Michael Allgrunn, Christopher Douglas, Sebastian Wai
{"title":"Optimal Timeout Choices in Clutch Situations in the NBA","authors":"Michael Allgrunn, Christopher Douglas, Sebastian Wai","doi":"10.1177/15270025231217961","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When down by a possession in fourth quarter with the shot clock off and possessing the ball, National Basketball Association (NBA) coaches face a decision: take a timeout and draw up a play or let play continue. Utilizing play-by-play data for 16,839 NBA games, we find taking a timeout lowers a team's chances of a successful possession by 5.7 percentage points. Coaches might view taking a timeout as the safe decision, since blame for the loss would fall on the players for not executing the play, not on the coach for failing to call one. This suboptimal behavior suggests there is a principal–agent problem between team owners and coaches.","PeriodicalId":51522,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Sports Economics","volume":"93 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Sports Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/15270025231217961","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
When down by a possession in fourth quarter with the shot clock off and possessing the ball, National Basketball Association (NBA) coaches face a decision: take a timeout and draw up a play or let play continue. Utilizing play-by-play data for 16,839 NBA games, we find taking a timeout lowers a team's chances of a successful possession by 5.7 percentage points. Coaches might view taking a timeout as the safe decision, since blame for the loss would fall on the players for not executing the play, not on the coach for failing to call one. This suboptimal behavior suggests there is a principal–agent problem between team owners and coaches.
期刊介绍：
Journal of Sports Economics publishes scholarly research in the field of sports economics. The aim of the journal is to further research in the area of sports economics by bringing together theoretical and empirical research in a single intellectual venue. Relevant topics include: labor market research; labor-management relations; collective bargaining; wage determination; local public finance; and other fields related to the economics of sports. Published quarterly, the Journal of Sports Economics is unique in that it is the only journal devoted specifically to this rapidly growing field.
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