{"title":"Foreign institutional investors and executive compensation incentives: Evidence from China","authors":"Xu Cheng , Dongmin Kong , Gaowen Kong","doi":"10.1016/j.mulfin.2022.100758","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the effect of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) on executive compensation incentives. Using the quasi-natural experiment of Shanghai (Shenzhen)–Hong Kong Stock Connect, we show that the presence of FIIs has a positive effect on pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and helps to decrease excessive compensation. We also demonstrate that good corporate governance and high accounting information quality would be two possible underlying channels. Our results are more pronounced for firms with fewer state-owned shareholders and powerful managers. Overall, our results indicate that compared with domestic counterparts, FIIs are more effective at improving firms’ executive compensation incentives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47268,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Multinational Financial Management","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100758"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Multinational Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042444X22000299","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study examines the effect of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) on executive compensation incentives. Using the quasi-natural experiment of Shanghai (Shenzhen)–Hong Kong Stock Connect, we show that the presence of FIIs has a positive effect on pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and helps to decrease excessive compensation. We also demonstrate that good corporate governance and high accounting information quality would be two possible underlying channels. Our results are more pronounced for firms with fewer state-owned shareholders and powerful managers. Overall, our results indicate that compared with domestic counterparts, FIIs are more effective at improving firms’ executive compensation incentives.
期刊介绍:
International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.