The Real Effects of PCAOB Inspection Reports on the M&A Deals of Non-Big 4 Accounting Firms

Clive Lennox, Xi Wu
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Abstract

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important way for non-Big 4 accounting firms to grow their businesses. Non-Big 4 firms also account for the vast majority of PCAOB inspections. Consistent with negative inspection reports signaling low quality at inspected firms, we find that non-Big 4 accounting firms conduct fewer M&A deals after they receive negative inspection reports. Additional analyses support our hypothesized signaling mechanism: (1) the chilling effect of inspection reports on M&A activity is stronger when the inspected firm’s business is focused on public company audits, (2) the effect is stronger when stakeholders at the target firm know less about the acquirer because the acquirer is located in a different city, and (3) clients at the target firm switch to new firms rather than move over to the acquirer if the acquirer received a negative inspection report prior to the M&A date. JEL Classifications: D82; G34; G38; M42; M48.
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PCAOB 检查报告对非四大会计师事务所并购交易的实际影响
并购 (M&As) 是非四大会计师事务所发展业务的重要途径。非四大会计师事务所也占 PCAOB 检查的绝大多数。与负面检查报告表明被检查企业质量低下的情况一致,我们发现非四大会计师事务所在收到负面检查报告后进行的并购交易较少。其他分析支持了我们假设的信号机制:(1)当被检查事务所的业务集中于上市公司审计时,检查报告对并购活动的寒蝉效应更强;(2)当目标事务所的利益相关者对收购方的了解较少(因为收购方位于不同城市)时,寒蝉效应更强;(3)如果收购方在并购日期前收到负面检查报告,目标事务所的客户会转向新的事务所,而不是转向收购方。JEL 分类:D82;G34;G38;M42;M48。
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