Modeling of Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion (C.T.P.C.) and Cost Structure in Tunisian Mobile Market

Sami Debbichi, Walid Hichri
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Abstract

We present in this paper a modeling of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) in different market structure using the interconnection fees and their marginal cost, in a Cournot competition. The objective is to compare the preference for collusion regarding this threshold in market structures and within two contexts: linear interconnection costs and quadratic ones. Collusion is more difficult in private duopoly that in a mixed one. This difficulty is increased with linear cost structure than quadratic costs. The findings we obtain from the application of our results to the Tunisian mobile market between (2002-2019) are consistent with our theoretical model.
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突尼斯移动市场串通偏好临界值(C.T.P.C.)和成本结构建模
在本文中,我们利用库诺竞争中的互联费用及其边际成本,对不同市场结构中的合谋偏好临界阈值(C.T.P.C.)进行了建模。目的是比较在市场结构中和在线性互联成本和二次方互联成本这两种情况下合谋临界点的偏好。在私人双头垄断中,合谋比在混合垄断中更难。与二次成本相比,线性成本结构增加了合谋的难度。将我们的结果应用于突尼斯移动市场(2002-2019 年)得出的结论与我们的理论模型一致。
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Modeling of Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion (C.T.P.C.) and Cost Structure in Tunisian Mobile Market Determinants of Taxable Enterprises Compliance In Bali, Indonesia
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