Crowdfunding and too much choice: A recipe for disappointment

Q1 Business, Management and Accounting Journal of Business Venturing Insights Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI:10.1016/j.jbvi.2023.e00436
Ramy Elitzur , Peri Muttath , David Soberman
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

In this study, we investigate the effects of reward options and their prices on crowdfunding success. Rational economics predicts that the more choice potential contributors have, the more likely it is that they find a reward option that stimulates participation. However, experiments in behavioral economics and marketing show that providing someone with excessive choice (overchoice) might adversely affect participation. Using data collected from Kickstarter, a well-known crowdfunding website, we demonstrate the existence of the overchoice phenomenon in the context of crowdfunding, i.e., an inverted U-shaped relationship between reward options and crowdfunding performance.

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众筹和太多选择:令人失望的秘诀
在本研究中,我们探讨了奖励选项及其价格对众筹成功的影响。理性经济学预测,潜在贡献者的选择越多,他们就越有可能找到刺激参与的奖励选项。然而,行为经济学和市场营销的实验表明,向某人提供过多的选择(overchoice)可能会对参与产生不利影响。我们利用知名众筹网站Kickstarter的数据,论证了众筹环境下存在着过度选择现象,即奖励选择与众筹绩效呈倒u型关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Business Venturing Insights
Journal of Business Venturing Insights Business, Management and Accounting-Business and International Management
CiteScore
11.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
62
审稿时长
28 days
期刊最新文献
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