Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises under consumer loss aversion

IF 5.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Management Science and Engineering Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI:10.1016/j.jmse.2023.11.001
Danli Yao , Simai He , Meng Zheng
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Abstract

In this paper, we focus on small business enterprises (SBEs) that usually have low market power but can rely on retailers to transact sales and gain the ability to disclose quality information. Moreover, consumer loss aversion (CLA) is pronounced when buying from SBEs that have yet to develop a strong reputation and uncertain quality. We focus on two competing SBEs with heterogeneous quality levels and discuss their quality disclosure strategies— whether selling through a retailer— in the context of CLA. We study the interaction between consumers' prior belief in product quality and CLA and how these factors affect equilibrium outcomes. We show that a situation in which low-quality and high-quality SBEs both choose to disclose will not occur under a neutral consumer attitude, i.e., it happens only when the aversion level is significant. When the aversion level is low, either the low-quality SBE or the high-quality SBE will decide to disclose, and the disclosing party depends on the prior belief. In addition, CLA significantly impacts the monotonicity of both SBEs' and retailers' prices and profits relating to the consumers' prior beliefs.

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消费者损失规避下的小企业质量披露策略
在本文中,我们关注的是小型企业(SBE),它们通常市场力量较小,但可以依靠零售商进行销售交易,并获得披露质量信息的能力。此外,当消费者从尚未形成良好声誉和质量不确定的小企业购买商品时,消费者的损失厌恶(CLA)会非常明显。我们以两家具有不同质量水平的相互竞争的中小型企业为研究对象,讨论它们的质量信息披露策略--是否通过零售商销售--与消费者损失规避的关系。我们研究了消费者对产品质量的先验信念与合同法之间的相互作用,以及这些因素如何影响均衡结果。我们的研究表明,在消费者态度中立的情况下,低质量和高质量的中小型企业都选择披露信息的情况不会出现,也就是说,只有当厌恶程度很高时,这种情况才会出现。当厌恶程度较低时,无论是低质量金沙国际娱乐网址还是高质量金沙国际娱乐网址都会决定披露信息,而披露信息的一方取决于事先的信念。此外,CLA 还会显著影响中小型企业和零售商与消费者先验信念相关的价格和利润的单调性。
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来源期刊
Journal of Management Science and Engineering
Journal of Management Science and Engineering Engineering-Engineering (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
3.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
108 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science (JEAS) is the official journal of the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (CUFE), Egypt, established in 1816. The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science publishes fundamental and applied research articles and reviews spanning different areas of engineering disciplines, applications, and interdisciplinary topics.
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