Golden rule in cooperative commons

S. Flåm
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Abstract

This paper considers common use of natural, renewable resources. It identifies good prospects for efficiency and welfare. To be precise, a core outcome -- hence cooperation -- can be secured over time by principal planning of total quotas, and in time by agents who share these in short-term markets. Information flows in two directions: to the principal as market prices and from him as total quantities. Of particular interest is eventual convergence to a golden-rule, steady state.
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合作公地的黄金法则
本文探讨了自然和可再生资源的共同使用问题。它指出了提高效率和福利的良好前景。准确地说,核心成果--即合作--可以通过委托人对总配额的长期规划,以及在短期市场上分享这些配额的代理人的及时规划来保证。信息是双向流动的:流向委托人的是市场价格,流出委托人的是总量。特别值得关注的是,最终会趋于黄金法则的稳定状态。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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6 weeks
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