Abnormal CSR Performance and Auditor Litigation Risk

Li (Lily) Zheng Brooks, C. S. Agnes Cheng
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Abstract

Recent studies provide evidence that corporate social responsibility (CSR) conscious firms are less likely to engage in high-profile corporate misconduct and be subject to SEC investigations, suggesting that auditor litigation risk may be lower for better CSR performers. However, we argue that the association between CSR performance and auditor litigation risk may not be linear for two reasons. First, for a given level of audit risk, the lower the perceived risk of material misstatement, the higher the actual detection risk. Second, ceteris paribus, an incorrectly assessed low audit risk acceptable for abnormally high CSR performance would also increase auditor’s actual detection risk. Using a matched sample analysis for the period of 2004 to 2013, this study finds that the propensity for auditors to be sued first decreases as CSR performance improves, but then increases with excessively high abnormal CSR performance. Further analyses indicate that the convexity of CSR performance on auditor detection risk arises from the inherent risk channel (client business risk, financial misreporting, and earnings management), but not from the control risk channel (internal control material weaknesses). This study provides new insights on the signaling value of CSR performance on an auditor’s litigation risk.
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企业社会责任异常表现与审计师诉讼风险
最近的研究证明,有企业社会责任意识的公司不太可能从事引人注目的公司不当行为,也不太可能受到美国证券交易委员会的调查,这表明企业社会责任表现较好的公司的审计师诉讼风险可能较低。然而,我们认为企业社会责任表现与审计师诉讼风险之间的关联可能不是线性的,原因有二。首先,在给定的审计风险水平下,感知到的重大错报风险越低,实际发现的风险就越高。其次,在不考虑其他因素的情况下,对企业社会责任表现异常高的可接受的低审计风险的错误评估也会增加审计师的实际发现风险。通过对 2004 年至 2013 年期间的匹配样本进行分析,本研究发现,审计师被起诉的倾向首先会随着企业社会责任表现的改善而降低,但随后会随着过高的异常企业社会责任表现而增加。进一步的分析表明,企业社会责任绩效对审计师发现风险的凸性来自于内在风险渠道(客户业务风险、财务虚报和收益管理),而不是来自于控制风险渠道(内部控制重大缺陷)。本研究为企业社会责任绩效对审计师诉讼风险的信号价值提供了新的见解。
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