PHILOSOPHIA最新文献

In Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, the agent has three options: a permissible act that saves no one, a wrongful act that saves only one child, or a supererogatory act that saves two children. Some may argue that if the agent is not going to save two children, she should save none rather than just one. However, this conclusion is counterintuitive. Although there are many proposed solutions to this problem, none of them provides a fully satisfactory answer. In this article, I argue that it is plausible to accept the Individualist Obligation Principle according to which, the agent is morally permitted to fulfill a prima facie obligation to save an individual in grave peril, provided that doing so demonstrates a substantial engagement with the individualized obligations to each individual involved.

Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue ‘The Cognitive Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness’, including brief introductions of the individual contributions.

The comment starts with a brief exposition of the Eroteric View put forth by Artūrs Logins. I then provide one friendly comment on the exact form of the normative question which is central to the view, and suggest that in addition to the question, ‘Why ought S to φ ?’, Logins should take the question, ‘Why is S permitted to φ?’ as definitive of normative reasons. In a more critical comment, I reflect on how normative explanatory reasons and normative reasoning reasons relate, calling into question Logins’s claim that the two kinds of reasons are fundamentally distinct. First, I argue that being a normative explanatory reason near enough guarantees being a normative reasoning reason; second, I argue that normative explanatory reasons as well as normative reasoning reasons can be weighed, and that they can be weighed against each other. But this causes trouble for the Eroteric View.

Comment on Philip Kitchers “What is the Use of Philosophy”, arguing that while Kitcher is right to insist on the practical relevance of philosophy one should be careful to distinguish this view from an instrumental understanding of philosophy. Maybe philosophy is of no use but still has an impact.

Drawing on past work, we introduce a new approach to the New Riddle of Induction, showing that the inductive projection of gruesome properties is unreliable under particular ideal conditions that are sufficient for the reliable inductive projection of non-gruesome properties. As an auxiliary to our account, we introduce rules for resolving conflicts between background information and the conclusions of otherwise reliable inductive inferences. Our approach to the New Riddle of Induction is quite permissive in the range of properties it recognizes as suitable for inductive projection, allowing for the inductive projection of highly gerrymandered non-natural properties. However, as an addendum to our discussion of the New Riddle, we show that natural properties do form a more reliable basis for inductive projection in cases where one’s sample is small.

Anyone who raises questions about a well-entrenched practice can expect at least some of the practitioners to offer rebuttals. I am grateful to those who view my critique of current analytic philosophy as flawed for taking time to endeavor to correct me. They will surely not be surprised to find me recalcitrant. But I hope they will conclude, as I do, that the present airing of disagreements is profitable.

This paper argues that polygamous marriage should be decriminalized only if certain conditions are met: (1) every party involved is able to enter and exit the marriage at all times, (2) governments promote social norms that respect equality of every sex, and (3) children’s well-being is protected. Four objections against the legalization of polygamy are examined and criticized. First, the structural inequality objection – polygamy should be illegal because the structure of polygamous marriage is inherently inegalitarian. Second, the bargaining inequality objection – polygamy should be illegal because, in inegalitarian liberal societies, it is more likely that those who choose to be the peripheral spouse in polygamous marriage would decide from unequal bargaining positions. Third, the male-dominated norms objection – polygamy should be illegal because, in social contexts where polygyny is much more popular than polyandry, legalizing polygamy would boost inequality between males and females. Fourth, the children’s well-being objection – polygamy should be illegal because it would likely inflict harm on children. I argue that these four objections fail to justify the criminalization of polygamy. Instead, polygamy should be legal under certain conditions that are not as demanding as polygamy’s critics propose.