Agentic misrecognition in the global monetary system

Abstract

This article employs the framework of agentic misrecognition to explore the institutional dynamics and distinct forms of agency operative in the global monetary system. The analysis is framed by the concept of “political recognition,” exploring the relationship between the dominant actor and subordinate actors, and showing the complex ways by which misrecognition is performed through, as well as shaped by, the sociopolitical logics of the monetary system. It shows how with the employment of formalist methodologies, the dominant actor protects its status by misrecognizing and resisting pleas for greater concern and more coordination, seeing subordinates not as creative agents but as challenges to its dominance. The analysis also explores how and why subordinate members come to support the misrecognition scheme even though it perpetuates instability and systemic inequalities. Similar to most studies on recognition theory, this article pays close attention to the plight of the misrecognized, but the analysis is also concerned with understanding the underlying cause of the misrecognition scheme and how the dominant actor as misrecognizer contributes to dysfunctions in the monetary system. In demonstrating the underlying features of the misrecognition scheme, this critique challenges established theories and methodologies in the monetary sphere.