{"title":"On the inefficiency of non-competes in low-wage labour markets","authors":"Tristan Potter, Bart Hobijn, André Kurmann","doi":"10.1111/ecca.12514","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the efficiency of non-compete agreements (NCAs) in an equilibrium model of labour turnover. The model is consistent with empirical studies showing that NCAs reduce turnover and average wages for low-wage workers. The model also predicts that, by reducing turnover, NCAs raise recruitment and employment. We show that optimal NCA policy: (i) is characterized by a Hosios-like condition that balances the benefits of higher employment against the costs of inefficient congestion and poaching; (ii) depends critically on the minimum wage; and (iii) alone cannot always achieve the constrained-efficient allocation—a result that also holds for optimal minimum wage policy—yet with both policies, efficiency is always attainable. To guide policymakers, we derive a sufficient statistic in the form of an easily computed employment threshold above which NCAs are necessarily inefficiently restrictive, and show that employment levels in current low-wage US labour markets typically exceed this threshold. Finally, we calibrate the model and show that Oregon's 2008 NCA ban for low-wage workers increased welfare modestly (by roughly 0.1%), and that if policymakers had also raised the minimum wage to its optimal level conditional on the enacted NCA ban (a 30% increase), then welfare would have increased more substantially—by over 1%.</p>","PeriodicalId":48040,"journal":{"name":"Economica","volume":"91 362","pages":"446-496"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economica","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12514","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study the efficiency of non-compete agreements (NCAs) in an equilibrium model of labour turnover. The model is consistent with empirical studies showing that NCAs reduce turnover and average wages for low-wage workers. The model also predicts that, by reducing turnover, NCAs raise recruitment and employment. We show that optimal NCA policy: (i) is characterized by a Hosios-like condition that balances the benefits of higher employment against the costs of inefficient congestion and poaching; (ii) depends critically on the minimum wage; and (iii) alone cannot always achieve the constrained-efficient allocation—a result that also holds for optimal minimum wage policy—yet with both policies, efficiency is always attainable. To guide policymakers, we derive a sufficient statistic in the form of an easily computed employment threshold above which NCAs are necessarily inefficiently restrictive, and show that employment levels in current low-wage US labour markets typically exceed this threshold. Finally, we calibrate the model and show that Oregon's 2008 NCA ban for low-wage workers increased welfare modestly (by roughly 0.1%), and that if policymakers had also raised the minimum wage to its optimal level conditional on the enacted NCA ban (a 30% increase), then welfare would have increased more substantially—by over 1%.
期刊介绍:
Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.