Evaluating the Pretoria Agreement: the limitations of presentist analysis of conflicts in Ethiopia

Abstract

SUMMARYThis debate piece contains an assessment of the debate on the ‘Pretoria Agreement’ (or Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) concluded on 2 November 2022 regarding the armed conflict in Ethiopia. On the basis of a critical discussion of a paper by F. Gebresenbet and Y. Tariku (2023) published in the Spring issue of the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), the author here contests the short-term analysis of the authors, who miss essential points of the wider context of political conflict in Ethiopia and also scholastically misrepresent some other authors in the debate.KEYWORDS: African politicsEthiopiaarmed conflictethno-political tensions Disclosure statementThe author declares no conflict of interest.Notes1 Like the excellent piece by Fitz-Gerald and Segal (Citation2023).2 Already widely known since 2021: see www.worldmedias.net/horn-of-africa-tplf-sympathizers-use-infiltrators-for-its-destabilizing-propaganda-action/. Examples are the systematic TPLF statements on ‘food aid blockade’ and ‘man-made famine’ in Tigray (disproved by the World Food Programme Ethiopia (see Omamo Citation2022); and the ‘Tigray genocide’ meme (disproved by UN-Equality and Human Rights Commission research) and post-war reporting. See also Sheba and Pearce (Citation2022). All this does not mean that Tigray’s population did not gravely suffer in the war (like those of Afar and Amhara regions).3 And the federal government in 2020 seems to have other priorities, like building huge new government palaces; compare Hochet-Bodin Citation2023. In fact, the economy is in dire straits: see www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2023/04/11/abiy-ahmed-s-loyal-allies-tasked-with-keeping-the-money-coming,109933716-eve?cxt=PUB&utm_source=AIA&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=AUTO_EDIT_SOM&did=1747468.4 Still in March 2023, a faction of the TPLF led by top cadres/military leaders like Migbe Haile, Getachew Aseffa, Abraha Tesfay and others was holding out and is in a state of armed vigilance (see https://twitter.com/jbirru/status/1635480052186873857). Other TPLF leaders, some of them now in the ‘interim government’ in Tigray, prevaricate on the Pretoria Agreement.5 In this agreement between the ‘senior commanders’ of both the federal army and the TPLF armed forces, it seemed that TPLF disarmament was conditioned on withdrawal of ‘non-ENDF’ forces from the war areas – highly contested.6 A new scandal erupted in June 2023, when it was revealed the massive quantities of humanitarian aid in Tigray were stolen or disappeared – allegedly under TPLF auspices. The entire WFP leadership resigned (https://abren.org/ethiopia-wfp-controversy-leads-to-resignations/). This continued a pattern of food aid theft and diversion by TPLF during the 2020–2022 war (www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Elelx4QLHQ; www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9SjilttgYk&t=3s).7 For the complexity of the issue, see www.hornafricainsight.org/post/welkait-ethiopia-geo-strategic-importance-and-the-consequential-annexation-by-tplf. See also the research-based heavy indictments in Geta Asrade et al. (Citation2022).8 The CoHA in Art. 10.4 announces to resolve this ‘in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ (see AU Citation2022), but that will not be smooth because this TPLF-made and imposed constitution of 1994 (adopted three years after the TPLF’s unilateral annexation of the Wolqait area) did not have majority support and is in itself highly contested. A ‘constitutional solution’ without assessing the historical facts and the interventionist TPLF policies of the last three to four decades (including demographic engineering) in this region will not bring stability.9 ‘Exclusive: Ethiopians Suffer Horrific Burns in Suspected White Phosphorus Attacks’, in the Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2021.10 See https://twitter.com/Eyob_Belachew33/status/1569760736515088384. Examples of lies could be multiplied. Countering them matters.11 With the massive attack on sleeping, unarmed (non-Tigrayan) soldiers of the federal army in camps in Tigray. See the shocking eyewitness-survivor account of Gashaye T’enaw (Citation2022).12 Remarkable is, for instance, the start of a digital media campaign by pro-TPLF activists entitled ‘Tigray genocide’ – on the first day of the conflict – even before the federal army had counter-attacked (see Abren.org, https://abren.org/premeditated-tigray-genocide-cyber-warfare-in-the-age-of-social-media/). The ‘genocide’ lie was perpetuated throughout the conflict but was later demonstrated to be entirely false.13 There were many more, doing great damage, but they are conveniently not mentioned by Fana and Yonas.14 For instance, www.ascleiden.nl/sites/default/files/j.abbink_working_paper_152_18-10-2021_final.pdf; https://www.e-ir.info/2021/11/21/the-ethiopia-conflict-in-international-relations-and-global-media-discourse/); https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/01/tigray-conflict-ethiopia-ramifications-international-response/); or https://canopyforum.org/2022/10/26/has-religion-been-fueling-the-politics-of-conflict-in-ethiopia-a-cautionary-tale/.15 According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, armed conflict overall has declined since November 2022 but has also shifted from the Tigray area to Amhara and Oromia Regions: see https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/05/06/epo-april-2023-monthly-volatility-in-amhara-region-while-the-rest-of-the-country-stabilizes/; https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/04/05/epo-march-2023-monthly-political-violence-trends-decline-amid-opportunities-for-peace/; and https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/06/01/epo-weekly-20-26-may-2023/. Since May 2023 the federal army has engaged in a one-sided and politically ill-advised ‘disarmament’ campaign in the Amhara Region, which has provoked massive popular resistance.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJon AbbinkJon Abbink is a political anthropologist/historian and professor in political anthropology (focus on politics and governance) of Africa at the African Studies Centre, Leiden University, the Netherlands. He has carried out research on the history, politics and cultures of Northeast Africa, in particular Ethiopia, and published regularly on these subjects in international journals and books. A recent paper on Ethiopian history and history writing appeared in 2022 in Cahiers d’Études Africaines.