Reconstructing elections in a digital world

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe nature of elections has been transformed by the rise of digital technologies in the last few years, in large part due to the rise of social media platforms and their impact on election campaigning, dissemination of information and opinion formation. Furthermore, digital technologies have been employed in the administration of elections, and are being adopted by electoral management bodies. This article seeks to understand these transformations in light of ongoing debates regarding the regulation of elections and digital technologies by positing an approach focused on international human rights frameworks.KEYWORDS: Digital democracyelectionselection regulationdigital technologytechnology platformsartificial intelligencedisinformationsynthetic media Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Sutton Meagher, ‘When Personal Computers are Transformed into Ballot Boxes: How Internet Elections in Estonia Comply with the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ American University International Law Review 23, no.2 (2009): 349–86.2 Emma Baulch, Ariadna Matamoros Fernandez, and Fiona Suwana, ‘Memetic persuasion and WhatsAppification in Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election,’ New Media & Society (2022); Kristin English, Kaye D. 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Turkey, No. 3111/10, December 18, 2012.141 Joint Declaration on Media Independence and Diversity in the Digital Age, UN Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/e/379351.pdf.142 Takhshid, ‘Regulating Social Media in the Global South.’Additional informationNotes on contributorsNighat DadNighat Dad is the founder and Executive Director of the Digital Rights Foundation (DRF) with over a decade of experience on issues of technology governance and gender. Nighat serves as a member of the Independent Meta Oversight Board. She is member of several boards including Microsoft, Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web, and the Tor Project. She is a recipient of several awards including the Atlantic Council Freedom of Expression Award and the Human Rights Tulip Award.Shmyla KhanShmyla Khan has worked as the Director of Research and Policy at the Digital Rights Foundation from 2016–2023, focusing on issues of gender, technologies, and tech-facilitated abuse. A lawyer by training, she has taught subjects of privacy and tech-facilitated social change at the university level.