Endogenous property rights and the nature of the firm

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Economica Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI:10.1111/ecca.12506
Carmine Guerriero, Giuseppe Pignataro
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Abstract

While focusing on residual control rights, the property rights theory of the firm overlooks that the legal protection of each party's input shapes its ex post bargaining power. To evaluate this issue, we assume that the property rights on the inputs are selected by a legislator to maximize full investment and, conditional on this goal being reached, minimize inefficient deviations to intermediate investment profiles. Our model delivers three key novel implications. First, the strength of a party's property rights is related negatively to the strength of its residual control rights and determines entirely its ex ante incentives to invest. Second, the legislator tends to protect a firm less when its default payoff under its preferred ownership structure is larger and when its contribution to the relationship is the greatest. Finally, the extent of integration falls weakly with the default payoffs and displays an inverted U-shaped link with the intensity of the downstream firm's investment activity. Crucially, these predictions are consistent with the relationships between proxies for the strength of the downstream firms' property rights and firms' presence in the value chain, and measures of asset specificity and R&D intensity for 119 countries observed over the 2006–18 period.

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内生产权与企业性质
企业产权理论的重点是剩余控制权,但忽略了对各方投入的法律保护会影响其事后议价能力。为了评估这一问题,我们假定立法者选择的投入产权能够最大限度地增加全部投资,并在实现这一目标的条件下,最大限度地减少对中间投资状况的无效偏离。我们的模型有三个关键的新含义。首先,一方产权的强度与其剩余控制权的强度成负相关,并完全决定了其事前的投资动机。其次,当一家公司在其优先所有权结构下的违约回报越大、对双方关系的贡献越大时,立法者对该公司的保护就越少。最后,一体化程度与违约报酬的关系微弱,与下游企业的投资活动强度呈倒 U 型关系。最重要的是,这些预测与 2006-18 年间在 119 个国家观察到的下游企业产权强度、企业在价值链中的存在、资产专用性和研发强度等代用指标之间的关系是一致的。
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来源期刊
Economica
Economica ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
49
审稿时长
5 weeks
期刊介绍: Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.
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