Persistent Dissent and Plato’s Later Theory of Civic Participation

Abstract

Abstract Plato in the Laws proposes a simulation of nearly ideal conditions regarding the experts’ persuasion and observes that even in these circumstances some citizens will not agree with the epistemic authorities. In this paper, such situations are labelled as exhibiting persistent dissent . Plato maintains that persistent dissenters lack the virtue of sōphrosynē , but its meaning is notoriously difficult to decipher. This paper offers to examine the role of sōphrosynē in tackling persistent dissent in light of Plato’s reflections on civic participation. This angle will not only uncover the epistemic aspect of sōphrosynē that lays the groundwork for persuasion, but it will also give a less optimistic assessment of the civic theory of the Laws , whilst simultaneously widening our own understanding of the range of disagreements between the experts and the non-experts and the difficulties in removing them.