False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI:10.1007/s11238-023-09973-5

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters’ preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.

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可分离偏好下的防假名和防策略投票规则

摘要我们考虑的问题是，一个社会使用投票规则从给定的对象集合（候选人、二元问题或类似问题）中选择一个子集。我们假定投票人对对象子集的偏好是可分离的：如果且仅如果对象是好的，那么在一个集合中添加一个对象就会得到一个更好的集合（作为一个单子集合，对象比空集更好）。如果没有投票人因为不如实透露自己的偏好而获益，那么投票规则就是防策略的；如果没有投票人因为以其他身份提交多张选票而获益，那么投票规则就是防假名的。我们将所有满足防假名、防策略和无通调的投票规则描述为这样一类投票规则：如果一个对象在每个社会中都至少有一票，或者在每个社会中都获得全票，那么这个对象就会被选中。为此，我们首先要证明，如果一个投票规则是防假名、防策略和无条件的，那么投票者的身份并不重要。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Theory and Decision Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The field of decision has been investigated from many sides. However, research programs relevant to decision making in psychology, management science, economics, the theory of games, statistics, operations research, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and analytical philosophy have remained separate. Theory and Decision is devoted to all aspects of decision making belonging to such programs, but addresses also possible cross-fertilizations between these disciplines which would represent effective advances in knowledge. The purpose of the journal is to let the engineering of choice gradually emerge both for individual and for collective decision making. Formalized treatments will be favoured, to the extent that they provide new insights into the issues raised and an appropriate modeling of the situation considered. Due to its growing importance, expermentation in decision making as well as its links to the cognitive sciences will be granted special attention by Theory and Decision. Of particular interest are: Preference and belief modeling, Experimental decision making under risk or under uncertainty, Decision analysis, multicriteria decision modeling, Game theory, negotiation theory, collective decision making, social choice, Rationality, cognitive processes and interactive decision making, Methodology of the decision sciences. Applications to various problems in management and organization science, economics and finance, computer-supported decision schemes, will be welcome as long as they bear on sufficiently general cases. Analysis of actual decision making processes are also relevant topics for the journal, whether pertaining to individual, collective or negotiatory approaches; to private decisions or public policies; to operations or to strategic choices. Officially cited as: Theory Decis

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