Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-02-07DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102814
Teresa Hailer-Röthel
This paper investigates the gendered dynamics of parliamentary interruptions in the German Bundestag across 19 legislative periods (1949–2021). Motivated by anecdotal and journalistic reports of sexist heckling, the study examines whether female politicians face more frequent interruptions and, if so, under which conditions. Using a newly constructed dyadic dataset that links over 200,000 interruptions to individual speeches, the analysis explores how gender, ideology, and institutional position shape patterns of adversarial behavior. The findings reveal that in earlier decades, female MPs were not primarily interrupted by men, while since the late 1980s such a gendered pattern has become observable. In addition, heckling of female MPs often originates from opposing ideological camps or parliamentary blocs. These results nuance existing theories of gender bias in political discourse by highlighting how ideological conflict and inter-gender competition shape communicative power in parliamentary settings.
{"title":"Decoding discourse: Gendered heckling in German Bundestag debates (1949–2021)","authors":"Teresa Hailer-Röthel","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102814","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102814","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the gendered dynamics of parliamentary interruptions in the German Bundestag across 19 legislative periods (1949–2021). Motivated by anecdotal and journalistic reports of sexist heckling, the study examines whether female politicians face more frequent interruptions and, if so, under which conditions. Using a newly constructed dyadic dataset that links over 200,000 interruptions to individual speeches, the analysis explores how gender, ideology, and institutional position shape patterns of adversarial behavior. The findings reveal that in earlier decades, female MPs were not primarily interrupted by men, while since the late 1980s such a gendered pattern has become observable. In addition, heckling of female MPs often originates from opposing ideological camps or parliamentary blocs. These results nuance existing theories of gender bias in political discourse by highlighting how ideological conflict and inter-gender competition shape communicative power in parliamentary settings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102814"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146189046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-01-07DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102809
Federica Daniele, Guido de Blasio, Alessandra Pasquini
Local opposition to the installation of renewable energy sources is a potential threat to the energy transition. According to widespread belief, mostly based on anecdotal evidence, local communities tend to oppose to the construction of energy plants due to the supposedly negative externalities therein associated (the so-called “not in my backyard” or NIMBY phenomenon). Using administrative data on wind turbine installation and electoral outcomes across municipalities located in the South of Italy during 2005–20, we estimate the impact of wind turbines' installation on incumbent regional coalitions’ electoral support during the next elections. Our main findings, obtained by instrumenting wind turbine development with wind speed, point in the direction of a mild and not statistically significant electoral impact for right-wing regional coalitions and of a strong and statistically significant positive reinforcement for left-wing ones. Positive reinforcement appears to be weaker but still statistically significant in areas benefitting from a higher tourist penetration. Based on our analysis, the hypothesis of a political cost associated with the development of wind turbines due to a NIMBY type of behavior appears to be rejected by the data.
{"title":"Is local opposition taking the wind out of the energy transition?","authors":"Federica Daniele, Guido de Blasio, Alessandra Pasquini","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102809","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102809","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Local opposition to the installation of renewable energy sources is a potential threat to the energy transition. According to widespread belief, mostly based on anecdotal evidence, local communities tend to oppose to the construction of energy plants due to the supposedly negative externalities therein associated (the so-called “not in my backyard” or NIMBY phenomenon). Using administrative data on wind turbine installation and electoral outcomes across municipalities located in the South of Italy during 2005–20, we estimate the impact of wind turbines' installation on incumbent regional coalitions’ electoral support during the next elections. Our main findings, obtained by instrumenting wind turbine development with wind speed, point in the direction of a mild and not statistically significant electoral impact for right-wing regional coalitions and of a strong and statistically significant positive reinforcement for left-wing ones. Positive reinforcement appears to be weaker but still statistically significant in areas benefitting from a higher tourist penetration. Based on our analysis, the hypothesis of a political cost associated with the development of wind turbines due to a NIMBY type of behavior appears to be rejected by the data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102809"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145929236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102815
Shaowen Shu , Yinghao Pan , Hao Liu , Jingxian Zou
Can government talk move private capital? We study this question using city-level private entrepreneur symposiums across 293 Chinese cities from 2009 to 2021. Exploiting variation in symposium timing, we find that hosting a symposium increases local private firm investment by 0.24 percentage points—a 5 percent rise relative to the mean. The effect operates through four channels: improved entrepreneurial expectations, expanded credit access, accelerated accounts receivable collection, and reduced transaction costs. Crucially, communication effectiveness depends on follow-through: cities enacting concrete post-symposium policies generate significant investment responses, while those offering only rhetoric see no measurable effect. Effects are strongest during economic downturns, in less-developed cities, and where the private sector is weakest. These findings demonstrate that government communication can coordinate private investment when backed by credible commitment.
{"title":"The Governor’s Gambit: Does government-business communication move private capital?","authors":"Shaowen Shu , Yinghao Pan , Hao Liu , Jingxian Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102815","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102815","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Can government talk move private capital? We study this question using city-level private entrepreneur symposiums across 293 Chinese cities from 2009 to 2021. Exploiting variation in symposium timing, we find that hosting a symposium increases local private firm investment by 0.24 percentage points—a 5 percent rise relative to the mean. The effect operates through four channels: improved entrepreneurial expectations, expanded credit access, accelerated accounts receivable collection, and reduced transaction costs. Crucially, communication effectiveness depends on follow-through: cities enacting concrete post-symposium policies generate significant investment responses, while those offering only rhetoric see no measurable effect. Effects are strongest during economic downturns, in less-developed cities, and where the private sector is weakest. These findings demonstrate that government communication can coordinate private investment when backed by credible commitment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102815"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146189044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102806
Maria Montero , Alex Possajennikov , Yuliet Verbel
This paper studies responsibility attribution for outcomes of collusive bribery. In an experiment, participants labeled as either citizens or public officials can propose a bribery transaction to another participant (labeled as either public official or citizen, respectively), who decides whether to accept the proposal. We then let either the victims of the corrupt transaction or the bystanders of it judge the individual decisions of proposing and accepting. We interpret these judgments as a measure of responsibility attribution. We find that labels (citizen or public official) have a stronger effect than positions in the decision sequence (proposer or responder): public officials are consistently regarded as more responsible for corruption than citizens, while those accepting a bribery transaction are regarded as only somewhat more responsible than those proposing it. Further, we find that victims judge corruption decisions more severely than bystanders, although bystanders’ judgments are also consistently negative. In treatments with a neutral context, we find that judgments are less harsh than in the corruption context, bystanders’ judgments are much less harsh than those of victims, and responders are judged more severely than proposers. Our results suggest that people judge corrupt actors in context, more harshly when they are labeled as law enforcers (i.e., public officials), and that unaffected parties (i.e., bystanders) react nearly as negatively to corruption as those directly affected by it (i.e., victims).
{"title":"Attribution of responsibility for corrupt decisions","authors":"Maria Montero , Alex Possajennikov , Yuliet Verbel","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102806","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102806","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies responsibility attribution for outcomes of collusive bribery. In an experiment, participants labeled as either citizens or public officials can propose a bribery transaction to another participant (labeled as either public official or citizen, respectively), who decides whether to accept the proposal. We then let either the victims of the corrupt transaction or the bystanders of it judge the individual decisions of proposing and accepting. We interpret these judgments as a measure of responsibility attribution. We find that labels (citizen or public official) have a stronger effect than positions in the decision sequence (proposer or responder): public officials are consistently regarded as more responsible for corruption than citizens, while those accepting a bribery transaction are regarded as only somewhat more responsible than those proposing it. Further, we find that victims judge corruption decisions more severely than bystanders, although bystanders’ judgments are also consistently negative. In treatments with a neutral context, we find that judgments are less harsh than in the corruption context, bystanders’ judgments are much less harsh than those of victims, and responders are judged more severely than proposers. Our results suggest that people judge corrupt actors in context, more harshly when they are labeled as law enforcers (i.e., public officials), and that unaffected parties (i.e., bystanders) react nearly as negatively to corruption as those directly affected by it (i.e., victims).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102806"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-01-13DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102805
Masafumi Fujita , Haewon Youn
While global governance through public-private cooperation covers various issues, financial crisis management usually sees private financial institutions (PFIs) prioritize autonomy, leading to only limited and non-institutionalized cooperation. However, the Vienna Initiative (VI), created during the 2008–2009 Central and Eastern European (CEE) crisis, notably established institutionalized cooperation between PFIs and public actors led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why PFIs agreed to formal collaboration that limited their autonomy in this case remains unclear. Previous research suggests public sector pressure and PFIs' strategic interests in the CEE market. However, the former is challenged by the fact that PFIs' voluntary cooperation preceded the VI, and the latter fails to explain the need for extensive institutionalization. This study introduces a new model of global governance and explains the VI case through it: PFIs, aiming to address the crisis but facing the public sector's collective action problem in sharing crisis management costs, adopted a strategy of “reverse orchestration” to resolve this challenge. Specifically, PFIs utilized the IMF as an intermediary to help establish the VI, and the extensive institutionalization reflected PFIs' preference for constraining public actors rather than themselves. This argument is supported through process tracing, which includes original interviews. This study reinterprets the VI case and enhances the broader literature on global governance by illustrating how resourceful private actors can implement reverse orchestration—leveraging international organizations as intermediaries—to influence state behavior according to their interests.
{"title":"Bank–public sector cooperation in the Vienna Initiative: Addressing the collective action problem through “reverse orchestration”","authors":"Masafumi Fujita , Haewon Youn","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102805","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102805","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While global governance through public-private cooperation covers various issues, financial crisis management usually sees private financial institutions (PFIs) prioritize autonomy, leading to only limited and non-institutionalized cooperation. However, the Vienna Initiative (VI), created during the 2008–2009 Central and Eastern European (CEE) crisis, notably established institutionalized cooperation between PFIs and public actors led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why PFIs agreed to formal collaboration that limited their autonomy in this case remains unclear. Previous research suggests public sector pressure and PFIs' strategic interests in the CEE market. However, the former is challenged by the fact that PFIs' voluntary cooperation preceded the VI, and the latter fails to explain the need for extensive institutionalization. This study introduces a new model of global governance and explains the VI case through it: PFIs, aiming to address the crisis but facing the public sector's collective action problem in sharing crisis management costs, adopted a strategy of “reverse orchestration” to resolve this challenge. Specifically, PFIs utilized the IMF as an intermediary to help establish the VI, and the extensive institutionalization reflected PFIs' preference for constraining public actors rather than themselves. This argument is supported through process tracing, which includes original interviews. This study reinterprets the VI case and enhances the broader literature on global governance by illustrating how resourceful private actors can implement reverse orchestration—leveraging international organizations as intermediaries—to influence state behavior according to their interests.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102805"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gender-based violence in the U.S. is a silent epidemic. Twenty percent of women experience rape, yet only one in three reports it. Using FBI data and a regression discontinuity design, we examine the impact of female U.S. House Representatives on reported rapes and intimate femicides. Our findings suggest an increase in reporting, rather than higher levels of violence. Our setting and additional analysis allow us to rule out policy channels. We argue that female politicians serve as role models, influencing reporting through symbolic and social pathways. Congressional speech data support this argument: female legislators advocate more against gender-based violence, and their speeches correlate with higher reporting in their districts.
{"title":"Women in office: The impact of female politicians on gender-based violence reporting","authors":"Veronica Frisancho , Evi Pappa , Camila Ramírez , Chiara Santantonio","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102794","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102794","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Gender-based violence in the U.S. is a silent epidemic. Twenty percent of women experience rape, yet only one in three reports it. Using FBI data and a regression discontinuity design, we examine the impact of female U.S. House Representatives on reported rapes and intimate femicides. Our findings suggest an increase in reporting, rather than higher levels of violence. Our setting and additional analysis allow us to rule out policy channels. We argue that female politicians serve as role models, influencing reporting through symbolic and social pathways. Congressional speech data support this argument: female legislators advocate more against gender-based violence, and their speeches correlate with higher reporting in their districts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102794"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145897925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-01-03DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102793
Daniel Almén
Conscription is making a comeback, and selective conscription has been argued to be better adapted to future military needs, and thus attractive as a model for countries contemplating reintroduction. This paper estimates the effects of selective conscription on subsequent labour market outcomes and education up to age 34, exploiting a sudden downsizing of the Swedish military in 2004. The results show an increase in unemployment in the short run. Earnings decline substantially at first, recover by age 22, but become negative and statistically significant again after age 30. Educational enrolment is delayed, although educational attainment is unaffected by age 34. The adverse labour market effects and delayed education are driven by individuals with high cognitive ability. In contrast, low-ability conscripts increase their educational attainment, and there is no evidence of negative labour market effects for this group.
{"title":"Effects of selective conscription on the labour market and education: Evidence from Sweden","authors":"Daniel Almén","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102793","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102793","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Conscription is making a comeback, and selective conscription has been argued to be better adapted to future military needs, and thus attractive as a model for countries contemplating reintroduction. This paper estimates the effects of selective conscription on subsequent labour market outcomes and education up to age 34, exploiting a sudden downsizing of the Swedish military in 2004. The results show an increase in unemployment in the short run. Earnings decline substantially at first, recover by age 22, but become negative and statistically significant again after age 30. Educational enrolment is delayed, although educational attainment is unaffected by age 34. The adverse labour market effects and delayed education are driven by individuals with high cognitive ability. In contrast, low-ability conscripts increase their educational attainment, and there is no evidence of negative labour market effects for this group.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102793"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146038821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102808
J.Stephen Ferris , Bharatee Bhusana Dash
This paper uses a two period overlapping generations model with balanced growth to investigate the links arising among political competition, the effective number of political parties (ENP), the composition of government spending and the growth rate of the economy. The model highlights three hypotheses with respect to political competition and ENP. First, while a small rise in ENP is required to breakdown oligopolistic political power, a further rise will fragment the credibility of opposition to the incumbent governing party, lessening effective competition and leading to operational inefficiency and excessive government size. The second hypothesis argues that an increase in party competitiveness produces a compositional output response leading to a more consumption intensive package of government services. Third, effective party competition is complementary with economic growth. All three imply a non-monotonic relationship with ENP. A panel of annual data on 14 major Indian states spread over six decades is used to test these predictions and the results suggest that the data from Indian states fit well with the predictions of the model.
{"title":"Political competition, party structure and economic growth: Theory and evidence from Indian states","authors":"J.Stephen Ferris , Bharatee Bhusana Dash","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102808","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102808","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper uses a two period overlapping generations model with balanced growth to investigate the links arising among political competition, the effective number of political parties (ENP), the composition of government spending and the growth rate of the economy. The model highlights three hypotheses with respect to political competition and ENP. First, while a small rise in ENP is required to breakdown oligopolistic political power, a further rise will fragment the credibility of opposition to the incumbent governing party, lessening effective competition and leading to operational inefficiency and excessive government size. The second hypothesis argues that an increase in party competitiveness produces a compositional output response leading to a more consumption intensive package of government services. Third, effective party competition is complementary with economic growth. All three imply a non-monotonic relationship with ENP. A panel of annual data on 14 major Indian states spread over six decades is used to test these predictions and the results suggest that the data from Indian states fit well with the predictions of the model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102808"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2025-12-25DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102796
Yacov Tsur
Term limits exert two opposing effects on political corruption: they increase the incidence (frequency) while reducing the magnitude (average cost) of corrupt acts. Higher incidence arises from weakened electoral accountability during lame-duck and penultimate terms. Lower magnitude results from shorter tenures that impede the formation of extensive corrupt networks. Using cross-state variation in U.S. gubernatorial term-limit regimes, the analysis reveals that penultimate-term effects can raise the incidence of corruption by 28 %, yet concurrent reductions in magnitude more than offset this increase. Building on the well-established negative association between economic growth and corruption, the analysis employs observed state-level growth as a proxy for the aggregate impact of corruption. The findings indicate that stricter term limits are associated with lower overall corruption, underscoring the potential role of term limits as an institutional safeguard against political corruption.
{"title":"Term limits and corruption: Evidence from U.S. states","authors":"Yacov Tsur","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102796","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102796","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Term limits exert two opposing effects on political corruption: they increase the incidence (frequency) while reducing the magnitude (average cost) of corrupt acts. Higher incidence arises from weakened electoral accountability during lame-duck and penultimate terms. Lower magnitude results from shorter tenures that impede the formation of extensive corrupt networks. Using cross-state variation in U.S. gubernatorial term-limit regimes, the analysis reveals that penultimate-term effects can raise the incidence of corruption by 28 %, yet concurrent reductions in magnitude more than offset this increase. Building on the well-established negative association between economic growth and corruption, the analysis employs observed state-level growth as a proxy for the aggregate impact of corruption. The findings indicate that stricter term limits are associated with lower overall corruption, underscoring the potential role of term limits as an institutional safeguard against political corruption.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102796"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-06-01Epub Date: 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102797
Enrico Perotti , Oscar Soons
We analyse the causes and consequences of the adoption of a common currency by countries with persistently different institutional quality, as in the euro area. A diverse monetary union has redistributive effects on investment and fiscal capacity across countries and societal groups. A common currency leads to rapid market adjustments while nominal wages lag, and institutional differences persist, resulting in hidden currency revaluations and devaluations. Productive and fiscal capacity benefit in core countries with stronger institutions, while public spending is less constrained in periphery countries with weaker institutions just as their fiscal capacity is reduced by revaluation. Firms and employment gain in core countries, along with savers in periphery countries.
{"title":"The euro as an institutionally diverse monetary union","authors":"Enrico Perotti , Oscar Soons","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102797","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102797","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyse the causes and consequences of the adoption of a common currency by countries with persistently different institutional quality, as in the euro area. A diverse monetary union has redistributive effects on investment and fiscal capacity across countries and societal groups. A common currency leads to rapid market adjustments while nominal wages lag, and institutional differences persist, resulting in hidden currency revaluations and devaluations. Productive and fiscal capacity benefit in core countries with stronger institutions, while public spending is less constrained in periphery countries with weaker institutions just as their fiscal capacity is reduced by revaluation. Firms and employment gain in core countries, along with savers in periphery countries.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102797"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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