The Analysis and Reexamination of Functionalism from the Perspective of Artificial Intelligence

IF 0.5 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI:10.1007/s11406-024-00719-3
Strahinja Đorđević, Goran Ružić
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Abstract

This paper examines the role of machine functionalism, as one of the most popular positions within the philosophy of mind, in the context of the development of artificial intelligence. Our analysis starts from the idea that machine functionalism is a theory that is largely consistent with the principles behind the strong AI thesis. However, we will see that there is a convincing counter-argument against such claims, and we will problematize this issue. Also, by testing ChatGPT, as the most popular publicly available AI tool, we will make an effort to figure out whether the strong AI thesis could currently even be considered a potentially sustainable principle. Since ChatGPT fails the Turing test our conclusion is that the strong AI thesis cannot be upheld even in principle, implying that the current state of this AI tool does not yet provide strong enough arguments in favor of machine functionalism.

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从人工智能的角度分析和重新审视功能主义
机器功能主义是心智哲学中最流行的立场之一,本文探讨了机器功能主义在人工智能发展中的作用。我们分析的出发点是,机器功能主义是一种与强人工智能理论背后的原则基本一致的理论。然而,我们将看到,有一个令人信服的反驳理由来反对这种说法,我们将对这一问题进行论证。此外,通过测试 ChatGPT(最流行的公开人工智能工具),我们将努力弄清强人工智能理论目前是否可以被视为一个潜在的可持续原则。由于 ChatGPT 未能通过图灵测试,我们的结论是强人工智能理论即使在原则上也无法得到支持,这意味着该人工智能工具的现状还不能为机器功能主义提供足够有力的论据。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHIA
PHILOSOPHIA PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
141
期刊介绍: Founded in 1971, Philosophia is a much-respected journal that has provided a platform to many well-known philosophers, including Kenneth Arrow, A.J. Ayer, Roderick Chisholm, Bas van Fraassen, William Frankena, P.T. Geach, Alan Gewirth, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Popkin, W.V.O. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, Marcus Singer, Peter Singer, J.J.C. Smart, P.F. Strawson, and many others. Philosophia also published papers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap. Philosophia is an international journal in scope, submissions and readership. The journal publishes contributions fitting within various philosophical traditions, but manifests a preference of the analytic tradition in the broad sense of commitment to clarity and responsibility. Besides papers in the traditional subfields of philosophy and its history, Philosophia also publishes work on topical subjects such as racism, silence of God, terrorism, the nature of philosophy, emotion, AIDS, scientific discovery, punishment, modality, and institutional theory of art. Philosophia welcomes a wide range of contributions to academic philosophy, covering all fields of philosophy. Contributions to the journal may take the form of topical papers, philosophical surveys of literature, symposia papers, short discussion notes, puzzles, profiles, book reviews and more extensive critical studies of new books. The journal includes a ''books revisited'' section where a book and its impact are reconsidered a decade or more after its appearance. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.Please read our Editorial Policies carefully before you submit your paper to this journal https://www.springer.com/gp/editorial-policies
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