Asymptotic Performance Limitations in Cyberattack Detection

IF 2.4 Q2 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC IEEE open journal of circuits and systems Pub Date : 2023-12-04 DOI:10.1109/OJCAS.2023.3338639
Onur Toker
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Abstract

In this paper, we consider the difficulty of cyberattack detection with $d$ sensors and $n$ observations, and derive performance bounds that are valid independent of the attack detection algorithm used. In other words, regardless of whether it is an artificial intelligence (AI) or sensor fusion based approach or it is derived using a completely new innovative idea, a cyberattack detector using multiple observations does have certain fundamental performance bounds that are independent of the algorithm used. Cyberattacks introduce different forms of anomalies that may be small or large, and given enough measured data, even tiny anomalies will become more noticeable and cyberattack detection problem will be easier provided that a carefully designed attack detection algorithm is used. For example, False Data Injection (FDI) attacks with small injected error may be harder to detect, but such attacks can cause major failures if continued over a long time period. A natural question to ask is to what degree the cyberattack detection problem becomes easier if more and more measurements acquired over a long time period are used for threat assessment, and the risk level reduction achieved for each new observation. For a cyberattack detector, the false alarm rate is the probability of triggering an alarm when there is no cyberattack, and the probability of miss is the probability of not detecting a cyberattack. The risk level of a cyberattack detector is defined as the sum of the probability of false alarm and the probability of miss. By using the notion of Hellinger distance and total variation norm between probability distributions, we derive upper and lower bounds for the minimum possible (achievable) risk level under multiple measurements, and study asymptotic properties of such bounds. These performance bounds are valid regardless of the cyberattack detection algorithm selection; they imply certain fundamental performance limits in cyberattack detection applications with given number of observations; and also help us to understand the number of observations needed for a given cyberattack detection performance level.
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网络攻击检测的渐进性能限制
在本文中,我们考虑了使用 $d$ 传感器和 $n$ 观测数据进行网络攻击检测的难度,并推导出了与所使用的攻击检测算法无关的性能边界。换句话说,不管是基于人工智能(AI)或传感器融合的方法,还是使用全新的创新理念推导出的方法,使用多个观测值的网络攻击检测器确实具有一定的基本性能界限,而这些性能界限与所使用的算法无关。网络攻击会带来不同形式的异常,这些异常可大可小,只要有足够多的测量数据,即使是微小的异常也会变得更加明显,只要使用精心设计的攻击检测算法,网络攻击检测问题就会变得更加容易。例如,注入微小误差的虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击可能较难检测到,但如果这种攻击持续很长时间,就会造成重大故障。一个自然而然的问题是,如果在威胁评估中使用越来越多的长期测量数据,网络攻击检测问题会在多大程度上变得更容易?对于网络攻击检测器来说,误报率是指在没有网络攻击的情况下触发警报的概率,漏报率是指没有检测到网络攻击的概率。网络攻击检测器的风险等级定义为误报概率和漏报概率之和。通过使用概率分布之间的海灵格距离和总变化规范的概念,我们推导出了多重测量条件下最小可能(可实现)风险水平的上界和下界,并研究了这些界限的渐近特性。无论选择何种网络攻击检测算法,这些性能界限都是有效的;它们意味着网络攻击检测应用在给定观测数据数量下的某些基本性能极限;同时也有助于我们理解给定网络攻击检测性能水平所需的观测数据数量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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