JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY最新文献

This paper focuses on Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhist Abhidharma ontologies and their engagement. A close reading of two hitherto uncompared passages from Pātañjalayogaśāstra 2.13 and Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 4.94 suggests that they are intertextual or interdiscursive. A mirrored argument form in the texts explains ethical causality (karma) in relation to rebirth (punarjanman). The arguments in both texts are similar in form, sequence, and even conclusion, although not in terms of the doctrinal basis of reasoning. On first examination, both arguments analyse how action (karma) sustains patterns of moral repercussion across life and beyond death in terms of singular and plural causes and effects. But a close reading shows that the level of conceptual engagement on this issue is more nuanced – centred on ‘projecting’ and ‘completing’ mechanisms of karmic retribution (ākṣepaka karman and paripūraka karman) as well as determinate or indeterminate (niyata and aniyata) maturation of karmic effects. The paper suggests that the function of Patañjali’s passage was to serve as a structured engagement with Buddhist Sarvāstivāda karma theory.

Among the many works that Vedānta Deśikaṉ—(traditional dates: 1268-1369), a most eminent theologian of all times—composed in his lifetime, his minor works—thirty in number and collectively known as the Cillaṟai rahasyam (‘miscellaneous esoterica’)—stand out like guides meant to help those eager Śrīvaiṣṇavas who lack time to deepen their knowledge of Viśiṣṭādvaita by the study of longer and deeper texts. One such rahasyam is the Upakārasaṅgraham, in which Deśikaṉ deals (almost exhaustively) with the theme of God’s countless acts of upakāra (‘aid, help, favour’) upon the individual souls. This beneficence of God’s forms the very basis of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as it involves a discussion of one the three tattvas (‘realities’), namely, God, (and by extension, the sentient entity), as well as on mokṣa (‘liberation’), which is the ultimate aim of the Śrīvaiṣṇava Ācāryas. In this article, which is ultimately meant to introduce to the reader an important but little-known text, I shall explore the topic of infinite divine upakāra as elaborated upon by Vedānta Deśikaṉ in his Upakārasaṅgraham, which, according to this text, ought to inspire human gratitude. And in the process, we shall also examine the nature and object(s) of God’s acts of upakāra, and the means through which He proceeds to bestow them.

In our study of the development of Buddhist ideas over time, one of the major problems is the absence of the links, connecting different strata, strands or schools of the Buddhist thought. Perhaps, the most extreme example of this is the origin of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, a complex teaching that emerged almost “full-grown” in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. Our knowledge of the historical antecedents of Yogācāra is very scarce and, what concerns the school Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika, contradictory. The Māyājāla-sūtra very likely reveals important details regarding the very origin of the Yogācāra tradition and is, therefore, a long-sought-for source. Māyājāla-sūtra is a sūtra in the recently recovered Sanskrit Dīrgha-āgama. It stands out from the other Dīrgha-āgama sūtras by its diction and unique compositional and doctrinal features. One of its unique features is that its core terminology, its passages and similes are used extensively in the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika-Yogācāra sources, especially in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. In the article, I summarize the sūtra, overview these features and show that the central message of the sūtra is the so-called darśana-mārga, a path of seeing, which is accompanied by supramundane insight (lokottara-prajñā), which enables a Buddhist adept to directly perceive the true reality and become an ārya, noble person. I argue that this central idea of the sūtra is textually and doctrinally (or philosophically) interwoven with the specifically Yogācāra understanding of the darśana-mārga. Moreover, I show that one of the main ideas of the sūtra, the ambivalence of the sense objects, realized at the darśana-mārga, is likely an antecedent of the specifically Yogācāra teaching on the possibility of the same object to cause opposite types of experience, and, as such, an antecedent of the cornerstone Yogācāra principle of vijñaptimātratā (the teaching that the objects of perception are mere representations of/in the mind). Another important aspect explored in this paper is the intertextuality of the Māyājāla-sūtra, its parallels and the first chapters of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, which sheds important light on the origin of the latter text. I argue that these parallels to the Yogācāra teachings are, at the very least, their earlier precedents, and, because of that the Māyājāla-sūtra may be called a proto-Yogācāra sūtra.

This paper deals with the debates over kālamṛtyu (“timely death” or human death at the end of the life span) and akālamṛtyu (“untimely death” or premature death that occurs when the life span still remains). In cultural areas like ancient India, where the karman doctrine or the law of karman is firmly rooted, such “timely death” and “untimely death” have seemed to be the catalysts for the philosophical and ethical debates. Assuming that a person’s life itself would be affected by the person’s past karmans, each life span and death of individual persons would have been predetermined by their past karmans, and consequently, any efforts for preserving or prolonging life span in this world would have no meaning. If it were so, in the first place, does the karman doctrine leave room for “untimely death”? This paper discusses how Buddhist literature, especially the Questions of King Milinda (Milindapañha), and the Āyurvedic literature approach the above issues.

This paper investigates the relationship between the theory of many-sidedness (anekāntavāda), the theory of viewpoints (nayavāda), and the theory of sevenfold conditional predication (syādvāda) in the philosophical monographs of the Jaina philosopher Akalaṅka (c. 720-780 CE). Despite being celebrated as novel Jaina contributions to Indian philosophy, the mutual relationship between these three theories is poorly understood. Do these three theories represent three distinct frameworks with distinct purposes? Or do these three theories ultimately synthesise to form a single unified framework? Through a careful study of the Laghīyastraya and the Nyāyaviniścaya, this paper shows how Akalaṅka understands syādvāda as the central organising framework for integrating the theory of many-sidedness and the theory of viewpoints. On the one hand, syādvāda is analysed as the synthesis of multiple viewpoints because each of the seven conditional predications, when taken individually, represents a genuine viewpoint. On the other hand, the seven conditional predications of syādvāda, when taken collectively and iterated with respect to different characteristics, represent the linguistic formalisation of many-sided (anekānta) Jaina ontology. This paper shows how syādvāda as the grand synthesis of the theory of many-sidedness and the theory of viewpoints creates new possibilities as well as new problems within Akalaṅka’s philosophical system.

Haṭhayoga texts, influential in the development of modern posture-based yoga, offer a conceptual framework intertwining physical cultivation, health, and soteriological aims. This article explores two interconnected inquiries regarding early Haṭhayoga texts: How do they conceptualize health, and how do they perceive the relationship between health and soteriology? These investigations illuminate the place of health in early yoga texts within Hindu traditions prior to its global recognition.

This article reveals that early haṭha texts present a holistic approach to health, highlighting the interconnectedness of curing the mind and healing the body. This process entails not only eradicating physical diseases but also the transcendence of all forms of suffering. The transformative process of eliminating the misleading self-identity (ahaṁkāra) is pivotal, leading directly to health. This relationship extends beyond metaphorical comparisons of healing ignorance and suffering. This ontological framework proposes a harmonious integration between the material and soteriological realms, viewing the healthy body as a physical manifestation of the divine essence. Thus, the emergence of the biomedical discourse surrounding yoga in modern times did not occur autonomously. Haṭhayoga, with its roots dating back to the beginning of the second millennium CE, played a crucial role in shaping this historical transformation.

The thesis I will present is that, whatever its exact origins, the anekāntavāda was primarily (though not exclusively) used for two purposes: (1) to solve the “paradox of causality”, and (2) to classify non-Jaina systems of thought. The earliest texts in which the doctrine occurs present it as a solution to the paradox of causality. Only later do we find its use to classify non-Jaina philosophies.

The current study aims to clarify the meaning, the epistemic construction, and the pragmatics of the term āgama occurring in Pātañjalayogaśāstra I.7 and its commentaries. Since āgama is a linguistic construction, this paper is also a contribution to the inquiry into the philosophy of language of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. The inclusion of linguistic-philosophical arguments corroborates the Pātañjalayoga system of philosophy as a śāstra text and its logical and epistemological paradigm. The structure of the present work is as follows: a first part strictly dealing with textual sources, and a second where the content of textual sources is discussed. Relying on the early literature ranging from the Pātañjalayogaśāstra (c. 400 CE) to the Pātañjalayogasūtravṛtti of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (PYV, half of 17th—half of 18th cent. CE), to āgama can be accorded two principal meanings: as a generic verbal testimony, and as authoritative verbal teachings. Grounded on the evaluated textual material, the second part of this essay presents a hypothesis aiming at the understanding of verbal testimony: in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, āgama exhibits an epistemological, linguistic and psychological construction. In fact, as an epistemic theory of verbal testimony āgama functions following three main vectors being: (a) epistemological source and instance of valid cognition, namely a pramāṇa, (b) linguistically structured, āgama exhibits a propositional structure (vākya); and (c) a mental episode, placing āgama as one among the different mental events (cittavṛtti) described in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra.

Vasiṣṭha claims both that all four āśramas are equal and that the householder is the best of the four āśramas. This apparent contradiction would be resolved if either of these claims could be dismissed. Vasiṣṭha's claim that the four āśramas are equal seems entailed, however, by his endorsement of the original formulation of the āśrama system. His claim that the householder is superior, in turn, seems supported by the surplus of arguments that he offers in favor of the householder. Patrick Olivelle takes Vasiṣṭha to advance this surplus of arguments for the householder only to bolster the more modest claim that the householder is equal—and therefore not inferior—to the celibate āśramas. If this right, then Vasiṣṭha's claim that the householder is superior might be understood in the same way. If the balance of evidence weighs in favor of one claim or the other, however, it seems to weigh in favor of the superiority of the householder, rather than the equality of the āśramas. An alternative interpretation takes Vasiṣṭha to evaluate the householder in relation to two distinct metrics. The four āśramas are equal, he says, in their ability to attain the highest heaven. The householder is superior to the other three āśramas, however, in his unmatched contributions to the general welfare.

“Wherever there is smoke there must be fire.” In 1957, Aram M. Frenkian noticed that both ancient Greek and Indian philosophy makes use of the smoke-fire analogy as a model for inferential reasoning. He postulated that Greek use of the example reflected Indian influence on Greek philosophy which was mediated through the works of Pyrrho, the founder of Sceptisicm, who had accompanied Alexander the Great on his Indian campaign (327-5 BCE) and learnt from Indian sages (‘gymnosophists’ as the Greeks called them). More recent scholarship mainly shares his views. In the present paper, I argue that the smoke-fire example formed part of a complex theory of sign inference, and that not only the isolated analogy, but the theory as a whole which it illustrates is present in both cultures. Furthermore, the variants of this theory comprise such close and extended similarities that they must be the result of direct contact between Indian and Greek thinkers, although it is impossible to decide whether they stem from a common origin, or are the result of influence from one culture to the other.