{"title":"Invisible and indispensable: Using the lowly request for proposals to advance public value","authors":"Weston Merrick, Pete Bernardy, Patrick Carter","doi":"10.1111/puar.13807","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Requests for Proposals (RFP) may be the pinnacle of bureaucratic mundanity. Yet, hidden within this apparent monotony are powerful tools to advance public values. Federal, state, and local government grants deploy staggering sums, reaching into the hundreds of billions of dollars annually. With these distributions, the executive branch is often delegated substantial discretion. These are choices of consequence, but little support exists for public managers tasked with this work. This article examines the potential to improve administrative decision‐making by enhancing our understanding of how discretion is authorized and applied regarding RFPs. Drawing from professional experience, we create a framework to identify dimensions of discretion in these proposals and apply it to a Minnesota case. We end with a call for academics and practitioners to better partner on empirical inquiry that improves RFP administration; in doing so, there is immense potential to help civil servants to improve outcomes for the public.","PeriodicalId":48431,"journal":{"name":"Public Administration Review","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Administration Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13807","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Requests for Proposals (RFP) may be the pinnacle of bureaucratic mundanity. Yet, hidden within this apparent monotony are powerful tools to advance public values. Federal, state, and local government grants deploy staggering sums, reaching into the hundreds of billions of dollars annually. With these distributions, the executive branch is often delegated substantial discretion. These are choices of consequence, but little support exists for public managers tasked with this work. This article examines the potential to improve administrative decision‐making by enhancing our understanding of how discretion is authorized and applied regarding RFPs. Drawing from professional experience, we create a framework to identify dimensions of discretion in these proposals and apply it to a Minnesota case. We end with a call for academics and practitioners to better partner on empirical inquiry that improves RFP administration; in doing so, there is immense potential to help civil servants to improve outcomes for the public.
期刊介绍:
Public Administration Review (PAR), a bi-monthly professional journal, has held its position as the premier outlet for public administration research, theory, and practice for 75 years. Published for the American Society for Public Administration,TM/SM, it uniquely serves both academics and practitioners in the public sector. PAR features articles that identify and analyze current trends, offer a factual basis for decision-making, stimulate discussion, and present leading literature in an easily accessible format. Covering a diverse range of topics and featuring expert book reviews, PAR is both exciting to read and an indispensable resource in the field.