Pub Date : 2024-04-01Epub Date: 2021-12-15DOI: 10.1177/0148558X211062430
Karel Hrazdil, Dan A Simunic, Nattavut Suwanyangyuan
This study provides new evidence on the influential role of external auditors in enhancing the informativeness of form 10-K annual reports to shareholders. Specifically, we find that the client's choice of a Big 4 auditor (PwC, EY, KPMG, and Deloitte) versus a non-Big 4 auditor contributes to cross-sectional variations in 10-K disclosure volume. We also document that the benefit of enhanced disclosures provided by Big 4 auditors is more pronounced for audit clients with poorer accrual quality and those with higher information asymmetry. Furthermore, we introduce the portion of 10-K length unexplained by operating complexity and observable client characteristics as a new proxy for audit firm effort. Specifically, we find that abnormally long disclosures are associated with higher audit fees and longer audit report lag, which implies that an incremental level of audit effort can be inferred from the discretionary component of 10-K disclosures. As audit effort is costly, a greater volume of 10-K disclosures can be expected to be associated with an improvement in the quality of financial reporting. Overall, our findings show that auditors play more than a simple attestation role in the financial reporting process, and that the quality of financial reporting in a company's 10-K annual report is a joint product of the effort and decisions of both a company's managers and its auditors.
{"title":"Auditor Choice and the Informativeness of 10-K Reports.","authors":"Karel Hrazdil, Dan A Simunic, Nattavut Suwanyangyuan","doi":"10.1177/0148558X211062430","DOIUrl":"10.1177/0148558X211062430","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This study provides new evidence on the influential role of external auditors in enhancing the informativeness of form 10-K annual reports to shareholders. Specifically, we find that the client's choice of a Big 4 auditor (PwC, EY, KPMG, and Deloitte) versus a non-Big 4 auditor contributes to cross-sectional variations in 10-K disclosure volume. We also document that the benefit of enhanced disclosures provided by Big 4 auditors is more pronounced for audit clients with poorer accrual quality and those with higher information asymmetry. Furthermore, we introduce the portion of 10-K length unexplained by operating complexity and observable client characteristics as a new proxy for audit firm effort. Specifically, we find that abnormally long disclosures are associated with higher audit fees and longer audit report lag, which implies that an incremental level of audit effort can be inferred from the discretionary component of 10-K disclosures. As audit effort is costly, a greater volume of 10-K disclosures can be expected to be associated with an improvement in the quality of financial reporting. Overall, our findings show that auditors play more than a simple attestation role in the financial reporting process, and that the quality of financial reporting in a company's 10-K annual report is a joint product of the effort and decisions of both a company's managers and its auditors.</p>","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10913414/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72953069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1177/0148558x231202285
Petya Platikanova, Kazbi Soonawalla
We examine whether borrowers who share the same auditor with a syndicate lender (i.e., shared auditors) have improved access to the syndicate loan market. We predict and find evidence that shared auditors reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers as well as between lenders in a syndicate. We also find that borrowers who share auditors with lenders obtain better price and non-price terms compared with those without. Our empirical evidence also suggests that when borrowers and lenders share auditors, syndicates are less concentrated and more diverse, consistent with the prediction that shared auditors provide informational benefits on the syndicate market. Loan facilities with shared auditors are also more likely to be renegotiated with more favorable terms for borrowers. Taken together, our findings suggest that shared auditors contribute to the efficient functioning of debt markets by reducing the information asymmetries in debt contracting. JEL Classifications: M42, M41, G32, O16
{"title":"Shared Auditors in Private Lending","authors":"Petya Platikanova, Kazbi Soonawalla","doi":"10.1177/0148558x231202285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x231202285","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether borrowers who share the same auditor with a syndicate lender (i.e., shared auditors) have improved access to the syndicate loan market. We predict and find evidence that shared auditors reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers as well as between lenders in a syndicate. We also find that borrowers who share auditors with lenders obtain better price and non-price terms compared with those without. Our empirical evidence also suggests that when borrowers and lenders share auditors, syndicates are less concentrated and more diverse, consistent with the prediction that shared auditors provide informational benefits on the syndicate market. Loan facilities with shared auditors are also more likely to be renegotiated with more favorable terms for borrowers. Taken together, our findings suggest that shared auditors contribute to the efficient functioning of debt markets by reducing the information asymmetries in debt contracting. JEL Classifications: M42, M41, G32, O16","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135392768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-14DOI: 10.1177/0148558x231200920
Dean Crawford, Diana R. Franz, Collin Gilstrap, Gerald J. Lobo
This study examines how changes in tick size and the differential between short-term and long-term capital gain tax rates affect the market response to the announcement of stock distributions. Prior research finds that a stock distribution increases the volatility of the stock, which in turn increases the value of the stock’s tax-timing option. We show that the minimum tick size established by the exchange where the stock is traded affects a stock’s volatility and, therefore, the value of the tax-timing option and the market response to the stock distribution. We document a stronger relation between the market response and changes in volatility among large distributions than among small distributions. We also find a positive relation between the market response and the tax rate differential, although it is only significant for small distributions. Finally, we show that the relationship between the market response and changes in both volatility and tax rate differential is primarily driven by tax-sensitive institutional investors in the distributing firm.
{"title":"The Effects of Changes in Tick Size and Tax Rates on the Tax-Timing Option and the Market Response to Stock Distributions","authors":"Dean Crawford, Diana R. Franz, Collin Gilstrap, Gerald J. Lobo","doi":"10.1177/0148558x231200920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x231200920","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how changes in tick size and the differential between short-term and long-term capital gain tax rates affect the market response to the announcement of stock distributions. Prior research finds that a stock distribution increases the volatility of the stock, which in turn increases the value of the stock’s tax-timing option. We show that the minimum tick size established by the exchange where the stock is traded affects a stock’s volatility and, therefore, the value of the tax-timing option and the market response to the stock distribution. We document a stronger relation between the market response and changes in volatility among large distributions than among small distributions. We also find a positive relation between the market response and the tax rate differential, although it is only significant for small distributions. Finally, we show that the relationship between the market response and changes in both volatility and tax rate differential is primarily driven by tax-sensitive institutional investors in the distributing firm.","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135803185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Another trip around the sun? How does the auditor orbit the audit engagement? The primary objective of any audit engagement is to gather sufficient relevant audit evidence for the auditor to render an opinion on the financial statements. Previous research has illustrated that the compulsory rotation of audit firms yields positive effects on audit quality. The rationale behind auditor rotations lies in their potential to enhance audit quality by mitigating the risk of auditors becoming excessively familiar with clients, which could compromise their independence and impartiality.
{"title":"The Orbital Dynamics of Auditor Firm Rotation: Implications for Auditor Independence and Audit Quality","authors":"Delia DELIU, Andrei-Marius OLARIU","doi":"10.5171/2023.173471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5171/2023.173471","url":null,"abstract":"Another trip around the sun? How does the auditor orbit the audit engagement? The primary objective of any audit engagement is to gather sufficient relevant audit evidence for the auditor to render an opinion on the financial statements. Previous research has illustrated that the compulsory rotation of audit firms yields positive effects on audit quality. The rationale behind auditor rotations lies in their potential to enhance audit quality by mitigating the risk of auditors becoming excessively familiar with clients, which could compromise their independence and impartiality.","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136211023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1177/0148558x231200913
Kay Blaufus, Janine K. Jarzembski, Jakob Reineke, Ilko Trenn
We use a sample of 248 tax strategies published by U.K. companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 and FTSE 250 to examine (a) how companies present themselves—more as “responsible taxpayers” who view taxes as a meaningful contribution to society, or more as “tax planners” who view taxes primarily as a cost, and (b) whether these presentations correspond to actual tax avoidance behavior. Our results show that, on average, firms tend to portray themselves as “responsible taxpayers,” but that this portrayal is consistent with firms’ tax avoidance behavior only when firms are subject to above-average external monitoring by financial analysts. The results suggest that firms manage the content of qualitative tax disclosures to sway public opinion as long as the probability of detecting misstatements is sufficiently low. This raises doubts as to whether mandatory qualitative information provides added value for stakeholders if it is not under external review. JEL Classification: H25; H20; M40; M48
{"title":"Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy","authors":"Kay Blaufus, Janine K. Jarzembski, Jakob Reineke, Ilko Trenn","doi":"10.1177/0148558x231200913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x231200913","url":null,"abstract":"We use a sample of 248 tax strategies published by U.K. companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 and FTSE 250 to examine (a) how companies present themselves—more as “responsible taxpayers” who view taxes as a meaningful contribution to society, or more as “tax planners” who view taxes primarily as a cost, and (b) whether these presentations correspond to actual tax avoidance behavior. Our results show that, on average, firms tend to portray themselves as “responsible taxpayers,” but that this portrayal is consistent with firms’ tax avoidance behavior only when firms are subject to above-average external monitoring by financial analysts. The results suggest that firms manage the content of qualitative tax disclosures to sway public opinion as long as the probability of detecting misstatements is sufficiently low. This raises doubts as to whether mandatory qualitative information provides added value for stakeholders if it is not under external review. JEL Classification: H25; H20; M40; M48","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135093705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-30DOI: 10.1177/0148558x231198894
Qunfeng Liao, Bin Srinidhi, Ke Wang
Using a sample of 22,442 firm-year observations for 3,721 U.S. listed firms, we show that family firms, on average, issue annual reports with higher readability than non-family firms. Higher readability could occur due to lower obfuscation or less information conveyance. By controlling complexity and choosing readability measures linked to obfuscation, we attribute the higher readability to lower obfuscation. Our investigation into the heterogeneity in family firms shows that the positive effect of family control on reporting readability exists for eponymous family firms but not for non-eponymous family firms. We also find that family firms managed by founders or heirs issue more readable 10-K reports than non-family firms, but family firms managed by outsiders do not exhibit such a difference. Cross-sectional analyses show that the difference in readability between family and non-family firms diminishes for firms with more earnings manipulation, weaker board governance, and dual-class shares. Further, we find that investors perceive family firms’ annual reports with higher readability to be more informative. Finally, we use state-level succession tax cuts as an exogenous shock to link the higher readability to family insiders’ incentives and preferences. Our findings are consistent with the view that family insiders’ incentive to maintain family reputation contributes to lower obfuscation in 10-K narrative disclosures.
{"title":"Do Family Firms Issue More Readable Annual Reports? Evidence From the United States","authors":"Qunfeng Liao, Bin Srinidhi, Ke Wang","doi":"10.1177/0148558x231198894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x231198894","url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of 22,442 firm-year observations for 3,721 U.S. listed firms, we show that family firms, on average, issue annual reports with higher readability than non-family firms. Higher readability could occur due to lower obfuscation or less information conveyance. By controlling complexity and choosing readability measures linked to obfuscation, we attribute the higher readability to lower obfuscation. Our investigation into the heterogeneity in family firms shows that the positive effect of family control on reporting readability exists for eponymous family firms but not for non-eponymous family firms. We also find that family firms managed by founders or heirs issue more readable 10-K reports than non-family firms, but family firms managed by outsiders do not exhibit such a difference. Cross-sectional analyses show that the difference in readability between family and non-family firms diminishes for firms with more earnings manipulation, weaker board governance, and dual-class shares. Further, we find that investors perceive family firms’ annual reports with higher readability to be more informative. Finally, we use state-level succession tax cuts as an exogenous shock to link the higher readability to family insiders’ incentives and preferences. Our findings are consistent with the view that family insiders’ incentive to maintain family reputation contributes to lower obfuscation in 10-K narrative disclosures.","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136280553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-30DOI: 10.1177/0148558x231198895
Anna Agapova, Uliana Filatova
We examine whether sell-side analysts strategically time their favorable recommendations to cater to institutional investors while preserving analysts’ reputational capital. Although prior literature documents that analysts provide more positive recommendations for stocks that are part of their institutional clients’ (specifically, mutual funds’) portfolios, it does not explicitly address a reputation cost associated with such practice. Using a sample of analysts’ recommendations on U.S. firms for the 2002–2017 period, we document a pattern of analysts’ recommendations being more optimistic in the end month of a quarter and less optimistic in the beginning month of a quarter. This timing pattern ties to quarterly reporting periods of portfolio managers, with actively managed mutual funds’ holdings being affected the most. Analysts with Institutional Investor All-Star ranking do not engage in such stock recommendation timing practices. The market participants seem to believe rosy recommendations issued for stocks with more institutional holdings in the end month of a quarter with more positive cumulative abnormal returns to upgrade and downgrade recommendations. JEL classifications: G14, G24
{"title":"Analysts’ Institutional Client Catering and Reputation Tradeoff: Strategic Timing of Recommendations","authors":"Anna Agapova, Uliana Filatova","doi":"10.1177/0148558x231198895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x231198895","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether sell-side analysts strategically time their favorable recommendations to cater to institutional investors while preserving analysts’ reputational capital. Although prior literature documents that analysts provide more positive recommendations for stocks that are part of their institutional clients’ (specifically, mutual funds’) portfolios, it does not explicitly address a reputation cost associated with such practice. Using a sample of analysts’ recommendations on U.S. firms for the 2002–2017 period, we document a pattern of analysts’ recommendations being more optimistic in the end month of a quarter and less optimistic in the beginning month of a quarter. This timing pattern ties to quarterly reporting periods of portfolio managers, with actively managed mutual funds’ holdings being affected the most. Analysts with Institutional Investor All-Star ranking do not engage in such stock recommendation timing practices. The market participants seem to believe rosy recommendations issued for stocks with more institutional holdings in the end month of a quarter with more positive cumulative abnormal returns to upgrade and downgrade recommendations. JEL classifications: G14, G24","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136279569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.59006/vnfa-jaa.0920236
{"title":"Đánh giá nhu cầu của người tiêu dùng đối với các sản phẩm dệt may từ vật liệu mới Assessing consumer demand for textile products from new yarn materials","authors":"","doi":"10.59006/vnfa-jaa.0920236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.59006/vnfa-jaa.0920236","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135720175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1177/0148558x231194894
Senlin Miao, Mengchao Ai, John (Jianqiu) Bai, Ting Chen, Amy X. Sun
In this study, we instigate whether firms proactively change their voluntary disclosure in anticipation of the spillover of their peer firms’ litigation risk. We find that focal firms facing greater ex ante spillover litigation risk reduce disclosure activities by lowering both the likelihood of issuance and the frequency of management earnings forecasts. We then show that the effect is robust and unlikely driven by some omitted correlated variables using an alternative ex ante litigation risk measure that is not related to firm characteristics. We further demonstrate that the effect is likely causal using a difference-in-differences design where an unanticipated court ruling significantly reduces certain firms’ exposure to peers’ litigation risk spillover. The results from cross-sectional analyses are also consistent with ex ante litigation risk driving the negative relation.
{"title":"The Spillover of Shareholder Litigation Risk and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure","authors":"Senlin Miao, Mengchao Ai, John (Jianqiu) Bai, Ting Chen, Amy X. Sun","doi":"10.1177/0148558x231194894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x231194894","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we instigate whether firms proactively change their voluntary disclosure in anticipation of the spillover of their peer firms’ litigation risk. We find that focal firms facing greater ex ante spillover litigation risk reduce disclosure activities by lowering both the likelihood of issuance and the frequency of management earnings forecasts. We then show that the effect is robust and unlikely driven by some omitted correlated variables using an alternative ex ante litigation risk measure that is not related to firm characteristics. We further demonstrate that the effect is likely causal using a difference-in-differences design where an unanticipated court ruling significantly reduces certain firms’ exposure to peers’ litigation risk spillover. The results from cross-sectional analyses are also consistent with ex ante litigation risk driving the negative relation.","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135719107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-16DOI: 10.59006/vnfa-jaa.0920233
{"title":"Sửa đổi Luật Kế toán đảm bảo các quy định đồng bộ, phù hợp với thông lệ quốc tế và điều kiện của Việt Nam Amending the accounting law to ensure synchronizing regulations, in accordance with international practices and Vietnam's conditions","authors":"","doi":"10.59006/vnfa-jaa.0920233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.59006/vnfa-jaa.0920233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47160,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135353790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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