CDS Channels of Influence on Discretionary Accruals

Hao Cheng,Kian Guan Lim
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Abstract

Existing studies indicated that firm debt holders can use the credit default swap (CDS) market to hedge their credit risk, and thus they would reduce their monitoring of the firms, leading to largely distressed firms shirking and increasing positive abnormal earnings accruals. Besides providing insurance, however, the CDS spreads also perform price discovery of credit risk information sought by trade creditors and potential lenders who are not protected. High absolute abnormal discretionary accruals or bad earnings quality, especially negative abnormal accruals, would lead adverse CDS price signals that are very costly to the firm. This compels the firm under nondistressed conditions to be able to improve cash holdings, cash flows, working capital, and earnings reporting quality. Our new results indicate that the channels of improvement in earnings quality are through a firm’s large accounts payable and low cash holdings related to trade credit exposures. In the longer run, this leads to higher profitability and improved firm value. Thus, the generation of public information via the CDS market reduces information asymmetry and can enforce greater discipline in discretionary accounts reporting.
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CDS对可操纵性应计利润的影响渠道
现有研究表明,企业债务持有人可以利用信用违约互换(CDS)市场来对冲其信用风险,从而减少对企业的监控,导致大部分陷入困境的企业逃避并增加正异常应计收益。然而,除了提供保险之外,CDS价差还对没有受到保护的商业债权人和潜在贷款人寻求的信用风险信息进行价格发现。高的绝对异常可支配应计利润或不良的盈余质量,特别是负的异常应计利润,将导致不利的CDS价格信号,这对公司来说是非常昂贵的。这迫使公司在非困境条件下能够改善现金持有量、现金流、营运资本和收益报告质量。我们的新结果表明,盈余质量改善的渠道是通过公司的大额应付账款和与贸易信贷风险相关的低现金持有量。从长远来看,这将导致更高的盈利能力和企业价值的提高。因此,通过CDS市场产生的公开信息减少了信息不对称,并可以在可自由支配的账户报告中执行更严格的纪律。
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