Transferring Power to Maintain Control: Decentralization as a National-Level Electoral Strategy in Western Europe

IF 4.5 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS World Politics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1353/wp.2024.a916340
Bonnie M. Meguid
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Abstract

abstract: Why do national governments choose to transfer some of their administrative, political, and fiscal powers to regional authorities? This article develops and tests a nationally focused strategic account: decentralization is a targeted means to bolster a governing party's national-level electoral strength by appeasing the voters of threatening ethnoterritorial parties in national parliamentary elections. Statistical analyses of decentralization across the subnational regions of Western European countries confirm that governing parties transfer additional competencies to regions in which an ethnoterritorial party threat exists, when the government is legislatively vulnerable. In contrast, if a government is not dependent on a region for maintaining national parliamentary control, the presence of a strong ethnoterritorial opponent will not motivate the government to decentralize. These findings help to explain patterns of asymmetrical decentralization across regions within a country and why governing parties decentralize competencies to subnational governments that they do not expect to control.
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转移权力以保持控制:西欧作为国家级选举战略的权力下放
摘要:为什么国家政府会选择将部分行政、政治和财政权力移交给地区当局?本文提出并检验了一种以国家为中心的战略观点:权力下放是一种有针对性的手段,通过在国家议会选举中安抚那些受到威胁的民族地区党派的选民,来增强执政党在国家层面的选举实力。对西欧各国国家以下地区权力下放情况的统计分析证实,当政府在立法上处于弱势时,执政党会向存在民族领土党派威胁的地区转移更多的权力。与此相反,如果政府在维持国家议会控制方面不依赖于某个地区,那么民族地区强大对手的存在就不会促使政府下放权力。这些发现有助于解释一个国家内不同地区之间不对称的权力下放模式,以及执政党为何将权力下放给他们并不期望控制的国家以下各级政府。
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来源期刊
World Politics
World Politics Multiple-
CiteScore
8.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, review articles, and research notes bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics. The journal does not publish articles on current affairs, policy pieces, or narratives of a journalistic nature. Articles submitted for consideration are unsolicited, except for review articles, which are usually commissioned. Published for the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Affairs
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