{"title":"Demystifying Legal Personhood for Non-Human Entities: A Kelsenian Approach","authors":"Thomas Buocz, Iris Eisenberger","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqac024","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to show that minimalist theories of legal personhood are particularly well suited to evaluating legal personhood proposals for non-humans. It adopts the perspective of Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal personhood, which reduces legal persons to bundles of legal norms. Through the lens of Kelsen’s theory, the article discusses two case studies: legal personhood for natural features in New Zealand and legal personhood for robots in the EU. While the New Zealand case was an acclaimed success, the EU’s proposal was heavily criticised and eventually abandoned. The article explains these widely differing outcomes by highlighting the relevant legal norms and their addressees rather than legal personhood itself. It does so by specifying the rights and obligations that constitute the legal persons, by preventing the attribution of any other rights and obligations to these persons and, finally, by tracing who is ultimately addressed by the relevant rights and obligations.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"105 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac024","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article aims to show that minimalist theories of legal personhood are particularly well suited to evaluating legal personhood proposals for non-humans. It adopts the perspective of Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal personhood, which reduces legal persons to bundles of legal norms. Through the lens of Kelsen’s theory, the article discusses two case studies: legal personhood for natural features in New Zealand and legal personhood for robots in the EU. While the New Zealand case was an acclaimed success, the EU’s proposal was heavily criticised and eventually abandoned. The article explains these widely differing outcomes by highlighting the relevant legal norms and their addressees rather than legal personhood itself. It does so by specifying the rights and obligations that constitute the legal persons, by preventing the attribution of any other rights and obligations to these persons and, finally, by tracing who is ultimately addressed by the relevant rights and obligations.
期刊介绍：
The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.
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