Logistics Service Openness Strategy of Online Platforms with Vertical Differentiation and Endogenous Service Level

Abstract

This paper explores the strategic motivation for a platform to open its superior logistics service to a third-party seller with an endogenous service level. We consider a Stackelberg game between the platform and the seller who sells products to consumers who perceive the platform’s product as having a higher value than the seller’s product. We characterize the equilibrium results in two schemes regarding opening or not opening the service and present conditions for the platform to open the service and the seller to accept the service. In equilibrium, the platform’s logistics service remains at the same level before and after opening. Particularly, we demonstrate that the motivation for the platform to open the service is not simply collecting extra revenue from the service but can be understood from mitigating price competition and securing its demand and price. We find that the platform is always willing to open the logistics system because it provides the platform an additional tool to manipulate the seller’s pricing behavior and therefore improves its own profit. With a high commission rate, the platform is even willing to subsidize the seller for using the logistics service. A Pareto improvement can be realized for two firms when consumers are highly sensitive to the service level. Consumers are worse off after service opening in most cases. Our analysis offers insights into the incentives of one retailer providing high-quality service for its rival when retailers differentiate in price and service.