The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets

IF 2 Q1 LAW Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI:10.1093/jfr/fjab003
Brian D Feinstein, Kevin Werbach
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Abstract

The meteoric growth of global cryptocurrency markets presents novel challenges to regulators. Some policymakers and scholars warn that regulation will cause trading activity to cross borders into less-regulated jurisdictions—or even smother a promising new financial asset class. Others believe regulatory actions will stimulate activity by providing clarity to market participants. Standing behind this disagreement is a debate about the desirability of either outcome. Some believe that governments should promote development of the cryptocurrency sector within their countries, while others view cryptocurrencies as conduits of illegality and fraud that should be restricted through strict regulation or even outright bans. Yet these debates have, to date, been conducted almost entirely without data concerning the effects of regulation on market activity. As a corrective, in this article we assembled original data on cryptocurrency regulations worldwide and used them to empirically examine movement in trading activity at a number of exchanges following key regulatory announcements. We found that a wide variety of models yielded almost entirely null results. From the creation of bespoke licensing regimes to targeted anti-money-laundering and anti-fraud enforcement actions, as well as many other categories of government activities, we found no systemic evidence that regulatory measures cause traders to flee, or enter into, the affected jurisdictions. These findings at last provide an empirical basis for regulatory decisions concerning cryptocurrency trading. Among other things, they call into question that capital flight or chilling effects should be a first-order concern.
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加密货币监管对交易市场的影响
全球加密货币市场的迅速增长给监管机构带来了新的挑战。一些政策制定者和学者警告说,监管将导致交易活动跨越国界,进入监管较少的司法管辖区,甚至扼杀一个有前途的新金融资产类别。其他人则认为,监管行动将为市场参与者提供透明度,从而刺激经济活动。在这种分歧的背后,是一场关于两种结果是否可取的辩论。一些人认为政府应该促进本国加密货币行业的发展,而另一些人则认为加密货币是非法和欺诈的渠道,应该通过严格的监管甚至完全禁止来限制。然而,迄今为止,这些辩论几乎完全没有关于监管对市场活动影响的数据。作为纠正,在本文中,我们收集了全球加密货币监管的原始数据,并用它们来实证研究一些交易所在关键监管公告后的交易活动变化。我们发现,各种各样的模型产生的结果几乎完全为零。从定制许可制度的建立到有针对性的反洗钱和反欺诈执法行动,以及许多其他类别的政府活动,我们没有发现系统性证据表明监管措施导致交易者逃离或进入受影响的司法管辖区。这些发现最终为加密货币交易的监管决策提供了经验基础。除其他问题外,他们质疑资本外逃或寒蝉效应是否应该是首要问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.60
自引率
3.80%
发文量
12
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