Do Family Firms Issue More Readable Annual Reports? Evidence From the United States

IF 1.3 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance Pub Date : 2023-09-30 DOI:10.1177/0148558x231198894
Qunfeng Liao, Bin Srinidhi, Ke Wang
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Abstract

Using a sample of 22,442 firm-year observations for 3,721 U.S. listed firms, we show that family firms, on average, issue annual reports with higher readability than non-family firms. Higher readability could occur due to lower obfuscation or less information conveyance. By controlling complexity and choosing readability measures linked to obfuscation, we attribute the higher readability to lower obfuscation. Our investigation into the heterogeneity in family firms shows that the positive effect of family control on reporting readability exists for eponymous family firms but not for non-eponymous family firms. We also find that family firms managed by founders or heirs issue more readable 10-K reports than non-family firms, but family firms managed by outsiders do not exhibit such a difference. Cross-sectional analyses show that the difference in readability between family and non-family firms diminishes for firms with more earnings manipulation, weaker board governance, and dual-class shares. Further, we find that investors perceive family firms’ annual reports with higher readability to be more informative. Finally, we use state-level succession tax cuts as an exogenous shock to link the higher readability to family insiders’ incentives and preferences. Our findings are consistent with the view that family insiders’ incentive to maintain family reputation contributes to lower obfuscation in 10-K narrative disclosures.
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家族企业发布的年度报告是否更具可读性?来自美国的证据
通过对3721家美国上市公司的22442家公司的年度观察样本,我们发现,家族企业发布的年度报告平均比非家族企业更具可读性。由于较低的混淆或较少的信息传递,可以获得更高的可读性。通过控制复杂性和选择与混淆相关的可读性度量,我们将较高的可读性归因于较低的混淆。我们对家族企业异质性的调查表明,家族控制对报告可读性的积极影响存在于家族企业中,而不存在于非家族企业中。我们还发现,由创始人或继承人管理的家族企业比非家族企业发布的10-K报告更具可读性,但由外部人管理的家族企业没有表现出这种差异。横断面分析表明,家族企业和非家族企业之间的可读性差异在盈余操纵较多、董事会治理较弱和双重股权结构的企业中减小。此外,我们发现投资者认为家族企业的年度报告可读性越高,信息就越丰富。最后,我们使用州一级的继承税减免作为外生冲击,将较高的可读性与家庭内部人员的激励和偏好联系起来。我们的研究结果与家族内部人员维护家族声誉的动机有助于降低10-K叙事披露的模糊性的观点一致。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance (JAAF) is committed to publishing high quality studies in accounting and related fields. Papers on accounting issues relating to developing in other fields such as finance, economics, and operations are also welcome. Empirical, analytical and experimental works of all varieties and paradigms, normative as well as positive, will be considered, provided they significantly contribute to the advancement of our knowledge in accounting. Manuscripts submitted should contain original unpublished research and should not be under consideration for possible publication elsewhere.
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