{"title":"Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?","authors":"Roland Füss, Oliver Lerbs, Alois Weigand","doi":"10.1111/1540-6229.12469","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a community affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden, irrespective of local market conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. “Homeowner communities” may hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. By merging granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census with historical homeownership rates and housing damages during the Second World War as sources of exogenous variation in local homeownership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their population is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax salience is the key mechanism behind this effect. Moreover, we find positive spatial dependence on tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.","PeriodicalId":47731,"journal":{"name":"Real Estate Economics","volume":"135 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Real Estate Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12469","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a community affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden, irrespective of local market conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. “Homeowner communities” may hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. By merging granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census with historical homeownership rates and housing damages during the Second World War as sources of exogenous variation in local homeownership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their population is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax salience is the key mechanism behind this effect. Moreover, we find positive spatial dependence on tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.
期刊介绍:
As the official journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Real Estate Economics is the premier journal on real estate topics. Since 1973, Real Estate Economics has been facilitating communication among academic researchers and industry professionals and improving the analysis of real estate decisions. Articles span a wide range of issues, from tax rules to brokers" commissions to corporate real estate including housing and urban economics, and the financial economics of real estate development and investment.