Platform Loophole Exploitation, Recovery Measures, and User Engagement: A Quasi-Natural Experiment in Online Gaming

IF 5 3区 管理学 Q1 INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE Information Systems Research Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI:10.1287/isre.2020.0416
Jianqing Chen, Shu He, Xue Yang
{"title":"Platform Loophole Exploitation, Recovery Measures, and User Engagement: A Quasi-Natural Experiment in Online Gaming","authors":"Jianqing Chen, Shu He, Xue Yang","doi":"10.1287/isre.2020.0416","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Online platforms often encounter the challenge of system vulnerabilities, such as bugs, which can be exploited by certain users for illicit gains. These platforms face a dilemma when devising countermeasures, particularly in deciding whether to penalize rule breakers. Different countermeasures can lead to varying economic impacts, including subsequent user engagement. In this study, based on unique field data from a prominent online gaming platform, we discovered that the occurrence of bugs has a negative effect on the online duration and consumption of observing players. Surprisingly, although the platform is responsible for the bugs, not penalizing rule breakers results in more substantial reductions in platform engagement among observing players compared with penalizing them. This effect is particularly pronounced for observers who are directly affected by rule violations. Our findings emphasize the essential role of the platform in fairly punishing rule breakers. To ensure the long-term prosperity of an online platform and the overall welfare of its participants, it is crucial for the platform to maintain high-quality system control and implement effective governance mechanisms for rule enforcement, thereby restoring justice and order to the online community.","PeriodicalId":48411,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information Systems Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2020.0416","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Online platforms often encounter the challenge of system vulnerabilities, such as bugs, which can be exploited by certain users for illicit gains. These platforms face a dilemma when devising countermeasures, particularly in deciding whether to penalize rule breakers. Different countermeasures can lead to varying economic impacts, including subsequent user engagement. In this study, based on unique field data from a prominent online gaming platform, we discovered that the occurrence of bugs has a negative effect on the online duration and consumption of observing players. Surprisingly, although the platform is responsible for the bugs, not penalizing rule breakers results in more substantial reductions in platform engagement among observing players compared with penalizing them. This effect is particularly pronounced for observers who are directly affected by rule violations. Our findings emphasize the essential role of the platform in fairly punishing rule breakers. To ensure the long-term prosperity of an online platform and the overall welfare of its participants, it is crucial for the platform to maintain high-quality system control and implement effective governance mechanisms for rule enforcement, thereby restoring justice and order to the online community.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
利用平台漏洞、恢复措施和用户粘性:在线游戏的准自然实验
在线平台经常遇到系统漏洞的挑战,例如漏洞,某些用户可以利用这些漏洞获取非法收益。这些平台在制定对策时面临两难境地,尤其是在决定是否惩罚违规者时。不同的对策可能导致不同的经济影响,包括随后的用户粘性。在本研究中,基于某知名网络游戏平台的独特现场数据,我们发现漏洞的发生对观察玩家的在线时间和消费有负面影响。令人惊讶的是,尽管平台对漏洞负有责任,但与惩罚违规者相比,不惩罚违规者会导致观察玩家的平台粘性大幅下降。对于直接受到违规行为影响的观察员来说,这种影响尤其明显。我们的研究结果强调了该平台在公平惩罚违规者方面的重要作用。为了确保网络平台的长期繁荣和参与者的整体福利,平台必须保持高质量的制度控制,并实施有效的规则执行治理机制,从而恢复网络社区的正义和秩序。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
9.10
自引率
8.20%
发文量
120
期刊介绍: ISR (Information Systems Research) is a journal of INFORMS, the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. Information Systems Research is a leading international journal of theory, research, and intellectual development, focused on information systems in organizations, institutions, the economy, and society.
期刊最新文献
Win by Hook or Crook? Self-Injecting Favorable Online Reviews to Fight Adjacent Rivals Omnificence or Differentiation? An Empirical Study of Knowledge Structure and Career Development of IT Workers Timely Quality Problem Resolution in Peer-Production Systems: The Impact of Bots, Policy Citations, and Contributor Experience Does David Make A Goliath? Impact of Rival’s Expertise Signals on Online User Engagement How to Make My Bug Bounty Cost-Effective? A Game-Theoretical Model
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1