{"title":"Power in sovereign debt markets: debtors’ coordination for more competitive outcomes","authors":"Martin Guzman, Maia Colodenco, Wiedenbrug Anahí","doi":"10.1093/icc/dtae008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Evidence suggests that sovereign debt markets are not featured by perfect competition but power dynamics are a key determinant of market outcomes such as ex-post returns on sovereign bonds. In such environment, coordination within each side of the market matters. With the purpose of influencing the international debt architecture, private creditors have historically been fairly coordinated and their interests more aligned ex-ante. Sovereign debtors, however, have not. The power asymmetry that that entails has equity and efficiency implications, both ex-ante and ex-post. This paper analyzes asymmetries in collective action of each side of the sovereign debt market and the mechanisms through which it affects market outcomes. It also analyses the Cartagena Group’s experience in the 1980s as a prominent historical case of greater borrower coordination and identifies mechanisms through which greater debtor coordination could be fostered.","PeriodicalId":48243,"journal":{"name":"Industrial and Corporate Change","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Industrial and Corporate Change","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtae008","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Evidence suggests that sovereign debt markets are not featured by perfect competition but power dynamics are a key determinant of market outcomes such as ex-post returns on sovereign bonds. In such environment, coordination within each side of the market matters. With the purpose of influencing the international debt architecture, private creditors have historically been fairly coordinated and their interests more aligned ex-ante. Sovereign debtors, however, have not. The power asymmetry that that entails has equity and efficiency implications, both ex-ante and ex-post. This paper analyzes asymmetries in collective action of each side of the sovereign debt market and the mechanisms through which it affects market outcomes. It also analyses the Cartagena Group’s experience in the 1980s as a prominent historical case of greater borrower coordination and identifies mechanisms through which greater debtor coordination could be fostered.
期刊介绍:
The journal covers the following: the internal structures of firms; the history of technologies; the evolution of industries; the nature of competition; the decision rules and strategies; the relationship between firms" characteristics and the institutional environment; the sociology of management and of the workforce; the performance of industries over time; the labour process and the organization of production; the relationship between, and boundaries of, organizations and markets; the nature of the learning process underlying technological and organizational change.