Contradiction, Negation, and the Catus. ṣko.tṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuh.ḥśataka

IF 0.4 2区哲学 0 ASIAN STUDIES JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI:10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4

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Abstract

Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the catuṣkoṭi via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using prasajya-pratiṣedha or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative catuṣkoṭi, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the catuṣkoṭi are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the catuṣkoṭi is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions.

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矛盾、否定和卡图斯。ṣko.tṭi：达摩帕拉对伊利耶德瓦的《卡图希斯达卡》的评论中的几个段落

摘要当我们不确定古印度佛教思想家用自然语言谈论 "矛盾 "等问题时，使用充满逻辑性的术语来翻译和解释他们所说的话，有时会让人感到沮丧。我牢记维特根斯坦的告诫："不要想，要看！"，通过对达摩巴拉《大正广百论》中几个相关段落的逐一研究，来探讨矛盾、否定和 "藏"（catuṣkoṭi）的问题。以下是一些相互关联的看法，尤其是考虑到本研究的有限范围及其方法论方面的考虑，这些看法不应一概而论。首先，存在不反对的隐性规则，由于隐性限定，表面上的反对不可能有真正的反对。此外，这些都不是自 Dignāga 以来或之后出现的新问题。其次，达摩巴拉及其同时代人熟悉两种否定用法，prasajya-pratiṣedha 用于否定对方的论点，与无对立观点有关。给使用prasajya-pratiṣedha 的句子或术语没有真实对象的论题赋予真值并不是一个好主意。而达摩帕拉的论题只是治疗工具。第三，在达摩巴拉对否定性的 "菩提心"（catuṣkoṭi）的论述中，我们可以看到不反对的规则、限定的策略和两种否定的用法。虽然 catuṣkoṭi 中的四个位置被认为是相互排斥、共同穷尽的，但它们在语用语境中是共同穷尽的，在某些解释中是相互排斥的，而不是全部。我的初步建议是，"catuṣkoṭi "是一种松散的基于术语的分类方式。最后但并非最不重要的是，在所讨论的文本中，我没有看到佛教思想家认可任何矛盾。

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Multiple-

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0.80

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0.00%

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期刊介绍： The Journal of Indian Philosophy publishes articles on various aspects of Indian thought, classical and modern. Articles range from close analysis of individual philosophical texts to detailed annotated translations of texts. The journal also publishes more speculative discussions of philosophical issues based on a close reading of primary sources.