Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102620
Niklas Potrafke
To which extent does business experience of politicians influence economic policies and economic outcomes? I review the new empirical literature which examines this question. The survey encompasses the literature on business politicians at the national, sub-national and local level. The results show that business politicians were active in promoting globalization and market-oriented economic reforms and influenced budget composition. Business politicians prioritized public investment expenditure and increased spending on infrastructure, roads and transport. They decreased spending on public consumption and transfers. The market-oriented policies translated into effects on economic outcomes. In the US states, for example, market-oriented policies of business politicians increased economic growth. Future research should examine how businesspeople in parliament influence economic policies and outcomes and employ survey experiments to investigate voters’ perceptions of business politicians.
{"title":"The economic consequences of businesspeople in politics: A survey","authors":"Niklas Potrafke","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102620","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102620","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To which extent does business experience of politicians influence economic policies and economic outcomes? I review the new empirical literature which examines this question. The survey encompasses the literature on business politicians at the national, sub-national and local level. The results show that business politicians were active in promoting globalization and market-oriented economic reforms and influenced budget composition. Business politicians prioritized public investment expenditure and increased spending on infrastructure, roads and transport. They decreased spending on public consumption and transfers. The market-oriented policies translated into effects on economic outcomes. In the US states, for example, market-oriented policies of business politicians increased economic growth. Future research should examine how businesspeople in parliament influence economic policies and outcomes and employ survey experiments to investigate voters’ perceptions of business politicians.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102620"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102650
Federico Carril-Caccia
This paper quantifies the effects of economic sanctions on bilateral cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) using a gravity model. It examines (1) the direct impact of sanctions on M&As from the sanctioning to the sanctioned country; (2) whether a significant share of M&As employs transit countries to circumvent sanctions; and (3) the heterogeneous effects of sanctions on M&As, considering whether they are imposed by a coalition of countries, the income levels of the sanctioning and sanctioned countries, as well as by sector and by type of restrictions imposed by sanctions. The results indicate that sanctions lead to a 13.5% reduction in bilateral M&As, and that the role of transit countries in circumventing them is limited. The negative effect is more pronounced when sanctions are imposed by a coalition of countries or target low-to-middle-income countries. The effects vary significantly across sectors and types of sanctions. At the sectoral level, the mining and quarrying, and manufacturing sectors are less affected compared to others. Sanctions that combine restrictions on trade, financial flows, and travel have the most severe impact, reducing the number of M&A projects by between 55% and 76%.
{"title":"The impact of economic sanctions on bilateral mergers and acquisitions","authors":"Federico Carril-Caccia","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102650","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102650","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper quantifies the effects of economic sanctions on bilateral cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) using a gravity model. It examines (1) the direct impact of sanctions on M&As from the sanctioning to the sanctioned country; (2) whether a significant share of M&As employs transit countries to circumvent sanctions; and (3) the heterogeneous effects of sanctions on M&As, considering whether they are imposed by a coalition of countries, the income levels of the sanctioning and sanctioned countries, as well as by sector and by type of restrictions imposed by sanctions. The results indicate that sanctions lead to a 13.5% reduction in bilateral M&As, and that the role of transit countries in circumventing them is limited. The negative effect is more pronounced when sanctions are imposed by a coalition of countries or target low-to-middle-income countries. The effects vary significantly across sectors and types of sanctions. At the sectoral level, the mining and quarrying, and manufacturing sectors are less affected compared to others. Sanctions that combine restrictions on trade, financial flows, and travel have the most severe impact, reducing the number of M&A projects by between 55% and 76%.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102650"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102637
Eline Moens , Dyllis De Pessemier , Stijn Baert
Although unequal treatment of workers based on political affiliation is prohibited in many countries, it is conspicuously understudied in the discrimination literature. In this study, we set up a vignette experiment with genuine recruiters to provide more insight into the effect of political engagement in job applicants on the assessment of their resumes by these professionals. We find that, overall, recruiters view an applicant as less creative, open-minded, empathetic and emotionally sensitive when a political engagement is expressed. These stigma are greater for candidates with a right-wing nationalist commitment. Relatedly, these candidates are assessed worse in terms of overall hireability and perceived inclination or taste among employers, colleagues and customers to collaborate with them. They are, however, seen as somewhat more assertive. In contrast to research conducted in one- or two-party systems, we do not find interactions with the political preference of the recruiter herself/himself. Overall, the effect of mentioning a political engagement in a resume is more negative when the required education level of the vacancy is high.
{"title":"How do recruiters assess applicants who express a political engagement?","authors":"Eline Moens , Dyllis De Pessemier , Stijn Baert","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102637","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102637","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although unequal treatment of workers based on political affiliation is prohibited in many countries, it is conspicuously understudied in the discrimination literature. In this study, we set up a vignette experiment with genuine recruiters to provide more insight into the effect of political engagement in job applicants on the assessment of their resumes by these professionals. We find that, overall, recruiters view an applicant as less creative, open-minded, empathetic and emotionally sensitive when a political engagement is expressed. These stigma are greater for candidates with a right-wing nationalist commitment. Relatedly, these candidates are assessed worse in terms of overall hireability and perceived inclination or taste among employers, colleagues and customers to collaborate with them. They are, however, seen as somewhat more assertive. In contrast to research conducted in one- or two-party systems, we do not find interactions with the political preference of the recruiter herself/himself. Overall, the effect of mentioning a political engagement in a resume is more negative when the required education level of the vacancy is high.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102637"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102639
Miriam Hortas-Rico , Ernesto Rodríguez-Crespo
This paper adds new evidence to the existing literature on institutions and well-being. In particular, we examine how women's political empowerment relates to subjective well-being and how this relationship is mediated by institutional quality. Drawing on data from 84 world countries for the period 2006–2019, several interesting findings arise from our results. First, there exists a positive relationship between women's political empowerment and subjective well-being, with the dimension of political representation exhibiting a predominant role. Second, the relationship between women's political inclusion and subjective well-being is mediated by the average quality of government, suggesting the existence of a positive interplay between both explanatory variables. Finally, the role played by institutional quality is contingent on the dimensions of governance considered, since only corruption control and government effectiveness are positive and significantly associated to subjective well-being.
{"title":"How does women's political empowerment relate to subjective well-being? The moderating role of institutional quality","authors":"Miriam Hortas-Rico , Ernesto Rodríguez-Crespo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102639","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102639","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper adds new evidence to the existing literature on institutions and well-being. In particular, we examine how women's political empowerment relates to subjective well-being and how this relationship is mediated by institutional quality. Drawing on data from 84 world countries for the period 2006–2019, several interesting findings arise from our results. First, there exists a positive relationship between women's political empowerment and subjective well-being, with the dimension of political representation exhibiting a predominant role. Second, the relationship between women's political inclusion and subjective well-being is mediated by the average quality of government, suggesting the existence of a positive interplay between both explanatory variables. Finally, the role played by institutional quality is contingent on the dimensions of governance considered, since only corruption control and government effectiveness are positive and significantly associated to subjective well-being.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102639"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102633
Friedrich Heinemann , Justus Nover , Paul Steger
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) provide opportunities for a more flexible and market-based provision of public services. At the same time, they may impair fiscal transparency and offer politicians discretion in the presence of strict fiscal rules if these only constrain the core budget. Using a comprehensive micro-data set of German SOEs, this paper studies a possible impact of the German debt brake on SOEs by tracking changes in financial indicators at the firm level that would hint to a circumvention of the rule. The identification exploits that the mounting compliance pressures over the lagged implementation of the debt brake from 2010 to 2020 differs across the 16 states. The results show that SOEs in fiscally more constrained states exhibit a stronger decrease in equity and reserves and a higher increase in debt compared to SOEs in less constrained states and the shorter the distance to the 2020 deadline. This result is based on a combined sample of state and municipal SOEs, a finding pointing towards the vertical spillover of a fiscal rule.
{"title":"State-owned enterprises, fiscal transparency, and the circumvention of fiscal rules: The case of Germany","authors":"Friedrich Heinemann , Justus Nover , Paul Steger","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102633","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102633","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>State-owned enterprises (SOEs) provide opportunities for a more flexible and market-based provision of public services. At the same time, they may impair fiscal transparency and offer politicians discretion in the presence of strict fiscal rules if these only constrain the core budget. Using a comprehensive micro-data set of German SOEs, this paper studies a possible impact of the German debt brake on SOEs by tracking changes in financial indicators at the firm level that would hint to a circumvention of the rule. The identification exploits that the mounting compliance pressures over the lagged implementation of the debt brake from 2010 to 2020 differs across the 16 states. The results show that SOEs in fiscally more constrained states exhibit a stronger decrease in equity and reserves and a higher increase in debt compared to SOEs in less constrained states and the shorter the distance to the 2020 deadline. This result is based on a combined sample of state and municipal SOEs, a finding pointing towards the vertical spillover of a fiscal rule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102633"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the group-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that, compared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the minority camp (the Titanic effect) and significantly higher in the majority camp (the behavioral bandwagon effect), and these effects are stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the distribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically predicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule.
{"title":"Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: An experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting","authors":"Yoichi Hizen , Kazuya Kikuchi , Yukio Koriyama , Takehito Masuda","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102646","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102646","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the group-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that, compared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the minority camp (the <em>Titanic effect</em>) and significantly higher in the majority camp (the <em>behavioral bandwagon effect</em>), and these effects are stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the distribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically predicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102646"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143349912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102622
Antonio C. David, Can Sever
Unanticipated changes in tax policy are likely to have different macroeconomic effects compared to anticipated changes due to several mechanisms. It is therefore important to understand what drives such policy surprises. We explore the nature of unanticipated tax policy changes by focusing on a political economy determinant of those events, namely the timing of elections. Using monthly data for 22 advanced economies and emerging markets over the period 1990-2018, we show that implementation lags tend to be longer for tax policy change announcements that are made during pre-election periods, thereby leading to a lower likelihood of ”tax news shocks”. We also find that implementation lags become much shorter for tax policy changes that are announced in the aftermath of elections. This pattern remains similar for different tax measures and types of taxes. The findings are robust to a number of checks, including controlling for various economic, institutional and political factors.
{"title":"Unpleasant surprises? Elections and tax news shocks","authors":"Antonio C. David, Can Sever","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102622","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102622","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Unanticipated changes in tax policy are likely to have different macroeconomic effects compared to anticipated changes due to several mechanisms. It is therefore important to understand what drives such policy surprises. We explore the nature of unanticipated tax policy changes by focusing on a political economy determinant of those events, namely the timing of elections. Using monthly data for 22 advanced economies and emerging markets over the period 1990-2018, we show that implementation lags tend to be longer for tax policy change announcements that are made during pre-election periods, thereby leading to a lower likelihood of ”tax news shocks”. We also find that implementation lags become much shorter for tax policy changes that are announced in the aftermath of elections. This pattern remains similar for different tax measures and types of taxes. The findings are robust to a number of checks, including controlling for various economic, institutional and political factors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102622"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102617
B.K. Song , Woo Chang Kang
We investigate whether the effect of rising inequality on electoral outcomes is conditional on local wealth within a country. In general, rising inequality increases support for left-wing parties among both poor and relatively well-off voters, but it also discourages turnout among those who are economically disadvantaged. As a result, left-wing parties’ electoral advantages become more salient in affluent localities, while they diminish in less affluent ones with larger shares of poor voters. To test these claims, we develop a unique measure of local inequality using actual transaction prices for residential housing in South Korea. Our analysis of aggregate data across four national legislative elections between 2008 and 2020 suggests that the effect of rising economic inequality varies depending on local wealth, generating political inequality where the policy preferences of voters in more affluent localities are better represented in the policy-making process.
{"title":"Inequality, local wealth, and electoral politics","authors":"B.K. Song , Woo Chang Kang","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102617","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102617","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether the effect of rising inequality on electoral outcomes is conditional on local wealth within a country. In general, rising inequality increases support for left-wing parties among both poor and relatively well-off voters, but it also discourages turnout among those who are economically disadvantaged. As a result, left-wing parties’ electoral advantages become more salient in affluent localities, while they diminish in less affluent ones with larger shares of poor voters. To test these claims, we develop a unique measure of local inequality using actual transaction prices for residential housing in South Korea. Our analysis of aggregate data across four national legislative elections between 2008 and 2020 suggests that the effect of rising economic inequality varies depending on local wealth, generating political inequality where the policy preferences of voters in more affluent localities are better represented in the policy-making process.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102617"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102629
Nicolas Cachanosky , João Pedro Bastos , Alexandre Padilla , Karla C. Hernández
We study the institutional impact 21st-century left-leaning populist regimes have in Latin America. Looking at the iconic left-leaning populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, we find that these types of populist regimes impose a significant deterioration on the liberal-democracy institutional quality of their countries. The institutional cost is significant and long-lasting, and our synthetic counterfactual suggests that liberal democratic institutions would have improved if not for these populist regimes.
{"title":"The institutional impact of left-leaning populism in Latin America","authors":"Nicolas Cachanosky , João Pedro Bastos , Alexandre Padilla , Karla C. Hernández","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102629","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102629","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the institutional impact 21st-century left-leaning populist regimes have in Latin America. Looking at the iconic left-leaning populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, we find that these types of populist regimes impose a significant deterioration on the liberal-democracy institutional quality of their countries. The institutional cost is significant and long-lasting, and our synthetic counterfactual suggests that liberal democratic institutions would have improved if not for these populist regimes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102629"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102648
Joan Costa-Font , Frank Cowell
This paper examines a behavioural explanation for the Brexit referendum result, namely the role of an individual’s inequality aversion (IA). We study whether the referendum result was an “unconsidered Leave” out of people’s low aversion to inequality. We use a representative sample of the UK population fielded in 2017, and analyse the extent to which lottery-based individual IA estimates predict their Brexit vote. We consider alternative potential drivers of IA in both income and health domains; these include risk aversion, alongside socio-economic and demographic characteristics. A greater aversion to income inequality predicts a lower probability of voting for Leave, even when controlling for risk aversion and other drivers of the Brexit vote. However, this effect is only true among men, for whom an increase in income IA by one standard deviation decreases their likelihood of voting for leaving the EU by 5 percentage points which would have reduced the probability of a leave vote, resulting in an overall remain majority in our sample. However, the effect of health inequality aversion is not significantly different from zero.
{"title":"An unconsidered leave? Inequality aversion and the brexit referendum","authors":"Joan Costa-Font , Frank Cowell","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102648","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102648","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines a behavioural explanation for the Brexit referendum result, namely the role of an individual’s inequality aversion (IA). We study whether the referendum result was an “unconsidered Leave” out of people’s low aversion to inequality. We use a representative sample of the UK population fielded in 2017, and analyse the extent to which lottery-based individual IA estimates predict their Brexit vote. We consider alternative potential drivers of IA in both income and health domains; these include risk aversion, alongside socio-economic and demographic characteristics. A greater aversion to income inequality predicts a lower probability of voting for Leave, even when controlling for risk aversion and other drivers of the Brexit vote. However, this effect is only true among men, for whom an increase in income IA by one standard deviation decreases their likelihood of voting for leaving the EU by 5 percentage points which would have reduced the probability of a leave vote, resulting in an overall remain majority in our sample. However, the effect of health inequality aversion is not significantly different from zero.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102648"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143387915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}