Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and Augmentations

IF 1.1 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI:10.1145/3623273
Nicole Immorlica, Sahil Singla, Bo Waggoner
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Abstract

In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions), and decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The goal is to prove a “prophet inequality”: that she can do approximately as well as a prophet with foreknowledge of all the values. In this work, we investigate this problem when the values are allowed to be correlated. Since non-trivial guarantees are impossible for arbitrary correlations, we consider a natural “linear” correlation structure introduced by Bateni et al. [9] as a generalization of the common-base value model of Chawla et al. [14]. A key challenge is that threshold-based algorithms, which are commonly used for prophet inequalities, no longer guarantee good performance for linear correlations. We relate this roadblock to another “augmentations” challenge that might be of independent interest: many existing prophet inequality algorithms are not robust to slight increases in the values of the arriving items. We leverage this intuition to prove bounds (matching up to constant factors) that decay gracefully with the amount of correlation of the arriving items. We extend these results to the case of selecting multiple items by designing a new (1 + o (1)) approximation ratio algorithm that is robust to augmentations.
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具有线性相关和增广的先知不等式
在经典的在线决策问题中,试图最大化其价值的决策者检查到达的物品序列以了解它们的价值(从已知分布中提取),并通过获取当前物品来决定何时停止该过程。目标是证明一个“先知不等式”:她可以做得和先知一样好,并且知道所有的值。在这项工作中,我们研究了当允许值相关时的这个问题。由于任意相关性不可能有非平凡保证,我们考虑Bateni等人[9]引入的自然“线性”相关结构,作为Chawla等人[14]的共基值模型的推广。一个关键的挑战是,通常用于预测不等式的基于阈值的算法,不再保证线性相关性的良好性能。我们将这个障碍与另一个可能独立感兴趣的“增强”挑战联系起来:许多现有的先知不等式算法对于到达项目的值的轻微增加并不健壮。我们利用这种直觉来证明边界(与常数因子匹配),这些边界随着到达的项目的相关性而优雅地衰减。我们通过设计一种新的(1 + o(1))对增广具有鲁棒性的近似比算法,将这些结果扩展到选择多个项目的情况。
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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
期刊介绍: The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.
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