Slurs and antipresuppositions

Abstract

It has been observed (Heim in Semantik: Ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen Forschung, 487–535, 1991) that when there is competition between alternative sentences with different presuppositional strength, use of the weaker alternative triggers an inference, sometimes called an antipresupposition, to the effect that the presupposition of the stronger alternative is not satisfied. Furthermore, it has been argued that in order to account for antipresuppositions, it is necessary to postulate an independent pragmatic principle called Maximize Presupposition!, which states that the sentence with the stronger presupposition should be preferred whenever its presupposition is satisfied. In parallel, presuppositional theories of slurs (Cepollaro, PhD thesis. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01508856/document, 2017; Cepollaro and Stojanovic in Grazer Philosophische Studien 93(3): 458–488, 2016; Schlenker in Theoretical Linguistics 33(2): 237–245. https://doi.org/10.1515/TL.2007.017, 2007) maintain that while these expressions encode the same truth-conditional content as their neutral counterparts, they trigger a presupposition that accounts for their derogatory potential. In this article, I argue that presuppositional theories of slurs together with Maximize Presupposition! predict that the use of a neutral counterpart triggers an antipresupposition to the effect that the presupposition of the corresponding slur is not satisfied. As a result, this view incorrectly predicts (i) that it is infelicitous to use the neutral counterpart in contexts where the slur’s presupposition is satisfied, and (ii) that felicitous use of the neutral counterpart in a context that is unspecific w.r.t. the pejorative presupposition typically triggers the inference that the presupposition of the corresponding slur is not satisfied.