Eco-evolutionary Logic of Mutualisms

IF 1.8 4区 数学 Q2 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI:10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8
Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters for punishment and reward strategies demonstrate that the range of conditions over which stability is observed can be extended; however, the role of community-level dynamics impacted by within-species interactions remains relatively unexplored. Here we develop a general and readily applicable approach for analysing a broad range of mutualisms. By incorporating within-species interactions, we show that mutualisms can be stably maintained across diverse environmental conditions without introducing changes to between-species interaction parameters. Further, a balance of within- and between-species interactions is sufficient to allow the persistence of mutualisms encountering ecological perturbations. Our simple and robust framework resonates with emerging empirical data highlighting the role of community-level interactions and population dynamics in maintaining mutualisms.
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共生的生态进化逻辑
不同物种成员之间的互惠互动是常见的,看似稳定的,因此显然是持久的。这与仅仅基于物种间相互作用的标准数学模型不一致,后者表明共生关系本质上是不稳定的。包含奖惩策略参数的模型表明,可以扩展观察到稳定性的条件范围;然而,受种内相互作用影响的群落水平动态的作用仍然相对未被探索。在这里,我们开发了一种通用的和易于应用的方法来分析广泛的互惠关系。通过结合种内相互作用,我们表明,在不改变种间相互作用参数的情况下,相互作用可以在不同的环境条件下稳定地维持。此外,物种内部和物种之间的相互作用的平衡足以允许互惠关系在遇到生态扰动时持续存在。我们简单而有力的框架与新兴的经验数据产生了共鸣,这些数据突出了社区层面的互动和人口动态在维持相互关系中的作用。
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来源期刊
Dynamic Games and Applications
Dynamic Games and Applications MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
13.30%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: Dynamic Games and Applications is devoted to the development of all classes of dynamic games, namely, differential games, discrete-time dynamic games, evolutionary games, repeated and stochastic games, and their applications in all fields
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