David Coyne, Itzik Fadlon, Shanthi P. Ramnath, Patricia K. Tong
We combine quasi-experimental variation in spousal death and age eligibility for survivors benefits using US tax records to study the effects on American households’ labor supply and the design of social security’s survivors insurance. Benefit eligibility at the exact age of 60 induces sharp reductions in the labor supply of newly widowed households, highlighting the value of survivors benefits and the liquidity they provide following the shock. Among eligible widows, the spousal death event induces no increases in labor supply, suggesting little residual need to self-insure. Using theory, we underscore the program’s protective insurance role and its high valuation among survivors. (JEL D12, D91, G22, G51, H55, J16, J22)
{"title":"Household Labor Supply and the Value of Social Security Survivors Benefits","authors":"David Coyne, Itzik Fadlon, Shanthi P. Ramnath, Patricia K. Tong","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190813","url":null,"abstract":"We combine quasi-experimental variation in spousal death and age eligibility for survivors benefits using US tax records to study the effects on American households’ labor supply and the design of social security’s survivors insurance. Benefit eligibility at the exact age of 60 induces sharp reductions in the labor supply of newly widowed households, highlighting the value of survivors benefits and the liquidity they provide following the shock. Among eligible widows, the spousal death event induces no increases in labor supply, suggesting little residual need to self-insure. Using theory, we underscore the program’s protective insurance role and its high valuation among survivors. (JEL D12, D91, G22, G51, H55, J16, J22)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141040985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Franklin, Clément A. C. Imbert, G. Abebe, Carolina Mejía-Mantilla
This paper evaluates a large urban public works program randomly rolled out across neighborhoods of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. We find the program increased public employment and reduced private labor supply among beneficiaries and improved local amenities in treated locations. We then combine a spatial equilibrium model and unique commuting data to estimate the spillover effects of the program on private sector wages across neighborhoods: under full program rollout, wages increased by 18.6 percent. Using our model, we show that welfare gains to the poor are six times larger when we include the indirect effects on private wages and local amenities. (JEL H76, I38, J22, J31, O15, O18, R23)
{"title":"Urban Public Works in Spatial Equilibrium: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia","authors":"S. Franklin, Clément A. C. Imbert, G. Abebe, Carolina Mejía-Mantilla","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220471","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates a large urban public works program randomly rolled out across neighborhoods of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. We find the program increased public employment and reduced private labor supply among beneficiaries and improved local amenities in treated locations. We then combine a spatial equilibrium model and unique commuting data to estimate the spillover effects of the program on private sector wages across neighborhoods: under full program rollout, wages increased by 18.6 percent. Using our model, we show that welfare gains to the poor are six times larger when we include the indirect effects on private wages and local amenities. (JEL H76, I38, J22, J31, O15, O18, R23)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141032337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I examine whether changing the form of disbursement of a microfinance loan enables female microfinance borrowers to overcome intra-household sharing pressure and grow their businesses. Using a field experiment with 3,000 borrowers in Uganda, I compare the disbursement of a loan as cash to disbursement onto a digital account. After 8 months, women who received their microfinance loan on the digital account had 11 percent higher (US$70) business capital and 15 percent higher (US$18) profits compared to those who received their loan as cash. Impacts were greatest for women who experienced pressure to share money with others in the household at baseline. (JEL C93, D13, G51, J16, O12, O16)
{"title":"Resisting Social Pressure in the Household Using Mobile Money: Experimental Evidence on Microenterprise Investment in Uganda","authors":"E. Riley","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220717","url":null,"abstract":"I examine whether changing the form of disbursement of a microfinance loan enables female microfinance borrowers to overcome intra-household sharing pressure and grow their businesses. Using a field experiment with 3,000 borrowers in Uganda, I compare the disbursement of a loan as cash to disbursement onto a digital account. After 8 months, women who received their microfinance loan on the digital account had 11 percent higher (US$70) business capital and 15 percent higher (US$18) profits compared to those who received their loan as cash. Impacts were greatest for women who experienced pressure to share money with others in the household at baseline. (JEL C93, D13, G51, J16, O12, O16)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141047161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We experimentally document persistence of suboptimal behavior despite ample opportunities to learn from feedback in a canonical updating problem where people suffer from base-rate neglect. Our results provide insights on the mechanisms hindering learning from feedback. Importantly, our results suggest mistakes are more likely to be persistent when they are driven by incorrect mental models that miss or misrepresent important aspects of the environment. Such models induce confidence in initial answers, limiting engagement with and learning from feedback. We substantiate these insights in an alternative scenario where individuals involved in a voting problem overlook the importance of being pivotal. (JEL D83, D91)
{"title":"Mental Models and Learning: The Case of Base-Rate Neglect","authors":"Ignacio Esponda, E. Vespa, S. Yuksel","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201004","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally document persistence of suboptimal behavior despite ample opportunities to learn from feedback in a canonical updating problem where people suffer from base-rate neglect. Our results provide insights on the mechanisms hindering learning from feedback. Importantly, our results suggest mistakes are more likely to be persistent when they are driven by incorrect mental models that miss or misrepresent important aspects of the environment. Such models induce confidence in initial answers, limiting engagement with and learning from feedback. We substantiate these insights in an alternative scenario where individuals involved in a voting problem overlook the importance of being pivotal. (JEL D83, D91)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140087007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin Ellison, Sang Seok Lee, Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke
How did countries recover from the Great Depression? In this paper, we explore the argument that leaving the gold standard helped by boosting inflationary expectations, lowering real interest rates, and stimulating interest-sensitive expenditures. We do so for a sample of 27 countries, using modern nowcasting methods and a new data-set containing more than 230,000 monthly and quarterly observations for over 1,500 variables. In those cases where the departure from gold happened on well-defined dates, inflationary expectations clearly rose in the wake of departure. Instrumental variable, difference-in-difference, and synthetic matching techniques suggest that the relationship is causal. (JEL E31, E32, E42, E43, F30, N10, N20)
{"title":"The Ends of 27 Big Depressions","authors":"Martin Ellison, Sang Seok Lee, Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke","doi":"10.1257/aer.20221479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221479","url":null,"abstract":"How did countries recover from the Great Depression? In this paper, we explore the argument that leaving the gold standard helped by boosting inflationary expectations, lowering real interest rates, and stimulating interest-sensitive expenditures. We do so for a sample of 27 countries, using modern nowcasting methods and a new data-set containing more than 230,000 monthly and quarterly observations for over 1,500 variables. In those cases where the departure from gold happened on well-defined dates, inflationary expectations clearly rose in the wake of departure. Instrumental variable, difference-in-difference, and synthetic matching techniques suggest that the relationship is causal. (JEL E31, E32, E42, E43, F30, N10, N20)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139127977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—decoupling—to study both problems at once. When decoupling works, everything we know from the separate analyses carries over, but interesting interactions also arise. We provide simple tests for whether decoupling is valid. We develop and numerically implement an algorithm to calculate the decoupled solution and check its validity. We also provide primitives for decoupling to work and analyze several extensions. (JEL D82, D86)
{"title":"Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection","authors":"Hector Chade","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220100","url":null,"abstract":"While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—decoupling—to study both problems at once. When decoupling works, everything we know from the separate analyses carries over, but interesting interactions also arise. We provide simple tests for whether decoupling is valid. We develop and numerically implement an algorithm to calculate the decoupled solution and check its validity. We also provide primitives for decoupling to work and analyze several extensions. (JEL D82, D86)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139126268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During World War II, the US government’s Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) supported one of the largest public investments in applied R&D in US history. Using data on all OSRD-funded invention, we show this shock had a formative impact on the US innovation system, catalyzing technology clusters across the country, with accompanying increases in high-tech entrepreneur-ship and employment. These effects persist until at least the 1970s and appear to be driven by agglomerative forces and endogenous growth. In addition to creating technology clusters, wartime R&D permanently changed the trajectory of overall US innovation in the direction of OSRD-funded technologies. (JEL H56, N42, N72, O31, O33, O38, R11)
{"title":"America, Jump-Started: World War II R&D and the Takeoff of the US Innovation System","authors":"D. Gross, B. Sampat","doi":"10.1257/aer.20221365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221365","url":null,"abstract":"During World War II, the US government’s Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) supported one of the largest public investments in applied R&D in US history. Using data on all OSRD-funded invention, we show this shock had a formative impact on the US innovation system, catalyzing technology clusters across the country, with accompanying increases in high-tech entrepreneur-ship and employment. These effects persist until at least the 1970s and appear to be driven by agglomerative forces and endogenous growth. In addition to creating technology clusters, wartime R&D permanently changed the trajectory of overall US innovation in the direction of OSRD-funded technologies. (JEL H56, N42, N72, O31, O33, O38, R11)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139019113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A main focus in economics is how to design optimal policies in second-best situations, which often requires a trade-off between giving some individuals more than they deserve, false positives, and others less than they deserve, false negatives. This paper provides novel evidence on people’s second-best fairness preferences from large-scale experimental studies in the United States and Norway. The majority of people are more concerned with false negatives than with false positives, but we document substantial heterogeneity in second-best fairness preferences between the countries and across the political spectrum. The findings shed light on the political economy of social insurance and redistribution. (JEL D63, D72, D78, H23, I38)
{"title":"Second-Best Fairness: The Trade-Off between False Positives and False Negatives","authors":"A. Cappelen, Cornelius Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211015","url":null,"abstract":"A main focus in economics is how to design optimal policies in second-best situations, which often requires a trade-off between giving some individuals more than they deserve, false positives, and others less than they deserve, false negatives. This paper provides novel evidence on people’s second-best fairness preferences from large-scale experimental studies in the United States and Norway. The majority of people are more concerned with false negatives than with false positives, but we document substantial heterogeneity in second-best fairness preferences between the countries and across the political spectrum. The findings shed light on the political economy of social insurance and redistribution. (JEL D63, D72, D78, H23, I38)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84692769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the consequences of noisy information aggregation for investment. Market imperfections create endogenous rents that cause overinvestment in upside risks and underinvestment in downside risks. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with easy scalability of investment. In general equilibrium, the shareholders’ collective attempts to boost value of individual firms leads to a novel externality operating through price that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks. (JEL D21, D25, D83, G14, G32, G41)
{"title":"Imperfect Financial Markets and Investment Inefficiencies","authors":"Elı́as Albagli, C. Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski","doi":"10.1257/aer.20170725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170725","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the consequences of noisy information aggregation for investment. Market imperfections create endogenous rents that cause overinvestment in upside risks and underinvestment in downside risks. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with easy scalability of investment. In general equilibrium, the shareholders’ collective attempts to boost value of individual firms leads to a novel externality operating through price that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks. (JEL D21, D25, D83, G14, G32, G41)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90591218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study the economic value of obesity—a status symbol in poor countries associated with raised health risks. Randomizing decision-makers in Kampala, Uganda to view weight-manipulated portraits, I find that obesity is perceived as a reliable signal of wealth but not of beauty or health. Thus, leveraging a real-stakes experiment involving professional loan officers, I show that being obese facilitates access to credit. The large obesity premium, comparable to raising borrower self-reported earnings by over 60 percent, is driven by asymmetric information and drops significantly when providing more financial information. Notably, obesity benefits and wealth-signaling value are commonly overestimated, suggesting market distortions. (JEL D82, G21, G51, I12, O16, Z13)
{"title":"Worth Your Weight: Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of Obesity in Low-Income Countries","authors":"E. Macchi","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211879","url":null,"abstract":"I study the economic value of obesity—a status symbol in poor countries associated with raised health risks. Randomizing decision-makers in Kampala, Uganda to view weight-manipulated portraits, I find that obesity is perceived as a reliable signal of wealth but not of beauty or health. Thus, leveraging a real-stakes experiment involving professional loan officers, I show that being obese facilitates access to credit. The large obesity premium, comparable to raising borrower self-reported earnings by over 60 percent, is driven by asymmetric information and drops significantly when providing more financial information. Notably, obesity benefits and wealth-signaling value are commonly overestimated, suggesting market distortions. (JEL D82, G21, G51, I12, O16, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83171292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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