{"title":"Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises under consumer loss aversion","authors":"Danli Yao , Simai He , Meng Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2023.11.001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we focus on small business enterprises (SBEs) that usually have low market power but can rely on retailers to transact sales and gain the ability to disclose quality information. Moreover, consumer loss aversion (CLA) is pronounced when buying from SBEs that have yet to develop a strong reputation and uncertain quality. We focus on two competing SBEs with heterogeneous quality levels and discuss their quality disclosure strategies— whether selling through a retailer— in the context of CLA. We study the interaction between consumers' prior belief in product quality and CLA and how these factors affect equilibrium outcomes. We show that a situation in which low-quality and high-quality SBEs both choose to disclose will not occur under a neutral consumer attitude, i.e., it happens only when the aversion level is significant. When the aversion level is low, either the low-quality SBE or the high-quality SBE will decide to disclose, and the disclosing party depends on the prior belief. In addition, CLA significantly impacts the monotonicity of both SBEs' and retailers' prices and profits relating to the consumers' prior beliefs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":"9 1","pages":"Pages 62-87"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096232023000598/pdfft?md5=0184bde182f38b11ae13fc505042bbe5&pid=1-s2.0-S2096232023000598-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1093","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096232023000598","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper, we focus on small business enterprises (SBEs) that usually have low market power but can rely on retailers to transact sales and gain the ability to disclose quality information. Moreover, consumer loss aversion (CLA) is pronounced when buying from SBEs that have yet to develop a strong reputation and uncertain quality. We focus on two competing SBEs with heterogeneous quality levels and discuss their quality disclosure strategies— whether selling through a retailer— in the context of CLA. We study the interaction between consumers' prior belief in product quality and CLA and how these factors affect equilibrium outcomes. We show that a situation in which low-quality and high-quality SBEs both choose to disclose will not occur under a neutral consumer attitude, i.e., it happens only when the aversion level is significant. When the aversion level is low, either the low-quality SBE or the high-quality SBE will decide to disclose, and the disclosing party depends on the prior belief. In addition, CLA significantly impacts the monotonicity of both SBEs' and retailers' prices and profits relating to the consumers' prior beliefs.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science (JEAS) is the official journal of the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (CUFE), Egypt, established in 1816.
The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science publishes fundamental and applied research articles and reviews spanning different areas of engineering disciplines, applications, and interdisciplinary topics.