bilateral relationship with Colombo in the latter stages of Sri Lanka's civil war. In both cases, he argues that New Delhi's freedom of action was constrained by circumstances largely beyond its control: principally, a fragmented parliament that gives small parties outsized influence. In the second two cases, Basrur detects signs of "voluntary drift" in the unresolved saga of India's nuclear strategy and in its failure to adequately prepare for mass casualty terrorist attacks prior to the assault on Mumbai in November 2008. Here, he thinks, leaders had sufficient control to make the changes needed but failed to act responsibly (p. 111). India's politicians have long had the means, he argues, to establish a clear nuclear strategy but have not done so, allowing inconsistencies to emerge between stated doctrine and evolving capabilities. Similarly, Basrur claims, India's leaders could and should have heeded warnings about the threat posed by militant Islamist [End Page 117] groups harbored in Pakistan. They did not act to address clear weaknesses in internal security, however, concentrating instead on fruitless attempts at coercing Islamabad into ending its covert sponsorship of terror. These arguments are finely crafted and convincing. Yet the theoretical innovation of Subcontinental Drift is also worth discussing. In particular, Basrur reintroduces a normative dimension to the analysis of policymaking and implementation, something that was always present in the work...