European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

英文中文

Bank–public sector cooperation in the Vienna Initiative: Addressing the collective action problem through “reverse orchestration” 维也纳倡议中的银行-公共部门合作：通过“反向协调”解决集体行动问题

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102805

Masafumi Fujita , Haewon Youn

While global governance through public-private cooperation covers various issues, financial crisis management usually sees private financial institutions (PFIs) prioritize autonomy, leading to only limited and non-institutionalized cooperation. However, the Vienna Initiative (VI), created during the 2008–2009 Central and Eastern European (CEE) crisis, notably established institutionalized cooperation between PFIs and public actors led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why PFIs agreed to formal collaboration that limited their autonomy in this case remains unclear. Previous research suggests public sector pressure and PFIs' strategic interests in the CEE market. However, the former is challenged by the fact that PFIs' voluntary cooperation preceded the VI, and the latter fails to explain the need for extensive institutionalization. This study introduces a new model of global governance and explains the VI case through it: PFIs, aiming to address the crisis but facing the public sector's collective action problem in sharing crisis management costs, adopted a strategy of “reverse orchestration” to resolve this challenge. Specifically, PFIs utilized the IMF as an intermediary to help establish the VI, and the extensive institutionalization reflected PFIs' preference for constraining public actors rather than themselves. This argument is supported through process tracing, which includes original interviews. This study reinterprets the VI case and enhances the broader literature on global governance by illustrating how resourceful private actors can implement reverse orchestration—leveraging international organizations as intermediaries—to influence state behavior according to their interests.

虽然公私合作的全球治理涵盖了各种问题，但金融危机管理通常是私人金融机构（pfi）优先考虑自治，导致合作有限且非制度化。然而，在2008-2009年中欧和东欧（CEE）危机期间创建的维也纳倡议（VI），特别是建立了pfi与国际货币基金组织（IMF）领导的公共行为体之间的制度化合作。在这种情况下，为什么pfi同意进行限制其自主权的正式合作尚不清楚。先前的研究表明，公共部门的压力和pfi在中东欧市场的战略利益。然而，前者受到pfi自愿合作先于VI的事实的挑战，后者未能解释广泛制度化的必要性。本研究引入了一种新的全球治理模式，并通过它来解释VI案例：pfi以解决危机为目标，但面临公共部门在分担危机管理成本方面的集体行动问题，采用了“反向协调”策略来解决这一挑战。具体来说，pfi利用国际货币基金组织作为中介来帮助建立VI，而广泛的制度化反映了pfi更倾向于约束公共行为者而不是他们自己。这一论点得到了过程追踪的支持，其中包括原始访谈。本研究通过阐释足智多谋的私人行为体如何实施反向协调——利用国际组织作为中介——来根据自身利益影响国家行为，重新解释了全球治理案例，并加强了有关全球治理的更广泛文献。

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引用次数: 0

Friend-shoring, near-shoring, and reshoring in factories America, Asia, and Europe amid rising geopolitical tensions 在地缘政治紧张局势不断加剧的情况下，美国、亚洲和欧洲的工厂在“朋友支持”、“近岸支持”和“回流支持”

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2026-01-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102804

Mitsuyo Ando , Kazunobu Hayakawa , Fukunari Kimura , Hiroshi Mukunoki

This study empirically investigates changes in sourcing patterns across three major production hubs: Factory America, Factory Asia, and Factory Europe. Specifically, using international and intra-national trade data from 2015 to 2024, we examine four types of “shoring” strategies, i.e., political friend-shoring, economic friend-shoring, near-shoring, and reshoring, simultaneously. Our findings provide quantitative evidence of increasing reliance on political friend-shoring, weakening dependence on near-shoring, and recent progress in reshoring amid heightened geopolitical risks, whereas economic friend-shoring appears unattractive on average. Moreover, we show that greater product substitutability does not necessarily lead to more significant changes in sourcing. We also revealed a notable difference across regions in political friend-shoring. The degree of its dependence is consistently most substantial for Factory America, while political motivations remain relatively unattractive for Factory Asia, with some specific variations even within the same Factory.

本研究实证调查了三个主要生产中心的采购模式变化：美国工厂、亚洲工厂和欧洲工厂。具体而言，我们使用2015年至2024年的国际和国内贸易数据，同时研究了四种类型的“支持”策略，即政治支持、经济支持、近支持和回流。我们的研究结果提供了定量证据，表明在地缘政治风险加剧的情况下，人们越来越依赖政治上的朋友支持，对近岸支持的依赖减弱，以及最近在回流方面取得的进展，而经济上的朋友支持平均而言似乎没有吸引力。此外，我们还表明，更大的产品可替代性并不一定会导致采购方面更大的变化。我们还发现，不同地区在政治朋友支持方面存在显著差异。对美国工厂的依赖程度一直是最大的，而政治动机对亚洲工厂来说仍然相对没有吸引力，甚至在同一工厂内部也有一些具体的变化。

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引用次数: 0

Attribution of responsibility for corrupt decisions 腐败决策的责任归属

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2026-01-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102806

Maria Montero , Alex Possajennikov , Yuliet Verbel

This paper studies responsibility attribution for outcomes of collusive bribery. In an experiment, participants labeled as either citizens or public officials can propose a bribery transaction to another participant (labeled as either public official or citizen, respectively), who decides whether to accept the proposal. We then let either the victims of the corrupt transaction or the bystanders of it judge the individual decisions of proposing and accepting. We interpret these judgments as a measure of responsibility attribution. We find that labels (citizen or public official) have a stronger effect than positions in the decision sequence (proposer or responder): public officials are consistently regarded as more responsible for corruption than citizens, while those accepting a bribery transaction are regarded as only somewhat more responsible than those proposing it. Further, we find that victims judge corruption decisions more severely than bystanders, although bystanders’ judgments are also consistently negative. In treatments with a neutral context, we find that judgments are less harsh than in the corruption context, bystanders’ judgments are much less harsh than those of victims, and responders are judged more severely than proposers. Our results suggest that people judge corrupt actors in context, more harshly when they are labeled as law enforcers (i.e., public officials), and that unaffected parties (i.e., bystanders) react nearly as negatively to corruption as those directly affected by it (i.e., victims).

本文研究了串通贿赂结果的责任归属问题。在一个实验中，被标记为公民或公职人员的参与者可以向另一个参与者（分别被标记为公职人员或公民）提出贿赂交易，后者决定是否接受该提议。然后，我们让腐败交易的受害者或旁观者来判断个人的提议和接受决定。我们将这些判断解释为责任归因的衡量标准。我们发现，标签（公民或公职人员）比决策序列中的位置（提议者或回应者）具有更强的影响：公职人员始终被认为比公民对腐败负有更大的责任，而接受贿赂交易的人只被认为比提议贿赂交易的人负有更大的责任。此外，我们发现受害者对腐败决策的判断比旁观者更严厉，尽管旁观者的判断也始终是负面的。我们发现，在中立情境下的判断比腐败情境下的判断更轻，旁观者的判断比受害者的判断更轻，反应者的判断比提议者更重。我们的研究结果表明，当腐败行为者被贴上执法者（即公职人员）的标签时，人们会在特定的背景下对腐败行为者进行更严厉的评判，而不受影响的一方（即旁观者）对腐败的反应几乎与直接受腐败影响的一方（即受害者）一样消极。

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引用次数: 0

Political competition, party structure and economic growth: Theory and evidence from Indian states 政治竞争、政党结构与经济增长：来自印度各邦的理论与证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102808

J.Stephen Ferris , Bharatee Bhusana Dash

This paper uses a two period overlapping generations model with balanced growth to investigate the links arising among political competition, the effective number of political parties (ENP), the composition of government spending and the growth rate of the economy. The model highlights three hypotheses with respect to political competition and ENP. First, while a small rise in ENP is required to breakdown oligopolistic political power, a further rise will fragment the credibility of opposition to the incumbent governing party, lessening effective competition and leading to operational inefficiency and excessive government size. The second hypothesis argues that an increase in party competitiveness produces a compositional output response leading to a more consumption intensive package of government services. Third, effective party competition is complementary with economic growth. All three imply a non-monotonic relationship with ENP. A panel of annual data on 14 major Indian states spread over six decades is used to test these predictions and the results suggest that the data from Indian states fit well with the predictions of the model.

本文采用平衡增长的两期重叠代模型，考察了政治竞争、有效政党数、政府支出构成和经济增长率之间的关系。该模型强调了关于政治竞争和环境政策的三个假设。首先，虽然ENP的小幅上升是打破寡头垄断政治权力所必需的，但进一步上升将破坏现任执政党反对派的可信度，减少有效竞争，导致运作效率低下和政府规模过大。第二种假设认为，政党竞争力的提高会产生一种组合产出反应，从而导致消费密集型的一揽子政府服务。第三，有效的政党竞争与经济增长相辅相成。这三者都暗示了与ENP的非单调关系。一组来自印度14个主要邦的年度数据在过去60年里被用来测试这些预测，结果表明来自印度邦的数据与模型的预测非常吻合。

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引用次数: 0

The euro as an institutionally diverse monetary union 欧元作为一个制度多样化的货币联盟

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102797

Enrico Perotti , Oscar Soons

We analyse the causes and consequences of the adoption of a common currency by countries with persistently different institutional quality, as in the euro area. A diverse monetary union has redistributive effects on investment and fiscal capacity across countries and societal groups. A common currency leads to rapid market adjustments while nominal wages lag, and institutional differences persist, resulting in hidden currency revaluations and devaluations. Productive and fiscal capacity benefit in core countries with stronger institutions, while public spending is less constrained in periphery countries with weaker institutions just as their fiscal capacity is reduced by revaluation. Firms and employment gain in core countries, along with savers in periphery countries.

我们分析了制度质量持续不同的国家（如欧元区）采用共同货币的原因和后果。一个多元化的货币联盟对不同国家和社会群体之间的投资和财政能力具有再分配效应。共同货币导致市场快速调整，而名义工资滞后，制度差异持续存在，导致货币隐性升值和贬值。制度较强的核心国家的生产能力和财政能力受益，而制度较弱的外围国家的公共支出受到的限制较少，因为它们的财政能力因汇率重估而降低。核心国家的企业和就业都在增加，外围国家的储户也在增加。

引用次数: 0

Is local opposition taking the wind out of the energy transition? 当地的反对是否将风能排除在能源转型之外？

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2026-01-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102809

Federica Daniele, Guido de Blasio, Alessandra Pasquini

Local opposition to the installation of renewable energy sources is a potential threat to the energy transition. According to widespread belief, mostly based on anecdotal evidence, local communities tend to oppose to the construction of energy plants due to the supposedly negative externalities therein associated (the so-called “not in my backyard” or NIMBY phenomenon). Using administrative data on wind turbine installation and electoral outcomes across municipalities located in the South of Italy during 2005–20, we estimate the impact of wind turbines' installation on incumbent regional coalitions’ electoral support during the next elections. Our main findings, obtained by instrumenting wind turbine development with wind speed, point in the direction of a mild and not statistically significant electoral impact for right-wing regional coalitions and of a strong and statistically significant positive reinforcement for left-wing ones. Positive reinforcement appears to be weaker but still statistically significant in areas benefitting from a higher tourist penetration. Based on our analysis, the hypothesis of a political cost associated with the development of wind turbines due to a NIMBY type of behavior appears to be rejected by the data.

当地反对安装可再生能源是对能源转型的潜在威胁。根据一种普遍的信念，大多是基于轶事证据，当地社区倾向于反对建设能源工厂，因为它可能带来负面的外部性（所谓的“不要在我的后院”或邻避现象）。利用2005 - 2020年意大利南部各城市的风力涡轮机安装和选举结果的行政数据，我们估计了风力涡轮机安装对下届选举中现任区域联盟选举支持的影响。我们的主要发现是，通过测量风力涡轮机的发展速度，指出了右翼地区联盟对选举的温和影响，在统计上不显著，而左翼联盟对选举的积极影响，在统计上显著增强。在受益于较高游客渗透率的地区，正强化似乎较弱，但在统计上仍然显著。根据我们的分析，由于邻避类型的行为，与风力涡轮机发展相关的政治成本假设似乎被数据所拒绝。

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引用次数: 0

Women in office: The impact of female politicians on gender-based violence reporting 在职女性：女性政治家对性别暴力报道的影响

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102794

Veronica Frisancho , Evi Pappa , Camila Ramírez , Chiara Santantonio

Gender-based violence in the U.S. is a silent epidemic. Twenty percent of women experience rape, yet only one in three reports it. Using FBI data and a regression discontinuity design, we examine the impact of female U.S. House Representatives on reported rapes and intimate femicides. Our findings suggest an increase in reporting, rather than higher levels of violence. Our setting and additional analysis allow us to rule out policy channels. We argue that female politicians serve as role models, influencing reporting through symbolic and social pathways. Congressional speech data support this argument: female legislators advocate more against gender-based violence, and their speeches correlate with higher reporting in their districts.

性别暴力在美国是一种无声的流行病。20%的女性遭受过强奸，但只有三分之一的人报告。使用联邦调查局数据和回归不连续设计，我们研究了美国女性众议院议员对报告的强奸和亲密杀害女性的影响。我们的研究结果表明，举报人数有所增加，而不是暴力程度的上升。我们的设置和额外的分析使我们能够排除政策渠道。我们认为，女性政治家作为榜样，通过象征和社会途径影响报道。国会演讲的数据支持了这一观点：女性立法者更多地倡导反对基于性别的暴力，她们的演讲与她们所在地区更高的报告率相关。

引用次数: 0

Term limits and corruption: Evidence from U.S. states 任期限制与腐败：来自美国各州的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102796

Yacov Tsur

Term limits exert two opposing effects on political corruption: they increase the incidence (frequency) while reducing the magnitude (average cost) of corrupt acts. Higher incidence arises from weakened electoral accountability during lame-duck and penultimate terms. Lower magnitude results from shorter tenures that impede the formation of extensive corrupt networks. Using cross-state variation in U.S. gubernatorial term-limit regimes, the analysis reveals that penultimate-term effects can raise the incidence of corruption by 28 %, yet concurrent reductions in magnitude more than offset this increase. Building on the well-established negative association between economic growth and corruption, the analysis employs observed state-level growth as a proxy for the aggregate impact of corruption. The findings indicate that stricter term limits are associated with lower overall corruption, underscoring the potential role of term limits as an institutional safeguard against political corruption.

任期限制对政治腐败产生两种相反的影响：它们增加了腐败行为的发生率（频率），同时降低了腐败行为的规模（平均成本）。较高的发生率是由于跛脚鸭和倒数第二个任期期间选举问责制的削弱。较低的幅度源于较短的任期，这阻碍了广泛腐败网络的形成。利用美国州长任期限制制度的跨州差异，分析显示倒数第二个任期的影响会使腐败发生率增加28%，但同时减少的幅度远远抵消了这种增加。基于经济增长与腐败之间公认的负相关关系，该分析采用观察到的国家级经济增长作为腐败总体影响的代表。研究结果表明，更严格的任期限制与总体腐败程度较低有关，强调了任期限制作为防止政治腐败的制度保障的潜在作用。

引用次数: 0

When does state capacity Work? Social fragmentation and public goods provision in rural Japan 国家容量什么时候起作用？日本农村的社会分裂与公共产品供给

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-12-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102795

Jiali Shen

It is widely assumed that strong state capacity improves public goods provision. Yet, most existing studies treat the state as an autonomous provider, overlooking how its effects depend on societal context. This study examines how social fragmentation conditions the relationship between state capacity and public goods provision, drawing on original data from rural Japan. The findings reveal that high state capacity enhances provision only where social fragmentation is high; in more cohesive regions, strong state intervention may disrupt informal cooperation, reducing effectiveness. This non-linear effect is robust across multiple checks and is mediated through the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives. These results highlight the conditional nature of state capacity and the importance of state–society relations in shaping public goods outcomes. The study contributes to broader debates on governance and development by demonstrating that state capacity does not operate in isolation, and its effectiveness varies with the structure of social relations.

人们普遍认为，强大的国家能力可以改善公共产品的供应。然而，大多数现有研究将国家视为自主提供者，忽视了其影响如何取决于社会背景。本研究利用日本农村地区的原始数据，考察了社会分裂如何制约国家能力与公共产品提供之间的关系。研究结果表明，只有在社会分裂程度高的地方，高国家能力才能提高供给；在凝聚力更强的地区，强有力的国家干预可能会破坏非正式合作，降低效率。这种非线性效应在多个检查中是稳健的，并通过日本农业合作社进行调解。这些结果突出了国家能力的条件性质以及国家-社会关系在形成公共产品结果方面的重要性。该研究表明，国家能力不是孤立运作的，其效力因社会关系结构而异，有助于就治理与发展问题展开更广泛的辩论。

引用次数: 0

Do fiscal rules undermine public investments? A review of empirical evidence 财政规则会损害公共投资吗？对经验证据的回顾

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-12-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102775

Sebastian Blesse , Luisa Dörr , Florian Dorn , Max Lay

Fiscal rules are a frequent policy measure to restrict deficit-taking among incumbent politicians. In times of increased and sustained investment needs to mitigate the consequences of climate change, and to promote the digital and structural transformation, fiscal rules have become subject to criticism for undermining public investments. We review 36 existing empirical studies examining the effect of fiscal rules on public investments. We also discuss whether more public investments typically come at the cost of higher deficits and whether the effect on public investments differs between rigid and more flexible fiscal rules. Overall, we do not find majoritarian evidence for a negative effect of fiscal rules on overall public investments. Among the papers finding a (significant) effect of fiscal rules on public investments, the number of those that estimate a negative relationship, however, surpass the ones finding a positive relationship. Rigid fiscal rules seem to deter public investments as compared to more flexible and investment-friendly rules which, by contrast, rather increase public investments. Existing evidence does not suggest that public investments come at the cost of higher public deficits in a majority of studies (except in case of flexible fiscal rules). The design of fiscal rules appears to be crucial for higher public investments.

财政规则是限制现任政客赤字的常用政策措施。在需要增加和持续投资以减轻气候变化后果并促进数字和结构转型的时代，财政规则因破坏公共投资而受到批评。我们回顾了36项现有的实证研究，以检验财政规则对公共投资的影响。我们还讨论了更多的公共投资是否通常以更高的赤字为代价，以及刚性和更灵活的财政规则对公共投资的影响是否不同。总体而言，我们没有发现多数人认为财政规则对总体公共投资有负面影响的证据。然而，在发现财政规则对公共投资（显著）影响的论文中，估计存在负相关关系的论文数量超过了发现正相关关系的论文数量。僵化的财政规则似乎阻碍了公共投资，相比之下，更灵活、更有利于投资的规则反而增加了公共投资。现有证据并不表明，在大多数研究中，公共投资是以更高的公共赤字为代价的（灵活财政规则的情况除外）。财政规则的设计似乎对增加公共投资至关重要。

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