{"title":"District versus at-large voting: Why district voting results in worse policy for minorities","authors":"Donald Wittman","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102502","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>By making use of voting-rights acts, minorities have forced cities to convert from at-large elections to district elections when there is racially polarized voting and the minority percentage on the city council is significantly below the percentage of the minority population. The voting-rights acts also provide for the creation of majority/minority districts so that minorities are more likely to be elected to city councils. This article undertakes a detailed theoretical analysis of both district and at-large elections and shows that minorities are likely to be better off when there are at-large elections. In at-large voting systems, winning council candidates represent the median over <em>all</em> voters. In contrast, when there are district elections, each council member represents the interests of the median voter in their district. City council policy is then determined by the median council member, whose district represents few if any minorities. Various complications, such as non-voting, are considered with surprising results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 102502"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000041/pdfft?md5=38a894aa1e7efb930cb26fd9679a5637&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000041-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000041","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
By making use of voting-rights acts, minorities have forced cities to convert from at-large elections to district elections when there is racially polarized voting and the minority percentage on the city council is significantly below the percentage of the minority population. The voting-rights acts also provide for the creation of majority/minority districts so that minorities are more likely to be elected to city councils. This article undertakes a detailed theoretical analysis of both district and at-large elections and shows that minorities are likely to be better off when there are at-large elections. In at-large voting systems, winning council candidates represent the median over all voters. In contrast, when there are district elections, each council member represents the interests of the median voter in their district. City council policy is then determined by the median council member, whose district represents few if any minorities. Various complications, such as non-voting, are considered with surprising results.
期刊介绍:
The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).