The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance.

IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20190261
Marika Cabral, Can Cui, Michael Dworsky
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Abstract

Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.

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保险需求与强制保险的理由:来自工人赔偿保险的证据》(The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance)。
工伤保险为工伤提供无过失保险,几乎在所有州都是强制性的。我们利用一个没有强制保险的独特市场的行政数据来估算对工伤保险的需求,并利用监管保费的更新来进行识别。我们发现,保费每增加 1%,投保率就会下降约 0.3%。根据这些估算值和成本数据,我们研究了政府干预以提高保险覆盖率的潜在理由。分析表明,在这种情况下,几种形式的市场失灵--如逆向选择、市场支配力和外部性--可能并不能证明强制措施的合理性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
122
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.
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