Oxford Journal of Legal Studies最新文献

It must be rare that discoveries which transform mathematics also undermine legal rules. Yet this is precisely what happened when probability was first developed in the second half of the 17th century and the first decades of the following one. The focus of this article is a doctoral thesis in law written in 1709 by Nicolaus Bernoulli, an important mathematician of the age. He highlighted the dramatic implications of the new mathematics of probability for a rule which was fundamental to contemporary contract law in continental Europe. This article reconstructs a remarkable story about the place of mathematics in the history of contractual justice and the place of contractual justice in the history of mathematics.

A purchaser unwittingly buys stolen goods. The owner from whom they were stolen demands their return. The purchaser refuses. How should the law resolve their dispute? This article argues that the law's primary objective in resolving disputes between owners and good faith purchasers should not be to achieve 'justice' between the parties but to disincentivise theft. With some categories of goods, it is difficult to see how the legal attribution of liability can achieve this end. However, where goods are amenable to registration, the rules of good faith purchase can discourage theft by conditioning an owner's success over a good faith purchaser on the fact of prior registration. In the absence of a register, there seems little to choose between the parties. However, because the favoured party will frequently be a monopolist, the danger of holdouts warrants employing innovations from auction theory, the effect of which is to force the parties to reveal otherwise private information about their subjective valuations of the disputed goods.

This article examines the role of human agency within two competing regulatory paradigms: law and technological management. It sketches both paradigms and suggests that the direction of regulatory travel in familiar jurisdictions is from the former towards the latter. It then examines the possible effect of this transition upon human agency. It defends a general account of agency, distinguishing that notion from autonomy, and shows that that account informs the legal regulatory paradigm. It then considers whether agency, so conceived, can persist and flourish within a technological management regulatory context. It does so by reference to a thought-experiment. That experiment, and two of three responses to it, assumes that agency can be quantified, and the article shows how this can be done. It concludes that a transition from legal regulation to technological management will reduce the amount of human agency in the world and imperil other important values.

The 'one voice' doctrine holds that the executive's recognition of foreign states and governments is conclusive evidence of their status as such in English proceedings. However, the doctrine-properly understood as an irrebuttable presumption of status-is beset with theoretical and practical problems. Here, I argue that courts should abandon it, for three reasons: first, the doctrine is motivated by overbroad accounts of the executive's foreign affairs prerogative; second, it suffers from inconsistencies on matters of scope, which its underlying justifications cannot resolve; and third, the doctrine creates conceptual incoherence, undermining the purpose of other doctrines which operate contingently upon it. In its place, courts should adopt an alternative rule, triggering a rebuttable presumption of status and attributing evidential weight to executive certificates, which avoids these problems while still serving the 'one voice' doctrine's only legitimate purpose: helping courts reliably answer questions of status.

For many political constitutionalists, the ordinary democratic process should be the constitution; constitutional entrenchment and strong-form judicial review should be avoided. But how is ordinary democratic politics understood by political constitutionalists? To answer this question, this article engages in an interpretative inquiry to delineate four distinct ideological readings of political constitutionalism-democratic socialist, liberal, republican and conservative-that are alive within the existing literature. It does so to explain how these readings articulate subtly different understandings of ordinary democratic politics. In doing so, it reflects on how to identify political constitutionalist thought; how political constitutionalism can appeal to different ideologies; how ideologies have influenced the theory's intellectual development; and the ideological conditions required to sustain a political constitution.

Important cases and academic commentators have suggested that the mutual consent of principal and agent is necessary for actual authority to be conferred on the agent. The chief purpose of this article is to show that this view of mutual consent's role in agency law is inaccurate and misleading. Its central claim is that the agent's consent is not a necessary pre-condition for the conferral of authority. Instead, a principal can confer authority on an agent unilaterally. However, when authority is conferred unilaterally on an agent, the external aspect of agency is fully present, but the internal principal-agent relationship possesses two unique features, one relating to the agent's duties and the other relating to the agent's ability to disclaim. The account presented here thus clarifies the proper scope of 'mutual consent' justifications in agency. Mutual consent may justify some incidents of agency, but it does not justify them all.

This article provides a historical perspective on capacity to consent to sex. It examines who could make decisions about sex, whose consent mattered and why. The article draws from legal history and from transcripts and testimonies in unreported sexual offence cases in England, heard in the Central Criminal Court in London and the regional assizes between the years of 1918 and 1950. These cases, often involving vulnerable complainants below the age of consent and those with mental disabilities, show that the concept of capacity was neither fixed nor clearly articulated. The article argues that, historically, capacity was not a biological or medical construct, but rather a social one, influenced by notions of class, gender and even eugenic ideals. The article demonstrates that, during this period, sexual offence law enabled social and population control, and that, despite significant legislative advances, capacity remains a fraught concept.

This article investigates how human rights considerations are increasingly shaping tort law by focusing on the gradual expansion of the duty of care in business and human rights cases. For decades, victims have attempted to hold parent companies to account for extraterritorial human rights abuses committed by their foreign subsidiaries. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that UK courts have jurisdiction over such business and human rights cases. These cases are not only jurisdictional. They also contributed to developing the duty of care case law on parental liability. But how much can human rights considerations stretch the boundaries of tort law? The article analyses the case of climate change litigation to assess whether a further development in tort law jurisprudence would be necessary to hold corporations accountable for their contribution to climate change.

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 expanded the identification doctrine in welcome ways, but, I argue, does not go far enough. Specifically, I contend that the Act's reforms do not sufficiently respond to the threat of senior managers who culpably interfere in the proper flow of information within the company to orchestrate harmful or risky practices by others, all while seeking to avoid liability by preventing any individual from forming the full mens rea of any economic crime. How should the criminal law respond to this gap? I argue it would be problematic to respond by extending individual liability even further-say, by expanding the already 'disturbingly wide' inchoate offences in the Serious Crime Act 2007. Instead, the collective knowledge doctrine provides a tailor-made solution to these scenarios. This doctrine would permit courts (in narrow circumstances) to aggregate individuals' mental states within the company to construct a distinct corporate mens rea. I argue that section 196 of the 2023 Act, which expands the identification doctrine, could be read to incorporate a narrow version of the collective knowledge doctrine-at least if courts are willing to adopt a purposivist orientation aimed at giving effect to the wider aims of Parliament. A restricted version of the collective knowledge doctrine would have normative benefits and so, I suggest, is worth putting to the courts through test litigation.