Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines

IF 1.2 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI:10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4
Daniel Bruno Davis, Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap
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Abstract

Corruption plays a central role in underdevelopment in the Philippines, yet there is no reliable, non-aggregate, and periodic measurement for corruption in the country. This study demonstrates the use of statistical techniques to synthesize information from public procurement contracts into one indicator to measure corruption risk for each province in the Philippines from 2004 to 2018. The results show corruption risk decreased from the 2004 term to 2013, and increased to an all-time high in 2016. Regression analysis also shows that two measures of political power concentration among clans—a Hirschman–Herfindahl Index applied to the political sphere (Political HHI), and the Size of the Largest Dynasty per Province—is significantly and positively linked to the corruption risk indicator at least at the 5% significance level. This result coheres with emerging literature on political dynasties, suggesting that these debilitate checks and balances and increase the risk of impunity and malgovernance at the local level, particularly in the Philippines. This study highlights the importance of studying corruption vis-à-vis the evolving issue of political dynasties amassing power, and provides further evidence that reforms are required in this area to promote development in democracies.

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腐败风险与政治王朝:利用菲律宾的公共采购数据探索两者之间的联系
腐败在菲律宾的欠发达中起着核心作用,但该国却没有可靠的、非汇总的、定期的腐败衡量指标。本研究展示了如何利用统计技术将公共采购合同的信息综合为一个指标,以衡量菲律宾各省 2004 年至 2018 年的腐败风险。结果显示,腐败风险从 2004 年到 2013 年有所下降,2016 年又上升到历史最高点。回归分析还显示,宗族间政治权力集中度的两个衡量指标--应用于政治领域的赫希曼-赫芬达尔指数(Political HHI)和各省最大王朝的规模--至少在 5%的显著性水平上与腐败风险指标显著正相关。这一结果与有关政治王朝的新兴文献相一致,表明政治王朝削弱了制衡机制,增加了地方一级有罪不罚和治理不善的风险,尤其是在菲律宾。本研究强调了研究腐败问题与不断演变的政治王朝集权问题的重要性,并进一步证明需要在这一领域进行改革,以促进民主国家的发展。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Economics of Governance aims to foster research on governance at many levels: corporations, non-profit organizations, local and federal governments, and international organizations. Applications include the internal organization of firms, corporate governance, the private provision of public goods, local public policies, relations across levels of government, public expenditure and regulation, and problems of credibility and enforcement of international agreements. Though the journal aims to contribute to general economic knowledge, it is also interested in applying theoretical and empirical insights to important current topics. The journal is open to many approaches, including formal theoretical analysis, systematic observation, simulation, and empirical studies. Interdisciplinary contributions by economists, organizational scholars, and political scientists are encouraged. Officially cited as: Econ Gov
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