In unsteady waters: How mayors and chief administrative officers make sense of a public service bargain in disequilibrium

Abstract

Public service bargains (PSBs) have become a central heuristic to understand the relationship between politicians and senior bureaucrats. In this article, we add to the existing literature by exploring how both politicians and senior bureaucrats make sense of a PSB in disequilibrium. Based on individual and focus group interviews and six case studies of breakdown in the bargain, we find that bargains may be unstable due to both changing circumstances and differences in interpretations. We add to previous research by demonstrating how the differences in interpretations may manifest themselves along two dimensions, that is, in the balance between the types of competences and rewards that should be included in the bargain as perceived by politicians and senior civil servants, as well as how the competences and rewards agreed upon are interpreted. The way mayors and chief administrative officers (CAOs) understand their relationship (the public service bargain) can sometimes reach a state of disequilibrium. This study explores how such a disequilibrium is interpreted by the relevant actors in terms of competences and rewards. Proactive renegotiation and alignment between mayors and CAOs is essential in responding to individual and relational dynamics to ensure efficient and legitimate cooperation between political and administrative actors.